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The political rhetoric of the Second Party Era has not always been viewed as intellectually or even on 
occasion politically meaningful.  In the opening to his book The Politics of Individualism Lawrence 
Frederick Kohl relates a story in which he runs into a former professor he has not seen in some time, 
who expressed open disappointment when Kohl revealed he was working on 19th Century political 
rhetoric.  The Second Party Era and its ideal have been somewhat overshadowed by its legends, 
which tend to revolve around tales of staggering corruption.  In addition, when viewed from a 
cynical 21st century perspective, it is hard to take the words of Second Party Era politicians seriously.  
Their rhetoric was contained sweeping promises of wealth beyond measure, and threatened the 
collapse of human civilisation, and even decency, if their arguments were not supported and 
implemented.  The public at large has also been dealt with in a fairly condescending manner, and the 
advent of white manhood suffrage is perceived by some writer to have merely been an opportunity 
for politicians to hoodwink an unwitting electorate that was insufficiently informed to make 
decisions on anything other than visceral reaction.  This is however unfair, and enforces a modern 
cynicism upon interpretations and examinations of the political rhetoric of the period.  Politicians of 
this period meant what they said, that both the leaders and individual citizens of the United States 
were deeply concerned with the nature of democracy, and how to create a genuinely egalitarian 
society.  Federalism, and any form of American aristocracy was dead.  Both the Whigs and the 
Democrats considered themselves inheritors of the Jeffersonian mantle.  However they were 
pursuing the goal of an egalitarian society in nation rapidly evolving in demographic, economic and 
financial terms.  These changes were creating a society of competing interests, and it was to the task 
of regulating and uniting these interests that political rhetoric addressed itself. 
     The rise of machine politics of the type pioneered by Martin Van Buren and the Albany Regency, a 
group of young politicians who emerged onto the political scene in the late 1810s confirmed this.  
The group was made up of men who would become prominent in New York politics and the nation 
over the next 40 years; William L. Marcy, Benjamin F. Butler, Silas Wright, Edwin Croswell, Azariah C. 
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Flagg and Churchill C. Cambreleng.1  In 1821 the Regency and its supporters dominated the 
Constitutional Convention of that year, holding 110 of 126 seats.2  The Constitution they pushed 
through did away with property qualifications for voting, replacing them instead with a requirement 
to pay taxes, work on the state roads or to serve in the militia.3  Politicians began to address their 
rhetoric to a far larger number of constituents.  The rhetoric they used necessarily changed.  While it 
shifted to embrace democratic concepts and institutions, politicians also developed rhetorical 
strategies which aimed to create and maintain the large coalitions of fractious politicians which 
made up the mass democratic parties of the second party system.  This became increasingly difficult 
throughout the period, as the Second Party Era evolved. 
     The rhetoric they used has been viewed with cynicism, often interpreted as rabble rousing efforts 
by politicians hungry for power or wealth.  However while the corruption of the era was staggering 
by modern standards, it was not interpreted as such by contemporaries.  When William Marcy made 
ŚŝƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌƐŐŽƚŚĞƐƉŽŝůƐ ? ?ŚĞŬŶĞǁŚĞǁŽƵůĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŚŝƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŚŝƐ
constituents and party members for whom political triumph promised very real, measurable pay 
offs.  To Americans, political victory meant reward, just as much of the political rhetoric of the era 
promised rewards  W prosperity, freedom, access to new educational or transportation facilities, 
healthcare and employment.  This was not a cynical age, but rather an age when citizens were used 
to seeing their politicians pay out on promises made on the campaign trail.  Their grandfathers had 
fought for freedom and independence.  Their leaders had delivered upon it.  Second Party Era 
politicians offered prosperity and an egalitarian society of wealth and opportunity. 
     Hope for reward from the future was tempered by a growing fear of change.  Social reform 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŐƌĞǁŝŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ?ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇ ?ƚŽĂůƚĞƌŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ?
attitudes towards religious practice and thought, alcohol consumption, the role of the state in the 
                                                          
1
 Milton M. Klein (ed), The Empire State: A History of New York, New York 2001, p. 296. 
Note ± Benjamin F. Butler should not be confused with the Civil War general of the same name. 
2
 Ibid. p. 302. 
3
 Ibid. p. 303. 
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care of the infirm, the morality of slavery, and myriad other issues.  During the Second Party Era, the 
political parties of New York were confronted by political events that began to test their cohesion; 
the Bank War of the 1830s, the Mexican War of the 1840s, and, always developing, sectional 
hostility over the issue of slavery.  As these issues were debated, the population of New York State 
skyrocketed, propelled by a drop in infant mortality and a huge influx of immigrants during the 
1840s.  In response to these changes and influences, rhetoric evolved to attempt to unify the often 
fractious factions jostling one another for different causes, either embracing or rejecting the changes 
occurring all around them. 
     New York had a large and heterogeneous population, and its geographical position had already 
made it the most important economic centre of the nation in 1828; she would go on to become the 
pre-eminent economic, financial and mercantile state of the nation by 1840.  The arrival of 
thousands of immigrant Americans created new cultural tensions and new political forces, both in 
defence of and opposition to immigrant communities.  New York was also the site of some of the 
most radical and aggressive reform movements of the era.  The counties of Western New York, 
ŶŝĐŬŶĂŵĞĚƚŚĞ “ƵƌŶƚ-KǀĞƌ ?Žƌ “/ŶĨĞĐƚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ? ?ǁĞƌĞƚŚĞƐŝƚĞŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐ
Protestant revivals.  Known as the Second Great Awakening, these revivals swept again and again 
across this section of New York.  They inspired reform movements such as prison and asylum reform, 
temperance movements and educational reform efforts which played active roles in state politics.  
dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐĂůƐŽĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚ ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ
designed to appeal to and mobilise mass democratic populations.  The struggles of these 
organisations, both Democratic and later, Whig, in both internal and external terms, would produce 
many of the most influential politicians of the era.  The intensely complex partisan political conflict 
of New York was galvanised by a growing and combative free press.  In addition, besides the major 
parties the politics of New York would be heavily influenced by influential third parties that emerged 
in response to specific crises and social movements and developments.  New York had a tremendous 
spectrum of views and distinct groups that are suggestive of trends elsewhere in the United States. 
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     There are maŶǇǁŽƌŬƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŽĨŐƌĞĂƚƵƐĞǁŚĞŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨEĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚWĂƌƚǇƌĂ ?ĂŶŝĞůtĂůŬĞƌ,ŽǁĞ ?ƐWhat Hath God Wrought and Sean 
tŝůĞŶƚǌ ? ?The Rise of American Democracy trace divisions in conceptions of democracy which 
developed after the victory of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and continued to become more developed 
ĂŶĚĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝǀŝůtĂƌŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?,ĂƌƌǇ> ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ?Liberty 
and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America, shows the way in which politics during the Jacksonian 
period were heavily influenced by the notion of a balance between freedom and individual and 
governmental power, and how this was one of the defining elements of political conflict in this 
period  W an important concept to understand when analysing Second Party Era political rhetoric.  A 
useful broad history of the State of New York, The Empire State, edited by Milton M. Klein provides 
ĂŶĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĐĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ŶŽůĚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?ĂǀŝĚůůŝƐ ?A History of New York State 
ŝƐĂůƐŽǀĞƌǇƵƐĞĨƵůĨŽƌĂďƌŽĂĚŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?tŽƌŬƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƚŽ
political conceptions and philosophies are similarly common on the broad history of the nation, but 
less common when specifically dealing with New York, or with the antebellum period, typically 
covering a broader area and time span.  Indispensable for a study of New York in these terms, 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝƐDĂƌŬ> ?ĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛthe Revolution in the New York Party Systems 1840  W 1860, which 
provides a superb examination of the pressures which led to the collapse of the Second Party System 
in the state.  Berger highlights particularly the way in which pre-existing intra-party divisions were 
exacerbated by the slavery issue.   
     There are many excellent books that debunk the theory that the Whig Party had no political 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇďĞǇŽŶĚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŶĚƌĞǁ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ŽƌƵŶƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĂǀĂƌŝĐĞ ? ?DŝĐŚĂĞů,Žůƚ ?Ɛmagnum 
opus, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party is a vital aid to understanding the development 
of Jacksonian opposition into a coherent party.  Holt highlights the way the fortunes and misfortunes 
of the Whig Party were heavily influenced by their internal divisions (often of a sectional nature) and 
their competitive relationship with the Democratic Party.  He makes an effective argument that the 
Whigs were far more than simply a collection of politicians opposed to Jackson however, charting 
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their development of, and battle to promote, a coherent political philosophy.  Daniel Walker Howe ?Ɛ
The Political Culture of American Whigs In relation to the other sources and the historiographical 
debate as to the overall meaningfulness of the rhetoric of the Second Party Era, Howe rejects the 
idea that social conflict in Jacksonian America was exaggerated.  He notes the violent nature of the 
society in which this rhetoric was deployed, and argues that Whig  W Democratic conflict was actually 
an expression of broad divisions in American society.  In regard to the historiographical question of 
similarities between Whigs and Democrats, Howe argues that there was often a consensus on means 
but not on ends between Jacksonians and Whigs. 
     There are several examinations of the Democratic Party, and of Jacksonianism.  John William 
Ward, in his work Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age, examines the meaning that the image of 
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŚĞůĚĨŽƌŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŵĂŐĞŝƐĂĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞƐŽĨ
will, nature and providence, and that these themes represent impulses present in American society 
during the Second Party Era.  Marvin Meyers, in his work The Jacksonian Persuasion argues that 
party conflicts were not merely public spectacles, but rather moral dramas, with salvation or 
damnation in the balance.  He points out that Jacksonianism cleared the way for laissez faire 
capitalism whilst holding in their political conscience an ideal of a chaste republican order that 
ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŐƌĞĞĚ ?ĞǆƚƌĂǀĂŐĂŶĐĞ ?ƌĂƉŝĚŵŽƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐ ?:ŽŚŶƐŚǁŽƌƚŚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬAgrarians 
and Aristocrats is also useful for developing ideas about the central philosophies of both Whigs and 
Democrats; however I reject his argument that Whigs were by definition opposed to egalitarianism. 
     Indispensable for consideration of concepts of democracy during this period iƐ>ĞĞĞŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
Concept of Jacksonian Democracy.  Benson rejects the distinction traditionally made between Whigs 
and Democrats as the parties of aristocracy and democracy respectively.  He also points out that the 
Democrats and Whigs used the same kind of language, and that in fact the differences between 
them had more to do with means than ends; positive vs. negative theories of the role of 
government.  Examine the leadership of both parties Benson rejects the argument they came from 
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distinct socio-economic groups, finding numerous commonalities between them.  Also useful is 
<ŽŚů ?ƐThe Politics of Individualism, in which he stresses the individualism enforced by the nature of 
American society during the Second Party Era.  He cites radical economic and social change and 
argues that this placed a new and unfamiliar burden on the individual, who was shorn of traditional 
and established social ties and thrust into an impersonal economic and social system.  Americans 
responded to the new pressures created by a society that stressed individualism with vary degrees 
of success.  They divided into political parties on the basis of that success  W those comfortable with 
change became Whigs, vice versa Democrats.  For a study specifically on political language Andrew 
RobĞƌƚƐŽŶ ?ƐThe Language of Democracy, while broad, contains a useful chapter on the Second Party 
Era that highlights the way in which improved communications led to politicians directing rhetoric 
more at their supporters in the electorate than their opponentƐŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶŝĞůd ?ZŽŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence focuses partly on New York, 
particularly on the Constitutional Convention of 1846, and notes the declining popularity of a 
political language that glorified majoritarianism in the 1840s and 1850s. 
     This study focuses on how New York politicians used abstractions and keywords of political 
idealism for ordinary political purposes as part of the daily contest between parties.  It frames the 
development and evolution of rhetorical strategy over the second party system period, considers 
major questions relating to this topic.  This study argues that over the course of the period, both the 
Whig and Democratic Parties used political rhetoric to create broad umbrella identities, beneath 
which they were able to gather large numbers of politicians of different political factions from across 
the broad political spectrum.  The aim of these identities was to establish reliable partisan majorities 
which could be used to deliver electoral victories.  This study also considers the breakdown of these 
identities which began in the mid-1840s, and culminated in the collapse of the New York Whig Party 
and the schism of the New York Democratic Party in 1854.  In conclusion, this study explains why the 
rhetorical strategies which had developed over the 1830s and 1840s were unable to adapt to, and in 
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fact were one of the causes of, the pressure placed upon the second party system in New York by 
the rise of slavery as the major issue concerning the nation in the late 1840s and 1850s. 
     Between 1828 and 1846, the Whig and Democratic Parties of New York had substantial electoral 
success.  They developed reliable blocs of voters that made New York elections hotly contested 
affairs, in which the parties vied for tiny fractions of the electorate in order to achieve a margin of 
victory.  They achieved this through the use of rhetorical strategies that developed the identity of 
the party in clear terms with the public.  These identities were multi-faceted  W they encompassed 
not only economic, but social and moral attitudes.  Over the course of the years between the 
election of Andrew Jackson, and the 1846 Constitutional Convention, these strategies allowed the 
two parties to develop broad political organisations that encompassed large numbers of politicians 
representing a spectrum of political attitudes.  However as the Second Party Era Progressed, distinct 
weaknesses in this rhetorical strategy emerged.  As the parties were confronted by the issues and 
events of the mid-19th ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐďĞĐĂŵĞŵŽƌĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĞĨŝǆĞĚ ?ĂĐŚŶĞǁƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
challenge reduced the flexibility of the party identity, creating division and hostility within the party 
structures.  By the late 1840s, both parties were riven by internal turmoil.  When this issue of slavery 
forced its way into public debate in the late 1840s and 1850s, the rhetorical strategies the New York 
Parties had developed over the previous two decades proved unable to cope, and in fact 












     /Ŷ ? ? ? ?EĞǁzŽƌŬĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂƚǁŽƉĂƌƚǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ
Jeffersonian Republicans.  Historian Lee Benson argued convincingly that no such party as the 
National Republicans existed in New York in 1828, and that in fact the supposition of its existence 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚEĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?4  However over the previous 
ĚĞĐĂĚĞDĂƌƚŝŶsĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ƐƵĐŬƚĂŝůĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶWĂƌƚǇŚĂĚĐŽŵĞƚŽĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞ
New York politics.  A loose group of politicians, who may be called Anti-Jacksonians, opposed them.  
These included the Anti-Masons, who had been inspired by the disappearance of William Morgan, a 
disgruntled Mason who had published an exposé on the rituals and practices of the Masonic order, 
in 1826.  Morgan was subsequently imprisoned and then abducted.  The real source of Anti-Masonry 
however was not ƚŚĞĂďĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞůĞƚŚĂƌŐǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
crime.  Influential editors such as Thurlow Weed of the Albany Evening Journal stressed the dangers 
of political power in the hands of men whose primary loyalty was not to the nation, but to their 
ĐĂďĂůŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?&ƌĞĞŵĂƐŽŶƌǇ ?ĂůůŽǁĞĚŵĞŶƚŽ “ƉƌŽƉŽƵŶĚĂŶĂĐƚŽĨǁŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ
discuss it, and though it should be disapproved by the company, the propounder [sic] must remain 
ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƵŶƉƵŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?5 Anti-Masonic rhetoric focused on perceived threats to 
egalitarian values that were becoming increasingly influential in New York politics.  The rhetoric of 
New York politics before 1834, and the emergence of the Whig Party, was heavily influenced by the 
rhetorical interaction between these three major groups, and this interaction would provide the 
foundation for political rhetoric in New York during the Second Party Era. 
     Political rhetoric during the 1828 presidential election in New York reflected both the inchoate 
nature of opposition to Jackson, and the lack of a two party system in New York at that time.  
However every faction active in New York politics used their rhetoric to defend the egalitarian values 
popular in New York following the advent of universal white male suffrage.  Although in the 1828 
                                                          
4 Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case, New York 1964, p. 29. 
5 Henry Dana Ward, The Anti Masonic Review and Magazine, New York 1828, p. 215. 
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election rhetoric focussed on the individuals, it had a broader meaning than a simple indictment or 
ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĞŝƚŚĞƌĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?dŚĞƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂƐŝĚĞĂů
Americans, and, in doing so, they presented contrasting views on the virtues appropriate to political 
leadership and the nature of that leadership in relation to egalitarian democracy. 
     Anti-Jacksonian rhetoric focussed on moral indictments of General Andrew Jackson that partly 
reflect the disorganised nature of Anti-Jacksonians  W they could not unite on policy issues.  Their 
rhetoric was marked by themes that became common in the rhetoric of the Whig Party.  Anti-
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ůŝĨĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶ “ƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇĨůĂŐƌĂŶƚǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚǁĂŶƚŽĨĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ? ?6 They portrayed Jackson as warlike, 
undisciplined and intemperate, arguing he could not be trusted to wield the power of the office.  
sŝĐĞ “ŵĂǇindeed be said to have acquired a degree of legitimacy, if the only republic on earth, the 
preservation of which depends on the virtue of citizens and rulers, should elevate to the first office 
ŝŶŝƚƐŐŝĨƚĂŵĂŶŽĨďůŽŽĚƐƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶĚŝŵŵŽƌĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ?ǁĂƌned a Republican Convention at Utica, 
New York, friendly to the re-election of John Quincy Adams.7  dŚĞǇĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŚŝƐƚŽĚĂŵƐ ?
 “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚŐƌĂĚĞ QĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂůŵŽƐƚƵŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞĚĂƐƐŝĚƵŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐ
which assumed that this comparŝƐŽŶǁĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝĐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐǇ ?8  The anti-Jackson 
coalition focussed on character attacks that presented Jackson as a threat to democracy.  Rhetoric 
focussed on comparisons of Jackson and Caesar and the danger of an overly powerful executive.  
This rhetoric was designed to appeal to opponents of the Albany Regency, by arguing that it had 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌďǇŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŝƚƐĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ? “ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨ
influencing its schemes and of obtaining its assent to selfŝƐŚĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?9  ǇůŝŶŬŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞ
ƚǇƌĂŶƚ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŽƚŚĞůďĂŶǇZĞŐĞŶĐǇĂƐĂƚǇƌĂŶŶŝĐĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ŷƚŝ-Jacksonians used the 
                                                          
6 Republican Party (N.Y.), State Convention:  Proceedings and Address of the Republican Young Men of the 
State of New York, Assembled at Utica on the 12th Day of August, 1828, Utica 1828, p. 13-14. 
7 Ibid, p. 17. 
8 National Republican Party (N.Y), Address of the State Convention of delegates from the several counties of the 
state New-York, Albany 1828, p. 16. 
9 Ibid, p. 23. 
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language of egalitarianism to communicate with the electorate.10   At the core of all New York 
rhetoric was a conflict over how best to effect egalitarian economic opportunity; this conflict would 
provide the basis for Second Party Era rhetoric in New York. 
     Democratic endorsements of Jackson shifted the debate into one over the nature of leadership in 
an egalitarian dĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŚĞůĚ “ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŝƚĂŵĂŶĞƋƵĂůůǇĨŽƌĐŝǀŝů ?ĂƐĨŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ?
rule: strong native sense ? correct and discriminating judgment ? wisdom in contrivance, and 
promptness and firmness in execution ? a knowledge of mankind, and unbending integƌŝƚǇ ? ?11  
Jacksonians presented their candidate as the ideal American in terms that did not have a strong 
intellectual or professional basis.  The Jacksonian definition of suitability for office stressed qualities 
easily attained by any individual, without requiring an expensive and superior education.  They 
ƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚĚĂŵƐ ?ůŽŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƐƉƌŽŽĨŽĨĂĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŽƌŝĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ
that the  “ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĚǇŶĂƐƚǇŚĂƐĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞĚĂůůƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŝŐƵĞ ?ŝŵƉƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƐĞůĨŝƐŚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?
intŽŽŶĞƉŚĂůĂŶǆŽĨĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĂƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?12  Jacksonian rhetoric focussed on 
presenting their candidate as the ideal choice of an egalitarian electorate by maintaining a strong 
anti-establishment, anti-intellectual basis.  This developed a poǁĞƌĨƵůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ “ŚĂǀĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐ
ƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨ “ŚĂǀĞŶŽƚƐ ? ?>ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ<ŽŚůĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŬĞǇĞĚŝŶƚŽ
prevalent anxieties and hopes in US society which were the principal cause of division within the 
electorate between Whigs and Democrats.13 
     Debate over the morality of the 1824 election result was central to the rhetoric of the 1828 
election.  This debate illustrated the divisions present in the two campaigns regarding the nature of 
political leadership and authority.  :ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶƐĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚĚĂŵƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚďĂƌŐĂŝŶ ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ? W
                                                          
10 Ibid, p. 16. 
11 Republican Party (N.Y.), Address of the Republican General Committee of Young Men of the City and County 
of New York, Friendly to the Election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, to The Republican Electors of the 
State of New-York, New York 1828, p. 15. 
12 Garret Gilbert, An Address delivered at a meeting of the Republican Electors of the Ninth Ward of the City of 
EĞǁzŽƌŬ ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ'ůŽƌŝŽƵƐĂƚƚůĞŽĨEĞǁ Orleans, New York 1828, p. 20. 
13 Lawrence Frederick Kohl, The Politics of Individualism: Parties and American Character in the Jacksonian Era, 
New York 1989 p. 21-22 (Democratic fears) & p. 63-65 (Whig hopes). 
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the accusation that Adams had colluded with Henry Clay of Kentucky, promising Clay the office of 
Secretary of State in return for his support in the House decision on the presidency.  Jacksonians 
furiously denounced the decision of the House, pointing out that Jackson had held the largest share 
of the popular vote, making him clearly, they argued, the choice of The People.  Adams and Clay had 
therefore conspired to rob The People of their chosen representative.  Anti-Jacksonian rhetoric 
ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĚĂŵƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĚĞĐƌŝĞĚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽ “ĨŝůůƚŚĞůĂŶĚǁŝƚŚĐůĂŵŽƵƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞright of the House of Representatives to elect [Mr. 
ĚĂŵƐ ? ? ?ĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ “ĚŝƐŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďůĞĂŶĚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?14  An Adams 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶEĞǁzŽƌŬŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚ “been asserted that Mr. Clay, in voting for Mr. Adams, 
acted against the instruction of his constituents.  We admit that the Legislature of Kentucky did 
ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ QŵĞŵďĞƌƐ QĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŽǀŽƚĞĨŽƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ďƵƚǁĞĚĞŶǇƚŚĞŝƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?
broadly and in toto ? ?15 [italics in original text]  Differing attitudes toward the way in which 
representatives were responsible to their constituents is an example of the influence of egalitarian 
thought in New York political rhetoric.  However this is not proof of an anti-egalitarian basis to the 
political ideology of the Adams campaign.  Rather it highlights different interpretations of leadership 
roles.  Adams men believed that egalitarian democracy meant choosing who would lead the 
community  W Jacksonians argued that egalitarian Democracy meant electing leaders who simply 
carried out the wishes of their constituents, and did not seek to shape their opinions or actions. 
     Jacksonian rhetoric sought to redefine how constituents understood their relationship to their 
representatives, presenting the people not only as the ultimate source of their authority, but also as 
arbiters of the mandate of ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚďĂƌŐĂŝŶ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂ
                                                          
14  Republican Party (N.Y.), Address of the Republican General Committee of Young Men of the City and County 
of New York, Friendly to the Election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, to The Republican Electors of the 
State of New-York, New York 1828, p. 4 Col II  W p.5 Col I. [For the specific states these delegates hailed from, 
please see the original text]. 
15 Republican Party (N.Y.), State Convention:  Proceedings and Address of the Republican Young Men of the 
State of New York, Assembled at Utica on the 12th Day of August, 1828, Utica 1828, p. 17  
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 “ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞspirit ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?16 [Italics in original text]  Jacksonian rhetoric encouraged 
a reinterpretation of widely accepted constitutional principles, such as the right of Congress to 
choose the President in the 1824 election, and, during the Bank War, the constitutionality of a 
national bank.  Jacksonians took advantage of the expansion of the electorate to reframe political 
debate in terms that the majority of the electorate found easy to understand  W simple messages that 
stressed the importance of common virtues and egalitarian values.17  Thus Jacksonians argued 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽƌƚŚĂƚŽĨĚĂŵƐŵĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚĚĂŵƐŚĂĚŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞĚ ? “ŝŶ
the ŵŽƐƚƐŚĂŵĞůĞƐƐŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?
election.18  Jacksonian rhetoric stressed the authority of the people over that of their representatives 
ďǇĨŽĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐĂůůĞŐĞĚĂďƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŐŶŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů
ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŽĨĚĂŵƐ ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǇĚŽŝŶŐƐŽƚŚĞǇƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĐĂƐƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ “ƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞƐWĂƌƚǇ ? ?ďǇ
accusing Adams of violating rights that did not exist.   
     Adams supporters attempted to derail Bucktail efforts by attacking their organisation and party 
structure.  Adams men argued that they sought to 
ĞŵĂŶĐŝƉĂƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĨĞƚƚĞƌƐ ŽĨ Ă ĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ Q ƉƌŽƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ƚĂůĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ
patriotism, dispensing the patronage of the State in reckless profusion on an 
illiberal and mercenary press, filling the offices of the State with men 
unknown by any public services, ungifted with talent, unfaithful to democratic 
principles, and bending their whole powers to the purposes of selfish 
aggrandizement.19 
Again, there was an egalitarian basis to the rhetoric  W that the Albany Regency held too much power, 
it corrupted the Democratic system, and it created a select number of men of wealth and political 
power whose status was established by their party rather than by the will of the electorate.  
                                                          
16 Republican Party (N.Y.), Address of the Republican General Committee of Young Men of the City and County 
of New York, Friendly to the Election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, to The Republican Electors of the 
State of New-York, New York 1828, p. 5. 
17 &ŽƌĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐĂŶĚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐĞĞŶĚƌĞǁt ?ZŽďĞƌƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790-1900 (1995), p. 68-96. 
18 Republican Party (N.Y.), Address of the Republican General Committee of Young Men of the City and County 
of New York, Friendly to the Election of Andrew Jackson to the Presidency, to The Republican Electors of the 
State of New-York, New York 1828, p. 11. 
19 Republican Party (N.Y.), State Convention:  Proceedings and Address of the Republican Young Men of the 
State of New York, Assembled at Utica on the 12th Day of August, 1828, Utica 1828, p. 23. 
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Jacksonians, in their refutation of these accusations, sought to reform popular conceptions of 
suitability for office.  Senator William L. Marcy of New York declared that to victors in political 
ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚƐ “ďĞůŽŶŐƚŚĞƐƉŽŝůƐŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ? ?20  Jacksonians argued that success in political competition 
gave the party not only the right, but the responsibility to award patronage among its followers.  
Parties were the channel through which the people expressed their will, legitimised at the ballot box.  
The appointment of individuals on the basis of party affiliation and participation was a vindication of 
that expression.  The rhetoric of Jacksonian opposition, stressing the intellectual qualifications of 
Adams, rejected this premise. 
     Conspicuous in its absence is overt reference to Anti-Masonry during the 1828 campaign, both 
ƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚĨĞĚĞƌĂů ?EĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĚĂŵƐŶŽƌ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŝĐŬĞƚĐŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐ “ĞǆĐŝƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?
Although Adams had publically denounced Freemasonry, Clay was a confirmed Mason  W Jacksonians 
had the same problem with their candidate.  However the rhetoric did respond to this new and 
powerful social movement.  Rhetoric often focussed on alleged conspiracy, corruption, and the 
combination of men of influence to subvert democracy.  Anti-Masonry itself, with its focus on the 
equality of men under the law, had a strong egalitarian basis for its criticisms of Freemasonry.  In a 
society that was experiencing rapid change caused by a rapidly developing market economy, of 
which there was little understanding, the fear of compromising the democratic process was rife.  
Increased opportunity resulted in concentrations of wealth that would have been unimaginable 
twenty years earlier.  The triumph of Republicanism over Federalism was fresh in the minds of New 
Yorkers in 1828, and the previous decade had been marked by a series of state conventions in which 
expanded suffrage had been fiercely contested.  Both Jacksonians and their opposition were to an 
extent ideologically attracted to Anti-Masonry for its egalitarian basis.  In practice though, the 
prevalence of Freemasonry in the leadership both groups made it difficult to take advantage of this 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ “ĞǆĐŝƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? 
                                                          
20 William Learned Marcy, Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations.  1989, n.d. 
<www.bartleby.com/73/1314> [accessed 10 July 2016]. 
14 
 
     dŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨdŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĨĞcts of Jacksonian 
rhetoric stressing the primacy of the wishes of The People over those of their leaders, and their 
successful definition of political contest as being between political and economic insiders and the 
great mass of the people.  The WorkingmeŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐƌĞĞĚŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ
adopted by the Democratic Party during the 1820s and the changes that were occurring within the 
economy of the state and nation.  As the Erie Canal expanded and concentrations of wealth grew, at 
the opposite end of the social scale grew, in urban areas, a large group of people in poverty.  It 
threatened those at the lower end of the scale of wealth whose prospects for future improvement 
were most threatened by economic change.  However unlike the political rhetoric of the parties of 
1828, the Workingmen identified policies in relation to the threats to egalitarian economic 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŚĞǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ? “dŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨůŽĂŶŝŶŐ QĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ĂŶĚŽĨĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŚĞďŝůůƐ Q ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŵĂǇĐĂƵƐĞƉůĞŶƚǇŽƌƐĐĂƌĐŝƚǇ QŝƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĂǀĞƌǇĨĞǁ ? ?ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ
held in New York City in December of 1829.21  The Workingmen claimed this developing group of 
ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐǁĂƐ “ĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚŽĨĂĐůĂƐƐŽĨŵĞŶƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚŽĨŵĞƌĐĂŶƚŝůĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐ
destƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚďŽĚǇŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƌĐŚĂŶƚƐ ? ?22  The new party then attacked the Democrats on 
ƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŝƚŚĂĚĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐĞEĞǁzŽƌŬ^ƚĂƚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? “KƵƌůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƐ ?ďǇĂĨĨŝǆŝŶŐ
enormous bonds to most of the appointed and many of the elective offices, have given to the 
ŚŽůĚĞƌƐŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĂŶƵŶĚƵĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ? ?23  dŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Party used the same democratised rhetoric the Democratic Party had used in the last election, but 
adapted to the new system of party poliƚŝĐƐ ?dŚƵƐ ? “WĂƌƚǇĨĂǀŽƌŝƚĞƐĂŶĚĂƉŽƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŶĞǆƚƚŽ
ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ŚĂǀĞǁŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇŝŶƚŽƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ “ƚŚĞŝŶƐŝĚŝŽƵƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ůŽďďǇ QǁŚŽ QǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĞƐŝƚĂƚĞ QƚŽĐŽŶƐŝŐŶƵƐĂŶĚŽƵƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ
baneful monied [sic ?ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?24  Using the language of the 1828 Democratic campaign, the 
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22 Ibid. 
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During the second party system, political debate would be closely tied to the propriety and efficacy 
of the policies of the major parties. 
     dŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
the public.  The rhetoric the major parties used to attack the Workingmen reveals the importance of 
ƚŚĞ “ƌĞĂƐƐƵƌŝŶŐ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?tŚĞŶ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶƐůĂƵĚĞĚƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞ ?ŵĂŶůǇǀŝƌƚƵĞƐŽĨ
Jackson, they reaffirmed an identity they claimed was quintessentially American.  This identity had 
an important conservative element.  The nation went through broad economic and social changes 
during the Second Party Era.  This created anxiety in New York society, closely related to decreasing 
and increasing economic importance for different industries, as well as social anxiety caused by the 
breakdown of traditional social relationships and the increasing importance of urban areas 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŚŽƚďĞĚƐŽĨǀŝĐĞĂŶĚĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇ
focused on members that held political attitudes too radical to be accepted by the overwhelming 
majority of the public. The New York Spectator, a subsidiary paper of the Commercial Advertiser and 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĚĂŵƐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ĐůĂŝŵĞĚŝƚŚĂĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽƌƐ
were, 
Fanny Wrights, ŝŶŵĞŶ ?ƐĐůŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?te mention this that mechanics and others may not 
be taken in; for we are well assured, there is not a single respectable person, of the 
above class, in that ward, but would consider his name and character made infamous by 
association with the infidel herd.25 
ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůƐĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚĞŵ ?&ƌĂŶĐĞƐtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚďƌŽĂĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚƌĂĚŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?dŚŽŵĂƐ^ŬŝĚŵŽƌĞ ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚƉĂƌƚǇ
member, was the author of The Rights of Man to Property, which asserted the only commodity of 
any value was labour and advocated property redistribution.  These radical attitudes intensified 
ĨĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇǁĂƐĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨ:ĂĐŽďŝŶŵŽďŽĐƌĂĐǇƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ
politicians feared Jacksonianism wŽƵůĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇ
                                                          




ƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŽƌƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ? “we consider 
ƚŚĞĂĐƋƵŝƌŝŶŐŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ QĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐƚŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?26  Conservatism and 
reassurance of the presence and strength of common social and moral values were prominent 
elements of New York rhetoric during the Second Party Era. 
     By the 1830s, in response to increasing demands for egalitarianism throughout society, 
Republican rhetoric became increasingly focussed on promoting the vision of an egalitarian 
democracy.  It is difficult to divide interpretations of this vision between Jacksonian and Anti-
Jacksonian factions.  This is primarily because until the emergence of the Whig Party, there was no 
two party system in New York.  Benson also noted the serious incongruity between the rhetoric of 
egalitarianism and democracy espoused by Jacksonians, and their poor track record for expanding 
democracy in the New York legislature  W in 1821 for example Van Buren had opposed universal 
white male suffrage.27  The reluctance of the establishment in 1828-1829 to support either Anti-
Masonry oƌƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƚŽ
egalitarian impulses only reluctantly.  In addition to the egalitarian themes present in the rhetoric of 
those years  W praise of The People, warnings of conspiracy and corruption - there is also a strong 
conservative element  W fear of mobocracy, and calls to stay the course of the Founding Fathers.  
How politicians understood egalitarianism in society and reconciled it with conservatism shaped the 
rhetoric of the Second Party System. 
     The success of the Jacksonians changed the major elements of public political discussion.  
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĂŶǇĂǀŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶůĞǀĞůůĞĚĂƚ:ŽŚŶYƵŝŶĐǇ
Adams following the election of 1824.  Jacksonian rhetoric would continue to stress the power of the 
people to control the actions of their representatives.  Their rhetorical strategy would continue to 
                                                          
26tŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇ ?E ?z ? ? ?The Proceedings of a Meeting of Mechanics and other Working Men held at 
Military Hall, Wooster Street, New-York, New York 1830. p. 5. 
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present political debate as a confrontation between the people, and exclusive elitist organisations 
whicŚƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĐƵƌƚĂŝůƚŚĞŝƌůŝďĞƌƚǇŽƌĚĞŶǇƚŚĞŵƚŚĞŝƌƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶĚƌĞǁ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
presidency included acts of unprecedented executive power, these were presented as defending 
egalitarianism.  Elements of criticisms of Jackson would re-occur in Whig rhetoric later in the Second 
Party Era.  Jacksonian rhetoric took advantage of divisions in American society that were already 
present to develop a prevailing narrative. But that narrative had severe flaws.  Besides the fact that 
Jacksonian policy often did ŶŽƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝƚƐĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇŝŶ ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞǁĂƐďǇ
no means overwhelming  W in 1828 he only received 51 percent of the vote.28   In the future, it would 
be to the 49 percent that opposed his election that Whig rhetoric would appeal with an alternate 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ĚĂŵƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŚĂĚŶŽƚĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚĂĐůĞĂƌƉŽůŝĐǇ
program, in keeping with its interpretation of the role of representatives as leaders of the people.  
However this interpretation does not compromise the egalitarian basis of the Adams campaign 
ideology.  Rather it is a characteristic of the embryonic form of what became Whiggery, particularly 












                                                          




     By 1834 opposition to Jacksonian Democracy had united under the banner of the newly formed 
Whig Party.  Whig political ideology stressed opposition of executive tyranny, economic 
improvement, and social harmony and mobility.  This mobility, Whigs argued, would be created via 
ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĞŶǀŝƐŝŽŶĞĚďǇ,ĞŶƌǇůĂǇ ?ƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ?dŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇŝƚ
produced would facilitate the general prosperity of all Americans.  Whigs did not believe that the 
economy was a zero-sum game.  General improvement and development of the economy through 
internal improvements, they argued, would benefit everyone, ensuring equality by disseminating 
success.  They championed the credit system as a tool which could be used by the less wealthy to 
enter the business world.  However Whiggery did not spring Athena like from the head of Henry 
Clay.  Marvin Meyers noted that Whigs maintained the ideals of republican virtue and routinely 
invoked the memory of the Founding Fathers and classically American imagery in the same way as 
the Democrats.29  What is often missed is the distinctly egalitarian nature of Whig rhetoric and 
ideology, owing to the success of the Democratic Party during the 1830s in creating a prevailing 
narrative in state and natiŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐĂƐ “ƚŚĞĂŶŬWĂƌƚǇ ? ?
     This narrative began in 1834, when the Jackson administration became determined to reduce the 
influence of the Bank of the United States (BUS).  To achieve this Jackson put into motion plans to 
ƌĞŵŽǀĞƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂůĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐŚĞůĚďǇƚŚĞh^ ?ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ĂŶŬtĂƌ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŵŝĚ-1830s.  However 
New York already had a bank war of its own.  In 1829, under the sponsorship of Van Buren, the New 
York legislature had passed a law establishing a safety fund.  The fund demanded that all banks 
contribute to a reserve fund that would be used to prop up any bank that failed  W effectively 
protecting the public and increasing the stability and strength of New York banks.30  But the 
provisions of the fund also allowed men to buy bank stock by paying only a fraction of the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?/ŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝƚƚƵƌŶĞĚďĂŶŬŝŶŐŝŶEĞǁzŽƌŬŝŶƚŽǁŚĂƚĞŶƐŽŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ “ĂƚŝŐŚƚůǇ
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enemies.31  Anti-ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƵƐĞĚďǇďŽƚŚƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŝ-Masonic 
Parties, both of which were political vehicles dedicated to egalitarian economic and social values.  It 
was Whiggery that sought to create economic equality via expanding opportunities for economic 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĂĨĞƚǇĨƵŶĚƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐŚĂĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨĞŶƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŵƉůǇ “ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚŽŶ
ƚŚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?32  In order to answer Anti-Masonic and later 
Whig criticisms, Democrats fŽĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŽŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ “ŵŽŶƐƚĞƌ ?ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ W the Second 
Bank of the United States. 
     h^ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚEŝĐŚŽůĂƐŝĚĚůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞĨĞĚĞƌĂůĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐƵŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ
ĂŝĚĞĚƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ŚĞƐŚĂƌƉůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĞĚƚŚĞh^ ?lending and raised short term interest 
rates so high that many firms had to curtail expansion plans or slipped into bankruptcy, a turn of 
affairs swiftly followed by layoffs.  New York Democrats struck the political blunder without mercy.  
 “dŚĞĂŶŬŽĨƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂƐĐƵƌƚĂŝůĞĚŝƚƐůŽĂŶƐ QƚŽƚŚĞĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
ĂůůŽĨƚŚŝƐĐƵƌƚĂŝůŵĞŶƚŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶǇƌĞǀƵůƐŝŽŶŝŶƚƌĂĚĞ ?ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ
Democratic Senator Silas Wright.33  dŚĞ “ ?ŵ ?ĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇŽĨĐƵƌƚĂŝůŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŝŵĂŐŝnary pressure and 
ƉĂŶŝĐ ?ƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ Albany Argus ĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵŽďŝůŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞh^ “ƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂĐƚƵĂů
ĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƐĞĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞĂŝĚŽĨƵŶƵƐƵĂůŵŽŶĞǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?34  
Democratic rhetoric emphasised the weakness of Whig rhetoric which defended the bank.  
Democrats portrayed the Bank as an institution hostile to the liberties of individual Americans, and 
ŝĚĚůĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƚŚŝƐ ?tŚŝŐƐĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
was too important to their economic politics to abandon it.    Democrats relied on hostility to 
                                                          
31 Ibid. p. 92 & 47.  Note  W dŽďĞĐůĞĂƌ ?ƚŚĞ^ĂĨĞƚǇ&ƵŶĚ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞƐƐĞŵďůǇƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞǁŚŽ
could operate a bank, where it could be located and how it could be operated, therefore constituting a strict 
legal monopoly. 
32 Ibid. p. 92. 
33 ^ŝůĂƐtƌŝŐŚƚ ? ‘Remarks of Mr. Wright in the US Senate, On Submitting the Resolutions of the State of New-
zŽƌŬŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞZĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞƉŽƐŝƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŐĂŝŶƐƚZĞĐŚĂƌƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĂŶŬ ? ? Albany Argus- Extra, 
March 1834, p. 5 col 1. 
34 Ibid. p. 1 col 1. 
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banking monopolies to portray the BUS as the greatest monster of them all, and the Whigs as 
defending it.  In doing so they undermined the egalitarian basis of Whig rhetoric and ideology.  
Between 1833 and 1837, Democrats developed a prevailing narrative that cast the Whig Party as 
being a party of the economic elite unwilling to share power or prosperity.  The New York 
Democratic Party rhetoric tied these accusations to constitutional propositions.  The Democratic 
WĂƌƚǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚĚĞĨĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? “/ŐŽĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚŝƐĂŶŬ ? ?ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚtƌŝŐŚƚ ? “ĂŶĚ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶǇĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇďĂŶŬƚŽďĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚďǇĐŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ Q ?ƵƉŽŶƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂĚŵŝƚƐ
not of compromise, that congress has not the power, by the constitution, to incorporate such a 
ďĂŶŬ ? ?35  Democratic rhetoric against the Bank defined it not simply as being an adverse influence on 
the interests of the population, but unconstitutional, and therefore un-American in natƵƌĞ ?tƌŝŐŚƚ ?Ɛ
argument was false; a national Bank was constitutional concept, and had been found so before.  
However, the point of the rhetoric was not to make concrete constitutional changes  W it was to 
portray the struggle against the Bank and the Whig Party as being a struggle in defence of the 
Constitution  W to develop a prevailing narrative. 
     dŚĞƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞĂƐƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝƚƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? “ĂŶŬŽƌŶŽĂŶŬ ? ?
the focus placed upon the alleged constitutional element of the issue and appeals to the legacy of 
ƚŚĞ&ŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ&ĂƚŚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶĚŝĐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐĐůŽƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽ ?ďƵƚ
autonomy from, the government.36  dŚĞh^ǁĂƐ “ĂŐƌĞĂƚĐŚĂƌƚĞƌĞĚDŽŶŝĞĚWŽǁĞƌ ?sic], more 
potent than the government, witŚǀĂƐƚĨĂĐƵůƚŝĞƐŽĨŵŝƐĐŚŝĞĨ ?ĂŶĚĞƋƵĂůĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?
charged the Albany Argus.37  ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŚĞh^ŝŶƚŽĂ “ŵŽŶƐƚĞƌ ? ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐŝƚƚŽ
the electorate as existing in defiance of the Constitution.  The Constitution in turn was presented as 
the bastion of liberty; thus the BUS was a threat to American freedom and democracy.  This kind of 
language was an effective tool in developing Party identity.  It allowed the Democrats to not only 
define themselves as anti-Bank and the Whigs as pro-Bank, a usefully simple differentiation, but also 
                                                          
35Ibid. p. 5 col 2. 
36Ibid. p. 1 col 2. 
37Ibid. p. 2 col 1. 
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allowed them to define the terms upon which that differentiation was made.  By attacking the Bank 
as un-democratic, they were able to simultaneously paint its supporters as such. 
     This kind of ideologically based rhetorical offensive was useful for maintaining party discipline.  
Although the Democratic Party was divided on issues such as internal improvements, broad 
ideological principles such as opposition to the BUS, expansion of the suffrage and increased 
rotation in office gave them an umbrella identity under which the party could unite.  For the New 
York Democratic Party this identity focussed on a vision of democracy that bore little resemblance to 
ƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞƌƐ ?ǁŚo had envisioned a republican system of government 
wherein the authority of representatives was insulated from the whims of the people at large.  
Democratic rhetoric sought to adjust popular conceptions of the Constitution with regard to the 
constitutionality of the BUS itself.  The Jackson administration was on unstable legal ground 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞh^ ?ĐŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?ĨĞĚĞƌĂůĚĞƉŽƐŝƚƐĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ
withdrawn unless Congress declared them unsafe.  In 1833 the House had voted by a more than two 
to one to accept the majority report of the Ways and Means Committee, that the deposits were 
safe.  Jackson however perceived himself to be in possession of a popular mandate which allowed 
him to bypass these regulations if acting in deĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĞ
 ? ? ? ?EĞǁzŽƌŬĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂ “ƵŶŝĨŽƌŵĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƚƌƵĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ
democracy, illustrated in repeated instances by an open denunciation of measures calculated to 
subvert them. ?38  The language of this rhetoric again reflects the efforts of the Democratic Party to 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ “ĚĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽ
ƐƵďǀĞƌƚ ?ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŚŝƐ “ĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƚƌƵĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ
developed both their own identity and that of the Whigs in terms which favoured them; what 
Democrats criticised, and what Whigs supported, was undemocratic. 
                                                          
38 Democratic Party (N.Y.) State Convention,  ‘Democratic State Convention ?, Albany Argus-Extra, September 
1836, P. 5. 
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     In the face of this rhetoric the New York Whig Party struggled to define itself in terms which were 
palatable to the wider electorate.  The difficulty experienced by opponents of Jacksonianism trying 
to unite disparate opposition to the Albany Regency, was that the most organised opposition group, 
the Anti-Masonic Party, was avowedly anti-organised politics and parties.  Anti-Masonry, argued 
Anti-DĂƐŽŶŝĐEĞǁzŽƌŬŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŵĂŶ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬtŚŝƚƚůĞƐĞǇ ? “ǁĂƐĞŵƉŚĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĂƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ
movement of the people themselves, not only in absence of, but in defiance of the counsels of 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ?39  Part of this resistance to cooperation with other groups opposed to 
Jacksonianism was the way in which Anti-Masons saw themselves as dedicated to a single political 
purpose; the eradication of Freemasonry.  This purpose translated itself into a political philosophy 
which stressed distinctly egalitarian principles  W equality under the law, opposition to undemocratic 
concentrations of power and an end to social deference.  Whittlesey explained the motivation of the 
Anti-Masonic party by ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “DĂƐŽŶƌǇĂŶĚDĂƐŽŶƐŚĂĚǀŝŽůĂƚĞĚƚŚĞůĂǁƐ ? QDĂƐŽŶƌǇĂŶĚ
DĂƐŽŶƐŚĂĚŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁƐ QDĂƐŽŶƌǇǁĂƐĂĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵƵƐƚ
ďĞƉƵƚĚŽǁŶ ? ?40  Whigs eventually tapped into this central theme of Anti-Masonry with rhetoric that 
ĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚŽŶ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐĂůůĞŐĞĚƵƐƵƌƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐĂƌŐƵĞĚǁĞƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ
prerogatives of Congress, such as his dismissal of Treasury Secretary William J. Duane.  By stressing 
the threat of Jackson as a tyrant, Whigs began to develop an egalitarian rhetorical narrative of their 
own. 
     Whig political philosophy argued that all Americans could, by virtue of hard work, share in the 
general prosperity of the nation.  This philosophy hinged on the concept of a harmonious 
relationship between employers and employees, but also encouraged individualism.  While the Whig 
Party agreed that there were both good and bad concentrations of power (reflected by the fact that 
so many former Anti-Masons joined the Whigs after the party dissolved in 1834), they rejected the 
idea that wealth always corrupted.  This kind of rhetoric appealed not only to the wealthy, but also 
                                                          
39 Jabez D. Hammond, The History of Political Parties in the State of New York, from the Ratification of the 
Federal Constitution to December 1840, Vol II, (IV Edition), Buffalo 1850, p. 378. 
40Ibid. p. 377. 
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to ambitious members of the middle class: foremen, small business owners and entrepreneurs, who 
found it difficult to reconcile their consciences with their growing wealth.  It also appealed to those 
wealthy elites who were losing their position as moral leaders of the community in the face of 
levelling Democratic ideology.  It worked particularly well in regions which had been intensely 
affected by the Second Great Awakening, such as the Burnt-Over District.  This series of popular 
Protestant revivals swept through the western section of the state.  It was particularly popular with 
the middle classes, and lent strength to the notion of personal responsibility for moral salvation not 
just of oneself, but also of others.  This philosophy merged well with the Whig conception of the 
positive role government should play in promoting the welfare of the people.  Beyond this, 
evangelist rhetoric merged well with the Whig belief in the positive nature of individualism.  John 
ƐŚǁŽƌƚŚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇtŚŝŐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐǁĞƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽ “ĐŽŵďĂƚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůůŝŶŐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨ
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?41  However this definition, explicitly understood, does not consider the 
egalitarian basis of Whig ideology.  Whig rhetoric embraced an individualism which could take 
advantage of education and economic opportunity in the same way that evangelists embraced an 
individualism that could facilitate spiritual salvation; they did not embrace social inequality. 
     The New York Whig Party fought the Democratic Party on the Bank issue by tying national 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶŬƚŽůŽĐĂůŽŶĞƐŝŶǁĂǇƐƚŚĂƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
in an unfavourable light.  The Whigs appealed to the business community that relied upon the BUS 
ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƐƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ?ĂŶĚƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐ
characterised by excessive use of executive power.  It seized on Democratic Governor William 
DĂƌĐǇ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚEĞǁzŽƌŬ^ƚĂƚĞďĂŶŬƐĨƌŽŵŝĚĚůĞ ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƉƌŝŶŐŽĨ
1834, a bill providing for a state bond issue of $6 million, $4 million of which would be provided to 
shore up New York City banks and the remainder to be made available to private individuals in 
                                                          
41 John Ashworth, Agrarians and Aristocrats: Party Political Ideology in the United States1837 to 1846, London 
1983, p. 52. 
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upstate New York.42   “d,^ddK&EtzKZ<DKZd''dKd,E<^&KZ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
trumpeted New York Whigs.43  In the State Assembly, William H. Seward used the bill to attempt to 
recapture the initiativĞ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞĚƚŚĞtŚŝŐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽƚŚĞ
public in a form which sought to counter Democratic implications of elitism.  Striking at the 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐƵŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƐŽ “ƐĞŶƐŝďůĞǁere the 
ĨŽƵŶĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ Q ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ?ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ Q ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĂĂŶŬŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?44  ^ĞǁĂƌĚĚĞĐƌŝĞĚƚŚĞ “ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?ƉůĂĐĞĚ
upon the economy by Democratic attacks on the Bank of the UnitĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ? “ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
the pressure fell first upon the merchants, it has since visited every class of citizens, the mechanics, 
ƚŚĞŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĂŵĞŶ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƌŵĞŶ ?ƚŚĞůĂďŽƌĞƌƐĂƚƚŚĞǁŚĂƌǀĞƐĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĞƚƐ ? ?45 
Seward assigned the soƵƌĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƚŽĂǁĂŶƚŽĨĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇĨŽƌ “ǁŚĞŶ
ŽŶĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚŽƵďƚƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞ ?ŝƐŝŵƉĂŝƌĞĚ ?ǁŚĞŶŵĂŶǇ ƌĞĂůĂƌŵĞĚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞ ?ƐŝŶŬƐ ? ?46  
Democratic attacks on the BUS had destroyed this confidence, and this threatened American 
ƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƉĂŝĚďǇƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
rhetoric identified the Whigs with a clear and simple policy, support for paper currency, and 
contrasted their support of the Bank with the alleged source of the problem, anti-BUS legislation, 
which was central to the identity of the Democratic Party.  The Bank War highlighted the way in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƵƐĞĚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂĐŚŽĨ
the two major parties sought to use their rhetoric to define not only what they supported, but to 
juxtapose those points in a favourable way against what they claimed their opponents supported. 
          ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐŚĂůůŵĂƌŬƐŽĨƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐƚǇůĞĂŶĚĨƌĂŵŝng which became 
the standard for both parties.  The BUS was not a threat to, but a servant of, the people and the 
                                                          
42 Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, New York, Oxford 1999, p. 34. 
43William H. Seward, ^ƉĞĞĐŚŽĨtŝůůŝĂŵ, ?^ĞǁĂƌĚŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ'Žǀ ?tŝůůŝĂŵ, ?DĂƌĐǇ ?Ɛ^ŝǆDŝůůŝŽŶ
Mortgage, New York 1834, p. 3. 
44 Ibid. p. 8. 
45 Ibid. p. 5. 
46 Ibid. p. 9. 
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ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ? “ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝĐƐ ?ƚŽ ?ĞŵƉůŽǇďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ŽƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĚĞďƚƐ W
and there are few of either class who can sustain themselves, during a season of depreciation of 
ĨĂƌŵƐ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂŶĚůĂďŽƌ ? ?47  This depreciation had been caused by the tyrannical actions of the 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?/ŶĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐƚŚĞh^ ? “ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌŝŶ
defining the offence and the penalty, the judicial power in convicting the bank, and Executive power 
ĐŽŶĨĞƌƌĞĚďǇŶŽůĂǁŝŶĞŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?dŚŝƐ “ǀŝŶĚŝĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
of the true threat to American liberty, the usurpation and expansion of executive power.  The 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇŽƌĐŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚŝƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ůŽĂŶǁĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŽŽĨ ? “/ƚŝƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ/ŵŽƐƚƐƚƌĞŶƵŽƵƐůǇƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝƚ ? ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ
declared, and warned that the dispensation of the loan would render the state banks hopeless 
ĐƌĞĚŝƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƚƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?ĚŽŽŵĞĚ “ƚŽďĞƐƵďƐĞƌǀŝĞŶƚƚŽĂŶĚĚŽƚŚĞǁŝůůŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽǁŝĞůĚƚŚĞ
ƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?dŚƵƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ “ĂŐƌĞĂƚŵŽŶŝĞĚƉŽǁĞƌƚŽďĞǁŝĞůĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ďǇƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƉĂƌƚǇ QdŚĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞ
ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?48  ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŚŝŶŐĞƐŽŶĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽ
the egalitarian impulses of contemporary New York society.  Just as the Anti-Masonic fervour would 
not tolerate Masonic privilege, so the New York Whigs summoned the spectre of conspiratorial 
threat to egalitarian values to battle the Democrats during the Bank War.  While both parties 
differed profoundly on how egalitarianism could be secured and maintained they identified the 
ƐĂŵĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŽŝƚ ? “ŵŽŶŝĞĚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ǁĂƐĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƚĞƌŵŝŶ ďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ? ?ĂŶĚƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ
same rhetorical methods to make their arguments. 
     Both parties attempted to reshape and adapt American abstractions to legitimise and justify their 
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?dŚĞh^ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂůŽĐƵƐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƚŚĞ “ĂŶŬtĂƌ ?ǁĂƐ
ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂů:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐƌĞ-
chartering was an issue around which the disparate coalitions of state based factions that made up 





ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĐŽƵůĚƌĂůůǇ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐƚŚĞĂŶĂƚŚĞŵĂŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ
position that opposed federally funded internal improvements and centralised political power, 
positions at the core of their political philosophy.  For the emerging Whig Party, whose political 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁĂƐĐůŽƐĞůǇǁĞĚĚĞĚƚŽ,ĞŶƌǇůĂǇ ?ƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŽ
synonymous with their goals that it was impossible for them to abandon it.  Instead Whigs 
attempted to develop an image of the U.S. as a land of boundless prosperity; thus New York Whigs 
presented the Bank as a tool which facilitated the betterment of the entire population, and not only 
a select few.  In the maelstrom of New York politics these clear divisions, which did not need to be 
defined in terms of specific policy, were of great use in constructing voting coalitions.  The rhetoric 
employed by both parties however, had deeper aims.  They were attempts not simply to win the 
argument, but to define the terms in which the argument was understood by the electorate.  
Democrats sought to establish a principle in the minds of the public that the Bank was by 
constitutional definition a corrupt and threatening institution; Whigs sought to establish the 
principle that the form Democratic attacks upon the BUS took was evidence of their inherent 
corruption.  Establishing a prevailing political narrative that defined egalitarianism in terms 
acceptable to the party was central to the rhetorical strategies of both Whigs and Democrats. 
     An example of Whig and Democratic efforts to develop a legitimised identity for their 
interpretation of egalitarian policy strategy was the affirmation of the importance of the image, if 
not the intentions and practical legacy, of the founding generation.  A large part of this effort was 
ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?EŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞ
Constitution defended the principles and freedoms that defined their nation were being adapted to 
fit with developing concepts of the legitimacy of egalitarian democracy.  Both Whigs and Democrats 
ŽĨƚĞŶĐŝƚĞĚƚŚĞ “ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨŝƐƐƵĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƚƌŝĐƚůĞŐĂůĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞir 
ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ “ƐƚƌŝĐƚ ?Žƌ “ůŽŽƐĞ ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐ ŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇ
argued over as both parties attempted to confirm that their vision of American democracy was the 
vision of the Constitution.  For politicians during this era the Constitution had an almost spiritual 
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element; although a law did not necessarily have to mean justice, constitutionality did have to 
reflect the true meaning of the American way of life, and could thus be argued over politically in this 
sense.  This was an early indicator of the importance of conservatism to successful rhetoric.  The 
Revolutionary Generation, having only very recently receded into the background of politics, 
continued to cast long shadows.  They had been elevated to a point wherein they were almost 
beyond criticism; even Democratic attacks upon John Adams were tempered by respect.  The wealth 
and success of the nation which followed the revolution meant that it was vital for both parties to 
ĐĂƐƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ “ƐƚĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?Đonfirming this notion in the minds of the electorate and 
making it a central theme of their political identities was an important objective for both parties. 
     ĞŶƚƌĂůďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞŝƌŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŝƌƌŚĞƚŽƌŝc 
portrayed their opposition.  Typical rhetoric identified a social or economic problem, attributed it to 
ĂƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
party.  A recurring theme of this kind of contrasting exercise was argument over opposing 
interpretations of the Constitution.  By rhetorically disregarding developments and precedents in 
constitutional law, the Democratic Party made constitutional interpretation an issue which was 
contested by the two pĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?/ƚǁĂƐƚŚƵƐĂďůĞƚŽůŝŶŬƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƚŽƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
interpretation of the Constitution, thereby manipulating popular conceptions of the Founding 
&ĂƚŚĞƌƐ ?ůĞŐĂĐǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌŐƵĞĚǁĂƐĞŶƐŚƌŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽďƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝŶůŝŶĞwith 
Democratic policies.  The Whig Party defended its interpretation of the Constitution by attacking the 
Democratic Party on the basis of (alleged) abuses of executive power committed by Andrew Jackson; 
the Maysville Turnpike veto, his disregard for the ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐŽŶ/ŶĚŝĂŶƌĞŵŽǀĂůŝŶ
Georgia, and his repeated usurpations of power through such actions as the dismissal of Treasury 
Secretary Duane.  In this way they linked their interpretation of the Constitution to a broad 
philosophic opposition to a threat to American liberties; executive tyranny.  In 1835 a young cabinet 
maker seeking work in New York was informed by one business owner he had no work available for, 
 “'ĞŶĞƌĂů:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŚĂƐƚŝĞĚƵƉƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĨŽƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚŽbe what it ought to be 
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ĨŽƌĂƉƌĞƚƚǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?49  dŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽǁŶĞƌ ?ƐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚtŚŝŐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐǁĂƐ
successful in some parts of the business community, particularly among employers as opposed to 
employees  W the Whigs had provided an interpretation of the Constitution which this workshop 
owner found more appealing than the one offered by the Democrats.  As the parties at this time 
were made up of coalitions of often disparate state based factions, the importance of this technique 
was that it allowed parties to develop a broad identity to which their members could lay claim whilst 
not restricting their rhetorical flexibility on local or faction based issues.  These differences in 
constitutional philosophy helped the parties define themselves from one another whilst they 
adapted to the newly enfranchised electorate in similar ways.  However as philosophy applied to 
policy and salient political issues became less vague, it became, in turn, less flexible. 
     Both Whig and Democratic rhetoric had a symbiotic relationship with the rhetoric of their 
opponents.  Benson argued that the concept of the negative reference group, defined by Robert 
DĞƌƚŽŶĂƐĂ “ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨŚŽƐƚŝůĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐƌŽƵƉƐŽƌĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƐŝĐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
attŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨŽŶĞĂƌĞĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?50  
This concept is useful for understanding the development of rhetorical strategy between Whigs and 
Democrats in New York.  Democrats argued for a negative state based attitude toward religious 
practices and social reform; the state had no business in interfering with citizens religious or 
communal lives.  Whigs supported the theory of positive government that took an active role in 
maintaining the welfare of the community, both moral and physical.  These attitudes translated into 
economic attitudes and theories; support for, or opposition to, the BUS and the American System.  
Both parties tailored their rhetoric to appeal to specific social and economic interest groups, while 
maintaining a clearly egalitarian foundation for their ideology.  However New York contended with 
an acceleration of demographic and social change after 1835.  These changes forced both parties to 
diversify their rhetoric to appeal to an ever broader cross section of the electorate.  At the same 
                                                          
49 Sean Wilentz (ed, Major Problems in the Early Republic 1787-1848, Lexington 1992, p. 202. 
50 Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case, New York 1964, p. 27. 
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time, they were confronted by the difficulty of achieving this without alienating the supporters they 






















Chapter 3  
     Between 1836 and 1840 the New York Whig and Democratic Parties became more ideologically 
polarised.  The Depression of 1837 caused both parties to affirm broad economic principles that 
provided the basis for their answer to the crisis and their assertions that their opponents were to 
blame.  The Democratic Party affirmed its dedication to negative state principles, while the Whig 
party developed an egalitarian ideology based on positive state principles.  The way in which these 
ideas translated into practical policy created intense internal division within the Democratic Party.  
     The Depression struck in 1837, following several years of increasing economic pressure.  Inflation 
beginning in 1833 had caused a rise in the price of fuel, food and rent, and that increased economic 
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉŽŽƌ ?dŚŝƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶ
the Bank of England decreased the number and amounts of its loans at the same time as a sudden 
drop in the price of cotton.  By May 9th ƌƵŶƐŽŶDĂŶŚĂƚƚĂŶ ?ƐďĂŶŬƐŚĂĚĚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŵŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶ
ƐƉĞĐŝĞ ?ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐĂůůƚǁĞŶƚǇƚŚƌĞĞŽĨDĂŶŚĂƚƚĂŶ ?ƐďĂŶŬƐƚŽĐĞĂƐĞĞǆĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƐƉĞĐŝĞĨŽƌďĂŶŬƐŶŽƚĞƐŽŶ
May 10th.  State economic development ground to a halt, business after business collapsed; 
thousands of New Yorkers lost their employment. 
     &ŽƌƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƚŚĞĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĐĂƵƐĞĚĂƐŚŝĨƚŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ
ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĂŶƚŝ-bank wing.  DeclarŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?Ɛ
 “ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĐŚŝĞĨůǇƚŽďĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽŽǀĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĂůůƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐŽĨďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ Q
stimulated to its destructive consequences by excessive issues of bank paper, and by other facilities 
for the acquisition and enlargemeŶƚŽĨĐƌĞĚŝƚ ? ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚDĂƌƚŝŶsĂŶƵƌĞŶŵŽǀĞĚƐƚĞĂĚŝůǇĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the onset of the crash to adopt the principles espoused by William Leggett, editor and co-owner of 
the New York Evening Post.51  >ĞŐŐĞƚƚ ?ƐĞĚŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐĞǆĐŽƌŝĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇĨŽƌĨĂŝůŝŶŐ to live 
up to the egalitarian principles it espoused, and made the Evening Post the organ of the Locofoco 
                                                          
51 Martin Van Buren, Message from the President of the United States, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the 
Commencement of the First Session, of the Twenty-fifth Congress, September 5, 1837, Washington 1837, p. 4. 
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faction of the New York Democracy.52  The Democratic Party, he argued, had an unhealthily close 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƚŚĞďĂŶŬŝŶŐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? “tŚĂƚĂůŽŶĞŝƐ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ? ?>ĞŐŐĞƚƚĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? “ǁŚĂƚŝƐ
demanded by both the letter and spirit of our institutions, and by the fundamental principle of 
ůŝďĞƌƚǇ ?ŝƐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƚƌĂĚĞ ?ĂŶĚĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďĂŶŬĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?53  >ĞŐŐĞƚƚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ
applied the negative state principles that the Democrats had used during the Bank War to the in-
state banking system.  It presented the concepts of egalitarianism and negative state principles as 
being inseparable, creating tension between pro-state bank Democrats and those who would be 
labelled Locofocos.  
     The practical application of Locofoco negative state ideology was the Independent Treasury Bill, 
which removed federal deposits from state banks.  This controversial measure was amended to 
include a provision which required the government to deal exclusively in specie.  This policy, which 
stressed the hard-money Jacksonian bona-fides of the administration, caused a general shift of the 
ideological centre of Democratic Party rhetoric.  The administration began to support the rhetoric of 
the Locofocos, echoing their hard money, anti-monopoly positions.  The support of the Van Buren 
Administration was illustrated by the issuance of federal jobs and party leadership positions to men 
who would previously have been considered too radical for them, such as Leggett.  This change in 
rhetoric alienated fiscal conservatives within the Democratic Party.  By more clearly linking the 
Jacksonian concept of egalitarianism to negative state principles it caused division within the New 
York Democratic Party. 
     Pro-banking Democrats were alienated as the party mainstream moved to a more extreme 
negative state position.  Senator Nathaniel Tallmadge was a prominent member of the pro-banking 
wing of the New York Democracy.  Following the passage of the Independent Treasury Act his career 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĐůŽƐĞĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐtŚŝŐWĂƌƚǇ ?
                                                          
52 A full explanation on the emergence of the Locofoco faction can be found on p. 25. 
53 William Leggett, Democratick Editorials: Essays in Jacksonian Political Economy, n.d., 
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Leggett/lgtDE6.html> [accessed on 10 July 2016]. 
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Tallmadge noted angrily that many who had viewed the anti-bank principles of the radical wing of 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇĂƐ “ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀe of the best interests of society, began to renounce former opinions, and 
adopt this radical creed, because they believed it met with approbation of those who held the reins 
ŽĨƉĂƌƚǇĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ? ?54  Increasingly he and other Democrats who were friendly to banking interests 
found themselves unable to agree with or bring their rhetoric into line with the party mainstream.  
This caused increasing friction within the state party.  The Democrats held the advantage in 1836 of 
having been in control of the state patronage for almost a decade.  The party had numerous 
powerful public officials across the state, whose jobs were dependent upon their loyalty to the party 
and its success at the polls.  Access to those prizes was endangered for conservatives by the shift in 
philosophy which Leggett and his adherents supported.  The result was a division between old 
school Democrats who sought to retain influence within the party without further disruption of the 
status quo, and a new and aggressive faction determined to carry the egalitarian rhetoric of the 
Party through to its logical policy results (in terms which embraced negative state doctrine). 
     This struggle had broken out into the open in New York City with the emergence of the Locofoco 
faction in 1835.  Tammany Hall had always portrayed itself as a democratic institution, but by 1835 
many members of the Hall believed it was run by its more affluent members who had little interest 
in the practical application of the egalitarian attitudes they espoused.  In 1835 these men, united on 
the issue of hard currency, resolved to challenge the bank friendly faction which dominated 
Tammany politics.  Forewarned, when the Party convened on December 29th to nominate candidates 
for the 1836 election, the pro-bank faction drove through their ticket and then doused the lights of 
the hall, attempting to close the meeting.  The rebels, however, were prepared with pockets full of 
the new Locofoco matches; they relit the lamps and established their own slate of candidates.  The 
Locofocos became the popular name for reform Democrats in New York politics.  Synthesising the 
                                                          
54 Nathaniel Tallmadge, Remarks of Mr. Tallmadge in Defence of the People of New York, against the Charge of 
Bank Influence, Washington 1838, p. 8. 
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complaints of Locofocoism, Leggett became the principal exponent of Locofoco thought.  He argued 
that 
Governments have no right to interfere with the pursuits of individuals, as guarantied 
[sic] by those general laws, by offering encouragements and granting privileges to any 
particular class of industry, or any select bodies of men, in as much as all classes of 
industry and all men are equally important to the general welfare, and equally entitled 
to protection.55 
dŚŝƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐǁĂƐƚŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?
Liberty, Locofocos argued, was defined by equality of opportunity.  This equality had been corrupted 
ďǇ ? “dŚĞĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶWĂƌƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƵƐĂŐĞƐĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?56  
Tammany Hall suddenly found itself embattled in a struggle for the identity of the party.  The 
Locofocos argued that the Democrats had failed to demonstrate that they were fully dedicated to 
the content of the rhetoric they used to win elections, and they successfully turned that rhetoric 
upon their opponents within the Party.  This division further emphasised the major weakness of the 
identities which New York political parties were developing.  Rhetoric designed to distinguish the 
ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞǀĞƌƐƵ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
were increasingly defined by inflexible political principles.  The development and application of these 
principles often left factions of the party disgruntled, or entirely out in the cold, pushing them 
toward cooperation with the opposition. 
     dŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐ ?ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞsĂŶƵƌĞŶ
administration.  The passage of the Independent Treasury Bill was a reflection of an important shift 
ŝŶĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůŝďĞƌƚǇ ?sĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽŽŶŐƌĞƐƐĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ negative state doctrine. 
A system founded on private interest enterprise and competition without the aid of 
legislative grants or regulations by law would rapidly prosper ; it would be free from the 
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influence of political agitation, and extend the same exemption to trade itself ; and it would 
put an end to those complaints of neglect, partiality, injustice, and oppression, which are the 
unavoidable results of interference by the Government in the proper concerns of 
individuals.57 
This rhetoric stressed the negative state in relation to the preservation of popular American 
ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? “ƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐgovernment ? ?ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ
ƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐZĞǀŝĞǁ ?ĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? “ŝƐĂŶĞǀŝů ?ĚŝĨĨering only in 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞĂŶĚŵŽĚĞŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĨƌŽŵĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵ ? ?58  This rhetoric linked a 
minimalist role and capacity of government to abstractions relating to the defence liberty from a 
despotic, over-powered central government.  The Revolutionary generation, argued Democratic 
ƐƐĞŵďůǇŵĂŶtŝůůŝĂŵ ?DĂĐůĂǇ ?ŽĨEĞǁzŽƌŬŽƵŶƚǇ ?ŚĂĚ “ůŽŽŬĞĚǁŝƚŚĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚƵƉŽŶŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ
ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŝƐƐƵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵ ? ?59  The key to Locofoco success 
with this rhetoric was that it reflected negative state theory.  Restriction of government relations 
with the banking community worked well as a policy expression of this theory. 
     This shift in party philosophy left the Democrats in a difficult situation in New York.  Pro-banking 
Democrats were appalled.  The Independent Treasury scheme, declared Tallmadge, had been 
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƐ “ƚŚĞĚƌĞĂŵŽĨĂǀŝƐŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? ?60  dŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶ
ƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ŝƐ ?ƉĂƌĂůǇǌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĞŶĞƌŐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞpopulation frozen up, business of all kinds [is] 
ĂƚĂƐƚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞǁŝǀĞƐĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨ Q ?ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞ ?ĨĂŵŝƐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂŶƚŽĨďƌĞĂĚ ? ?61  
dĂůůŵĂĚŐĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞsĂŶƵƌĞŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƐƵƌǇƉůĂŶƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĞŝŶƚƌĂ-party stress 
created by ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉůĂŶǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ ? “ƵƚƚĞƌŝŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇ
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
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Democratic Review, I, No. 1 (October, 1837), pp 1-15] 
59 William B. Maclay, Oration delivered at the Democratic Republican celebration of the sixty-third anniversary 
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ĂŶĚŝŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƐ ? ?62 He denounced the Locofocos, arguing they had 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŝĚĞĂƐŽĨĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶďǇ “ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ inroads and forcible 
ŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞŵďůĂŐĞƐŽĨƋƵŝĞƚ ?ŽƌĚĞƌůǇĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ?63  His language reveals the discomfiture 
of pro-ďĂŶŬĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŶĞǁƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐĞĚƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?tŚŝůĞ
conservatives had been happy to preach the creed of egalitarianism in their effort to destroy the 
BUS, they were less eager to apply it to the state banks.  The political philosophy of conservative 
Democrats at a state level held similar views to those of the Whigs, and conservatives began to 
express concern that they were being left behind as party rhetoric sought to polarise the two 
parties.  Even more tellingly, it echoed criticisms of the Democratic Party typically levelled at it by 
ƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐ ?dĂůůŵĂĚŐĞ ?ƐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĞǀŽŬĞƐƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨĚemocracy gone too far  W mob rule and 
violent political excitement.  His accusations of radicalism reinforced the point that as the 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂŵŽƌĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĂŶƚŝ-bank, anti-monopoly, anti-soft currency 
caste in the late 1830s it was placing strain on the unity of the party by alienating the conservative 
wing. 
     Tallmadge argued that the losses suffered by the Democrats in the 1837 state elections were 
ĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇ “ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐunderstood to be entertained by the administration QĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚƚŚŽƐĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?64  ?ŝƚĂůŝĐƐŝŶŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƚĞǆƚ ?dĂůůŵĂĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
repudiation of the shift of the Democratic Party toward a negative state philosophy was a result of 
its rendering it impossible for him to continue to relate his rhetoric, principally pro-banking, to his 
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐĂŶĚĂŝŵƐ ?/ŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŚĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ
ǁŽƵůĚĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚEĞǁzŽƌŬtŚŝŐƐ ?ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?dĂůůŵĂĚŐĞǁĂƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇĞůĞĐƚĞd to serve 
in the U.S. Senate as a Whig in 1839.  Those bank-friendly Democrats who remained with the party, 
such as Edwin Croswell, editor of the Albany Argus, Daniel Dickinson, William C. Bouck and Henry 
Foster, found themselves increasingly opposed to the economic policy of their (as they saw it) more 
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radical colleagues.  They accused the Locofocos of being radical and dangerous, of presenting a 
threat to American prosperity, and as hostile to the established liberties of New Yorkers.  The 
rhetoric they used to defend themselves used the same tactics which they had previously employed; 
it threatened the unity of the party by presenting the opposing factions as not simply wrong on the 
issues, but as a threat to American liberty and prosperity.   This problem illustrated an increasingly 
problematic weakness of the rhetorical strategies of the major parties.  When confronted by a 
divisive issue, factions within the party began to employ the same rhetoric they used to fight 
opponents outside the party.  Part of this process was defining the attitudes and philosophy of those 
opponents as incompatible with the identity of the party.  As such pro-banking Democrats began to 
feel increasingly as though they had been divorced from the mainstream Democratic Party, and 
would increasingly cooperate with the Whigs to obstruct the policies of what they considered the 
radical wing of the Party. 
     Locofoco rhetoric was successful because it tapped into key themes which had been worked into 
ƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇduring the administration of Andrew Jackson.  At a time when the 
Democratic administration was becoming unpopular owing to economic disruption, reaffirming 
these themes was of vital importance.  In Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age John William Ward 
argued that Jacksonian virtues can be understood as the combination of nature, providence and will 
 W  nature being natural sense rather than extensive education and training, will being the strength of 
personality and ambition to succeed, and providence being the blessing of God upon American 
enterprise.65  These themes have a natural affinity with the rhetoric of negative state philosophy.  
There is no need for education if a man can develop natural common sense; no need for social 
reform if each man ought to be free to exercise his own will as he sees fit; no need for a positive 
intervention by the state in the affairs of men if providence guides the actions of each individual in 
it.  State intervention, of any kind, rigged the game unfairly in favour of a privileged few.  Lawrence 
Frederick Kohl noted that the standard form of Jacksonian rhetoric was accusatory, and that the 
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:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶ “ůŽŽŬĞĚŽƵƚŽŶĂǁŽƌůĚŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚƚŽƚŚǁĂƌƚŚŝƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?66  Thus shifting rhetorical 
targets from the BUS to state banking issues reaffirmed Jacksonian negative state theories as 
mainstream Democratic thought.  
     The Depression and the shift it caused in Democratic political philosophy allowed Whigs to 
redefine their political philosophy into a form which contrasted that of the Democratic Party. Whigs 
preached a philosophy of positive, conservative government, communicating this to the electorate 
through rhetoric that hinged on a concrete legislative record and reference to liberty, particularly 
defence of democracy through opposition to executive tyranny.  Whigs argued that the Depression 
ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƌĞĐŬůĞƐƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh^ĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
ŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?dŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ “ƌĞĐŬůĞƐƐĂŶĚ QŝŶĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞ ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐǁĞƌĞĂƚƚŚĞ
 “ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůŽƵƌƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ?ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ?ĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐĂůĂŵŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĞWhig 
Almanac in 1838.67  Whig rhetoric sought to recast the terms in which New Yorkers understood the 
appropriate sphere and scope of legislative action.  It promoted the argument that government had 
a responsibility to act to protect the general well-being of its citizens; a positive theory of 
government which stressed that liberty could only be fostered and protected by an active and 
engaged legislature.  It was this positive theory of government which allowed the Whigs to stress 
that the Whig Party had an abiding interest in the welfare and prosperity of all sections of society, 
not just the wealthy. 
     'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůƐƉĞĞĐŚƚŽƚŚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬƐƐĞŵďůǇŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĚĞŵonstrated the 
transformation that he and similar politicians were effecting in Whig rhetoric.  Lamenting that, 
 “ĂŶŐƌǇƉĂƐƐŝŽŶƐ Q ?ŚĂĚ ?ĂǀĂŝůĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŽĨĚŝƐĂƐƚƌŽƵƐ Q ?ƚŝŵĞƐ ?ƚŽƐƵďǀĞƌƚƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶ
ƐŽŵĞŽĨŽƵƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚƌĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽ “ĚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƚĞƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽ
bring forward measures of rash and intemperate legislation, have subsided under a prevalent 
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67 Whig Party (N.Y.), dŚĞtŚŝŐůŵĂŶĂĐĂŶĚWŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶ ?ƐZĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?, New York 1838, p. 3. 
38 
 
ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐǁŝƐĞƌƚŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂŶƚŽĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ ? ?68  Seward attacked corruption in the Erie 
Canal boaƌĚ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŝƚĂƐĂ ? “ŐƌĞĂƚ ?ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐ ?ƵŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƉŽǁĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚ ? “ƚŚƵƐŐƌŽǁŶƵƉ
ƵŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƌĞĨŽƌŵƚŽĞŶĚ “ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƉĞƌŝŶƚĞŶĚĂŶƚƐĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŽƌƐ Q
ďĞŝŶŐůĞĨƚƚŽƚŚĞƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞŽƌĐĂƉƌŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐĂŶĂůĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ?69^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ rhetoric combined 
conservative impulses; preservation, continuity, respect for established law and order, with an 
attack on a Democratic corruption.  The reforms he suggested, limiting the term of office of canal 
commissioners and making their appointment subject to a popular vote, are reminiscent of those 
championed by the Democratic Party during the late 1820s and early 1830s.  This rhetoric was 
ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽĂ “ŐƌĞĂƚ ?ĂŶĚ “ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐ ?ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ
democratic institutions against which the Whigs were defending the people of New York.  
ĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞtŚŝŐŐĂŝŶƐŝŶƚŚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?^ĞǁĂƌĚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ? “dŚĞǌĞĂůĂŶĚ
patriotism manifested in our elections, prove that vigilance, the guardian of liberty is yet unsleeping; 
 QǀŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝŐŚƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŚĂƐŐŝǀĞŶƌĞŶĞǁĞĚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞŽĨƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?70  This kind of rhetoric tied the identity and ideology of the party to the defence of 
popular liberties that motivated American voters; equality, liberty and opportunity.  At the same 
ƚŝŵĞ ?ŝƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĞŝĚĞĂƐĂƐĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŝĚĞĂůƐ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŶĞǁ ?
dangerous ideas which had caused disruption in the economic life of the state.  His language called 
for conservatism and preservation, not change; calm support as opposed to angry, radical overhaul.  
In the face of the Democratic schism which had tarred that party with radicalism, if only temporarily, 
the success of this rhetoric for the Whigs showed the importance of maintaining a conservative 
party identity. 
     John Ashworth claims in Agrarians and Aristocrats ƚŚĂƚŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵtŚŝŐƐǁĞƌĞ “ƌĞƉĞůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
levelling offensive of the Jacksonians and suspicious of the claims that were now being made for the 
                                                          
68 George E. Baker, (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. II, New York 1853, p. 183-184. 
69 Ibid. p. 186 -187. 
70 Ibid. p. 184. 
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ŶĞǁĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĨŽƌŵŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?71  But this misinterprets Whig attitudes.  Rather, Whig 
rhetoric began to convey an intensely egalitarian message that stressed the positive role the state 
had to play in fostering that egalitarianism.  Whig rhetoric communicated the economic principles 
ƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇǁĂƐĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚƚĞƌŵƐ ?ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬtŚŝŐƐ ?
ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŵĂůůĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇŝƐƐƵĞĚƵƌŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ ? ? ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ
Democratic Legislature had passed a law prohibiting the issuance of small denomination bills ($5 or 
ƐŵĂůůĞƌ ?ďǇEĞǁzŽƌŬďĂŶŬƐ ?ĞƐŝŐŶĞĚĂƐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨĂ “ŚĂƌĚŵŽŶĞǇ ?ĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ?ƚŚŝƐůĂǁ
became intensely unpopular when the Depression struck and specie became increasingly difficult to 
acquire following the suspension of specie payments.  Whigs took up repeal of the 1835 small bills 
ůĂǁĂƐĂĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉŝƐƐƵĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?/ŶĂƐƉĞĞĐŚŐŝǀĞŶĂƚƵďƵƌŶ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ
focussed on similar themes to those that had been staples of Democratic oratory over the previous 
decade, in particular the right of the electorate to see popular opinion regulate the actions of the 
legislature.  As public opinion regarding the Democratic administration of the state was soured by 
the Depression, Seward turned that rhetoric upon the Democrats.   
Accustomed as the people have been to hear from the organs and representatives of the 
administration, while it was in the majority, language of unqualified respect and 
unconditional submission to the popular will, they looked without distrust to the legislature 
for repeal of the obnoxious law.  Nor could they believe that honorable men could so far 
forget their respect to constituency, or reluctant public servants so much undervalue the 
intelligence of the people, as to seek to evade the popular will, fully and unequivocally 
expressed.72 
Seward pointed out the 1837 legislature, dominated by Whigs, had answered this demand.  
However the State Senate, controlled by the Democrats, amended the bŝůů ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞďŝůů ?Ɛ
 “ŵƵƚŝůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇŚĂĚĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĂŶĚƌŝŐŚƚĞŽƵƐ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?73  By effectively arguing that the Democrats had 
courted public opinion whilst taking legislative action which flagrantly ignored it, Seward 
                                                          
71 John Ashworth, Agrarians and Aristocrats: Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-1846, London 
1983, p. 2. 
72, George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. III, New York 1853 p. 357. 
73Ibid. p. 359-60. 
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ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝƚƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂƐdŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĂƌƚǇ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ
simultaneously allowing Whigs to challenge it for that mantle.  The focus on the issue of small 
denomination bills is an example of the way Whigs had begun to reshape their rhetorical strategy.  
While remaining dedicated to the economic principles upon which the party had been founded, 
Whigs in New York had begun to communicate them to the electorate in ways that were designed to 
appeal to the mass of the electorate  W issues, such as lack of specie and declining economic 
opportunity, which voters confronted in their day to day lives, as opposed to abstract large scale 
economic designs. 
     Between 1836 and 1840, both Whig and Democratic rhetorical methods evolved.  For the Whigs 
this was chiefly in regard to how they legitimised their politics.  Recognising that the Democrats had 
successfully portrayed them as the party of privilege and wealth, they attempted to reform their 
rhetoric to convey the ideas of the party as being in response to expressions of popular will.  They 
ĞŵƵůĂƚĞĚƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ŐůŽƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂũŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ŐĞŶŝƵƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞ
new interpretation of legislators as bearing a responsibility to the desires of their constituents.  For 
the Democrats, the aftermath of the Bank War and the onset of the Depression forced them to 
confront the direction in which party rhetoric was taking them.  Both Democrats and Whigs 
supported internal improvements for the state.  By 1840, both had accepted the notion of 
corporations, and Democrats did not seek to roll back, or even permanently halt internal 
improvement projects such as the Erie Canal.  As such, both parties sought out issues which allowed 
them to differentiate themselves from their opponents.  For Democrats this process became 
divisive, alienating members of the party whose economic attitudes were not completely divorced 
from those of the Whig Party. 
     Through their respective responses to the crash, the Whig and Democratic Parties redefined their 
ideologies in more polarized terms.  The parties used rhetoric which stressed their fundamental 
philosophic difference from their opponents, whilst at the same time continuing to relate their ideas 
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to the same abstract concepts which were at the centre of contemporary American political thought.  
However the process of seeking out issues through which to polarise the identity of the party from 
its opposition led to inflexibility in party rhetoric which exacerbated internal division.  The small 
denomination bill issue provides an example of this.  Whigs attacked Democratic resistance to the 
issuance of small denomination bills at a time when that party was suffering internal conflict 
between its pro-banking wing and the emerging Locofocos, who were intractably dedicated to hard 
money principles.  Locofocos linked these principles to their efforts to defend the Party from 
 “ĚĞƐƉŝĐĂďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?ǁŚŽ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞŐĂƌĚĨŽƌĞǆƉĞĚŝŶĐǇ ?ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƌŝŐht to compromise 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?74  Locofocos were dedicated to what they regarded as the true principles of 
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶŝĂŶŝƐŵ ? “ĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞ ?ĂŶƚŝ-ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ?ŚĂƌĚŵŽŶĞǇŵĞŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĞƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŝŶ
their efforts to gain control of the state party.75  As such the party was left open to attacks on the 
basis of hard money credentials which not all of its members held.  In addition, it broke down the 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞ ?ďŽƚŚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĂƐ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐ
could not abandon one of the central pillars of their economic principles.  Whigs had a similar 
problem with the issue of a national bank.  Unpopular with the electorate, and yet central to Whig 
economic theory, one way in which the Whigs benefited from Democratic victory in the Bank War 
was that it removed this issue from public discourse.  The rhetoric of 1836 to 1840 revealed one of 
the key weaknesses of the rhetorical strategies of the New York parties of the Second Party Era; 
when confronted with issues that divided party opinion, parties often dissolved into acrimonious 
intra-party conflict.  Conflicts were settled by a continuous re-assertion of the party identity in 
increasingly fixed terms upon the issue, usually to the severe detriment of one or another faction.  
As more and more problems confronted the parties, this increasingly reduced the overall flexibility 
ŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
                                                          
74 Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, The History of the Loco-foco, Or Equal Rights Party: Its Movements, Conventions and 
Proceedings, New York 1842, p. 15. 
75 Ibid. p.  16. 
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     An important part of this phenomenon was the way that both parties used rhetoric to establish 
the terms of the debates in which they were engaged.  Both parties used language which portrayed 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐ
engaged in undermining and manipulating the public faith.  They regularly asserted that they were 
attempting to present the public with reality, while their opponents attempted to deceive them.  
Thus Seward entitled his speech on Democratic obstruction of the repeal of prohibition of small 
ĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďŝůůƐ “dŚĞdƌƵĞ/ƐƐƵĞ ? ?ŽƚŚ parties also framed debate in a way which supported the 
argument that they were defending conservative American values from the radicalism of their 
opponents  W Whigs would quickly begin to refer to all Democrats as Locofocos, hoping to capitalise 
on the radical reputation of that faction.  Locofocos in turn would routinely declare their loyalty to 
the Jeffersonian ideals upon which the Democratic Party had been founded.  Both parties predicated 
their arguments on attempting to preserve the republican virtue and ideals of the revolutionary 
generation  W to preserve and continue what their illustrious fathers had established.  This rhetorical 
strategy was employed regardless of how radical the reality of legislation proposed actually was, and 
served as a way of legitimising the policy agendas of both parties.  The crucial element that 
differentiates the two is their respective dedication to positive and negative state theory.  It was 
these opposing philosophies which allowed New York Whigs and Democrats to differentiate 
themselves from each other, while still promoting the same goals  W a society of social, legal and 









     By 1840 the New York Whig and Democratic Parties had developed identifiable rhetorical 
strategies.  This process had been particularly concerned with developing distinctions between the 
two parties.  The problem this posed to the Whigs and Democrats was that they had a great deal in 
common.  Both supported democratic government and institutions.  Both were supportive of the 
development of economic and financial institutions.  Both promised the same things to the 
electorate  W equality of opportunity, the development of democratic government.  Both favoured 
the expansion of internal improvements in the state, albeit via different means and at different 
rates.  In order to clearly differentiate themselves from one another, both parties developed 
ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?dŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇǁĂƐ cast 
ĂƐĂĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŝďĞƌƚǇ ?dŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇǁĂƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ
and philosophies subversive and dangerous to democratic government and processes.  This method 
had an intrinsic weakness which the final five years of the 1830s revealed in the Democratic Party.  It 
became increasingly apparent that while rhetoric which differentiated between the parties by 
casting opposition as un-democratic was effective in inter-party conflict, it was found to be equally 
effective in intra-party conflict.  The election of 1840 served as an example of how this kind of 
rhetoric could cause severe intra-party schisms.  
     The election of 1840 was the first time that the Whig Party unified behind a single candidate, 
General William Henry Harrison.  The importance of the candidate to Whig election rhetoric was 
made clear during the nomination process at the Whig convention at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 
1839.  Harrison was opposed for the nomination by Henry Clay and General Winfield Scott.  A letter 
in which General Scott had expressed opinions of an excessively anti-slavery stance led to his 
exclusion.  Thurlow Weed meanwhile was determined that Henry Clay should not receive the 
ŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?tĞĞĚǁĂƐ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĚǀŝƐĞƌ ? ĂŶĚǁĂƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚůĂǇ ?Ɛ
nomination as he believed that the Whigs required a candidate with a less chequered past.  Weed 
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wanted to use the kind of rhetorical methods that the Democrats had employed since 1828, but that 
rhetoric could not accommodate Clay as a candidate.  The selection of William Henry Harrison, a 
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǀĞƚĞƌĂŶǁĂƐĨĂƌŵŽƌĞƉƌĞĨĞƌĂďůĞ ?,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐǇĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽtŚŝŐƐƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
of policy in favour of rhetoric which allowed the party to recast its image and increase its support 
among the electorate. 
     dŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐĂƐƚŚĞĂƌĐŚĞƚǇƉĂůǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶďĞŐĂŶĂƚƚŚĞ
ŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶǁĂƐĚĞƉŝĐƚĞĚ “ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŽŶŚŝƐĨĂƌŵ ?
which is his daily employŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶŚŝƐĚĂŝůǇďƌĞĂĚ ? ?ĂŶ ƵŶƉƌĞƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ
ŵĂŶǁŚŽŵĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ ? “ďǇĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞŽĨŚŝƐĚƌĞƐƐ ?ĨƌŽŵĂŶǇŽĨŚŝƐďƌŽƚŚĞƌ
ĨĂŵĞƌƐ ? ?76  While his eleven year military career was covered extensively, only a tiny amount of 
attention was given to his legislative record.  A brief allusion referred to an act he had persuaded 
Congress to pass requiring public lands to be sold in small tracts, which provided a sop to Clay 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂǀĞƌƌĞĚ ?ĂůůŽǁĞĚ “ĞǀĞƌǇƉŽŽƌŵĂŶŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝĨŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝŽƵƐ ? Q ?ƚŽ ?
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĨƌĞĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? ?77This was a foretaste of Whig campaign rhetoric which 
redefined the party as the promoter of opportunity for Americans seeking to improve their social 
and economic status.  dŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐtŚŝŐĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐďǇƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŚŝƐ
conservatism, dedication to the legacy of the Revolutionary generation and the Whig principle of 
opposition to executive tyranny, explaining that,  
he has always been a Democratic Republican of the school of Washington, Jefferson and 
Madison; he detests the agrarian, infidel principles which are gaining power and influence at 
ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĚĂǇ QƌĞƐŝƐƚƐƚŚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƚŚĂƚthe spoils belong to the victors, and that an 
executive officer of government may assume the responsibility of construing the 
constitution and laws of the country for selfish or party purposes.78 
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rhetoric in the 1840 presidential campaign.  Whig rhetoric did not focus on Harrison as a politician; it 
focused on Harrison as an example of the image of the Whig American that the party sought to 
develop.  It clearly defined this identity, and then presented it to the public.  It was an effort to 
define what it meant to be a Whig in terms which were attractive to the greatest possible number of 
people. 
     The Whig Party employed Harrison in the same way the Democratic Party had employed Jackson 
in 1828.  Whigs elbowed campaign rhetoric into every possible part of life.  In New York a book of 
stories and anecdotes for children about Harrison was printed by J. P. Giffing, who published a 
number of pieces of Harrison campaign literature, with the recommendation it be read to children.  
ThĞǀŽůƵŵĞĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶĂ ? “republican hero  W ƉůĂŝŶ ?ƵŶŽƐƚĞŶƚĂƚŝŽƵƐ ?ĂŶĚďĞŶĞǀŽůĞŶƚ QĂpatriot 
ǁŚŽƐĞĚĞůŝŐŚƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŽƐĞƌǀĞŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?79  tŚŝŐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚ
ŽĨsĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƚĂƉŝŶƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐǇŽĨ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŵĂŐĞ ?tŚŝŐƐ
ĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞsĂŶƵƌĞŶůŝǀĞĚŝŶŽƉƵůĞŶĐĞ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶŚĂĚĨŽƌƐĂŬĞŶ ? “ƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐŽĨŚŝƐǇŽƵƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? Q ?ƚŽ ?ŐŽĨŽƌƚŚŝŶƚŽŽƵƌǁĞƐƚĞƌŶǁŝůĚƐ W [and] amid toils, privations and 
sufferings, rĂŝƐĞĚŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŽŚŽŶŽƵƌĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞďǇŚŝƐŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ? ?80  Whig rhetoric 
ƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝŵĂŐĞďǇĐĂƐƚŝŶŐ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶĂƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂůŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ? “ŚƵŵĂŶĞĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĂƐ
ǁĞůůĂƐďƌĂǀĞ QĂZWh>/EŝŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐŝŶŽƌŝŐŝŶal text]; they offered 
,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶĂƐƚŚĞĂƌĐŚĞƚǇƉĂůtŚŝŐ ?ĞƐƉŽƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚĞƐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨtŚŝŐŐĞƌǇ ? “ƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŚĂƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŽĂĨĞĂƌĨƵůĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? ? “ŚĞŝƐŝŶĨĂǀŽƌŽĨƐƵĐŚ
judicious tariff regulations as shall provide for the actual wants of the government, and protect the 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?ŚĞ “ŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚƉĂƐƐƉŽƌƚƐƚŽŽĨĨŝĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚƚŽƉĂƌƚǇ ?
                                                          
79  Capt. Miller (Psued.),  “,ĞƌŽŽĨdŝƉƉĞĐĂŶŽĞ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞ^ƚŽƌy of the Life of William Henry Harrison.  Related by 
Captain Miller to his Boys, New York 1840, p. 5. 
80Ibid, p. 6. 
46 
 
ďƵƚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?81  Whigs used Harrison rhetoric to recast the identity of the party.  Harrison was 
presented as a frontiersman, warrior, patriot, humble farmer, generous Christian, industrious 
labourer, and devoid of the aristocratic airs his supporters claimed were adopted by Democratic 
office holders.  Through avoiding discussion of policy and focussing on presenting a candidate whose 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ “ŝĚĞĂůŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ? ?tŚŝŐƐ
threw off the image of elitism and dedication to the interests of the wealthy cultivated by the 
Democrats over the 1830s.  By doing so they legitimised Whiggery as a democratic ideology. 
     Whigs echoed the tactics of the Democratic 1828 campaign of developing an image of their 
candidate based on popular conceptions of the ideal American.  Whig rhetoric also adopted the 
offensive element of this strategy, re-defining their opponents identity as one that was not just 
unappealing, but hostile to the electorate.  Van Buren was relentlessly attacked as an aristocratic, 
untrustworthy despot, grossly out of touch with the electorate.  Whig papers around the country re-
printed the speech of Congressman Charles Ogle of Pennsylvania, entitled On the Regal Splendour of 
the Presidential Palace ?sĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ĐŚĂƌŐĞĚKŐůĞ ?ůŝǀĞĚŝŶ “a PALACE as splendid as that of the 
Caesars, and ĂƐƌŝĐŚůǇĂĚŽƌŶĞĚĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŽƵĚĞƐƚƐŝĂƚŝĐŵĂŶƐŝŽŶ ? ?82 [Italics and capitals in the original]  
,ĞŚĂĚĐŽƌƌƵƉƚĞĚ ? “ƚŚĞƉůĂŝŶ ?ƵŶŽƐƚĞŶƚĂƚŝŽƵƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶŵĂŶŶĞƌƐŽĨŽƵƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ďǇĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
vain desires for external show and for foolish displays of splendour [sic ? ? ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶǁĂƐ
ŶŽǁŝŶĨĞƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŽĨĨŝĐĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǀǇŝŶŐ “ǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌƚŽŵĂŬĞĂƐƉůĞŶĚŝĚĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ?
ĞǀĞŶĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞŝƌƌĂŶŬĂŶĚŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?83  In comparing the decadence of the president to the 
struggles of working men Ogle truly hit his stride.  His speech included lists of grand and opulent 
furniture, landscaping works, decorations and fine food and drink, and was capped with a searing 
indictment of the President for his immoral expenditure at the expense of poor AmĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ? “dŚĞ
                                                          
81  An Old Democrat (Pseud), The Contrast: Or, Plain Reasons William Henry Harrison Should be Elected 
President of the United States, and why Martin Van Buren Should not be Re-Elected, New York 1840, p. 2, 3 & 
6. 
82 Charles Ogle, The Splendour of the President's Palace; Delivered in the House of Representatives, April 14th, 
1840, Washington 1840, p. 1. 
83Ibid. p. 20. 
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poor laborer with his fifty cents a day, has not only to provide his own coffee pot and pewter 
spoons, but he is compelled to purchase a coffee pot for the President, and pay for the spoons used 
ďǇƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ ? ?ƐƚŽƌŵĞĚKŐůĞ ?84  These accusations had little substance; Van Buren, the 
son of a tavern keeper, was hardly the pampered aristocrat that Whig rhetoric portrayed him as, and 
Harrison, a former general, congressman, senator and governor was hardly a homespun man of the 
people.  The real point of these attacks was to change the popular identity of the Whig Party to one 
which was more competitive in the political environment of the Second Party Era.  By attacking Van 
Buren in the same way as the Democrats had attacked John Quincy Adams, the Whig Party recast 
itself as the defender of American liberties from a corrupt and aristocratic executive. 
     Whig rhetoric portrayed republican virtue as being synonymous with labour, and developed an 
image of a virtuous republican poor, forced into hardship by the corruption and incompetence of 
ƵŶĐĂƌŝŶŐ ?ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŽĨĨŝĐĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?tŚŝŐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƚŝĞĚƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƚŽ
ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐŽĨƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇ ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐƚƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇŝng 
ĂŶĚƐĂůĞŽĨƉƵďůŝĐůĂŶĚŝŶƐŵĂůůƚƌĂĐƚƐǁĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŽƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇ “ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ QƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝŽƵƐƉŽŽƌ ? ?85  
ƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐďĞŶĞǀŽůĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŽƌǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞsĂŶƵƌĞŶ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƌĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞƌŝĐĂns during the depression.  
,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶǁŽƵůĚ ? “ƚĂŬĞĐĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞpoor as well as the ƌŝĐŚ ? ?86   “/ĂŵůŝŬĞǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ ?'ĞŽƌŐĞ ?ƉŽŽƌ ?ĂŶĚ
ŚĂǀĞƚŽůĂďŽƵƌĨŽƌŵǇůŝǀŝŶŐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌůŽŶŐƚŽŝůĂŶĚŚĂƌĚǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨŵǇĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
Harrison to a poor former soldier in one of the anecdotes presented in  “,ĞƌŽŽĨdŝƉƉĞĐĂŶŽĞ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞ
Story of the Life of William Henry Harrison ?ĂƐŚĞŚĂŶĚĞĚŚŝƐĨŽƌŵĞƌĐŽŵƌĂĚĞ “ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĐŽĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞ ?
ĞǆĐĞƉƚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂĚďĂƌĞŽŶĞŽŶŵǇďĂĐŬ ? ?87Whigs had embraced the change in the relationship 
between representatives and constituents, and presented their candidates as men of the people.  
                                                          
84Ibid, p. 25. 
85  Whig National Convention, Proceeding of the Democratic Whig National Convention, which assembled at 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the Fourth of December, 1839, for the Purpose of Nominating Candidates for 
President and Vice-President of the United States, Harrisburg 1839, p. 40. 
86  Capt. Miller (Psued.),  “,ĞƌŽŽĨdŝƉƉĞĐĂŶŽĞ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞ^ƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝĨĞŽĨtŝůůŝĂŵ,ĞŶƌǇ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ.  Related by 
Captain Miller to his Boys, New York 1840, p. 114. 
87Ibid, p. 101. 
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Whigs seized upon the jibe of a Democratic newspaper which had claimed Harrison was better off 
sitting on the porch of his log cabin and drinking hard cider than running for office at his age.  The 
Whigs exploited this blunder; the log cabin became the first political campaign symbol.  A campaign 
newspaper entitled The Log Cabin was established with Horace Greeley, who later founded the New-
York Tribune, one of the most influential papers of the era.  Greeley went on to play a major part in 
Whig and Republican politics, and he achieved national circulation with the Log Cabin.  The use of 
ƚŚĞůŽŐĐĂďŝŶĂŶĚŚĂƌĚĐŝĚĞƌƐǇŵďŽůƐ ?ƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐed poverty and the contrast 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚǁŝƚŚsĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚĚĞĐĂĚĞŶĐĞ ?ǁĞƌĞĂůůƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞ
ƚŚĞtŚŝŐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĂƚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ
their aims as measures in defence of American liberties. 
     tŚŝŐƐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚ
ďĞĐŽŵĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?tŚŝŐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚƚŚĞƌĞĨƵƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞsĂŶƵƌĞŶƚŽ
intervene in economic affairs to relieve the suffering of New Yorkers who had lost jobs, businesses 
ĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŵĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?/ƚĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶŐEĞǁzŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞ
Farmer fair prices for the products of his farm ; the same to the Mechanic for his work ; and to the 
>ĂďŽƌŝŶŐDĂŶ ?KE^dEdDW>KzDEd ?Z^KE>t'^ ?EWZKDWdWz ? ?ĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐŝŶ
original text].88  This was a departure from Whig rhetoric of the early 1830s, which tended to stress 
broad economic principles based on grand designs of development.  By focussing on what they 
claimed would be the results of their philosophy, as opposed to specific policy agendas, Whigs made 
their economic theories more appealing to New Yorkers who were frustrated by the lack of support 
they had received from the government during the Depression. 
     Democratic rhetoric in the 1840 presidential campaign was shaped by difficulties arising from 
internal divisions within the party.  The emergence of the Locofocos was an education for the 
Democrats in how destructive to party success the rhetorical strategies they used against their 
                                                          
 88Ibid. p. 3. 
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opponents could be when used in intra-party conflict.89  The Locofoco insurgency was made effective 
by the use of rhetoric that openly challenged their opponents for control of the party identity.  In 
 ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐŝƐƐƵĞĚĂ “ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂƚĂŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŚĞůĚĂƚhƚŝĐĂ ?dŚŝƐĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ĚŝƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚ “ĂŶǇŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽƌĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐĂŶǇŶĞǁƉĂƌƚǇ ?ďƵƚĚĞĐůĂƌĞŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů
Democratic party, our whole object being political reformation by reviving the landmarks and 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?90  The Locofocos language sought to establish that they were the 
legitimate representatives of the true principles of the Democratic Party.  They therefore had the 
right to claim the loyalty of all Democratic supporters.  Their rhetoric aimed to hijack the party 
identity.  They were successful because they conveyed their principles in terms that were difficult for 
their opponents to challenge, by framing them in the same terms as challenges to Adams 
Republicans and the Whig Party; as a defence of egalitarian principles and the legacy of the 
Revolutionary generation 
     Having thrown down the gauntlet before the pro-banking wing of the party, the Locofocos went 
on to define clearly what they coŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞ “ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?91This started with an 
assertion of the equal rights of all citizens, but quickly translated that simple statement into a 
philosophy which introduced precepts supportive of Locofoco policy aims.  The correct use of 
legislation was to  “ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĂŶĚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŽŶůǇŽƵƌŶĂƚƵƌĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĚƵƚŝĞƐ QŶŽŵĂŶŚĂƐĂŶĂƚƵƌĂů
right to commit aggression on the equal rights of another; and this is all from which the law ought to 
ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶŚŝŵ ? ?92  dŚĞ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐĚĞŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĂůů “ŵŽŶŽƉŽůŝĞƐďǇ legislation, because they are a 
                                                          
89 Although commonly referred to as the Equal Rights Party, in the style of an independent party organisation, 
Equal-Righters were a faction of the New York Democracy, and never operated or attempted to operate as an 
independent party. 
90 Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, The History of the Loco-foco, Or Equal Rights Party: Its Movements, Conventions and 
Proceedings, New York 1842, p. 39. 
91 Note  W /ŚĂǀĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇĂƐƚŚĞ “ƉƌŽ-banking 
ǁŝŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐŚĂƐƚŚĞƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ>ŽĐŽĨĐŽƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚďĂŶŬŝŶŐŝŶĂll its forms, which they did 
ŶŽƚ ?dŚĞ “ƉƌŽ-ďĂŶŬŝŶŐ ?ǁŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚďĂŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŚĂǀĞŶŽƚƵƐĞĚƚŚĞŵŽƌĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů “ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĞƉŝƚŚĞƚ ?ĂƐ/ďĞůŝĞǀĞ
that all politicians in this era essentially maintained that their principles were conservative, in that they were in 
keeping with the aims of the Revolutionary generation (or rather, claimed they were). 




ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞƋƵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨdŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚǇ “ƚŽƚŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĂŶĚ
unconstitutional creation of vested rights by legislation, because they are a usurpation of the 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?93  Locofocos were particularly interested in expanding the rights of 
individuals to become involved in banking.  The movement of the federal deposits to the state banks 
had created a huge expansion in opportunities for credit, and this in turn created a demand for more 
banks.  This demand in turn created spectacular corruption in the legislature, as members began to 
involve themselves in speculation and investment.  But many men were barred access to these 
opportunities.  The Locofocos desired an end to restrictions on the issuance of banking and business 
charters.  They framed these demands in terms which implied that these practices were un-
democratic, and by doing so they used their rhetoric to effectively challenge the pro-banking wing of 
the Party.  This challenge provides evidence of the potential for well-designed rhetoric to change 
ƉƵďůŝĐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?dŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨ
measures which were favourable to the Locofocos, such as the Independent Treasury Act, show that 
this in turn had an impact on the policy aims of the party. 
     Pro-banking Democrats refused to go quietly into the night, and the ensuing struggle highlighted 
major weaknesses in prevalent rhetorical strategies of the Second Party Era in New York.  In the 
months before the 1840 presidential election the division within the party became increasingly 
apparent and destructive to the interests of the state party as a whole.  In 1838, led by former party 
stalwarts such as Nathaniel Tallmadge, pro-banking Democrats met in convention and endorsed 
Seward for Governor.  In a speech given in the U.S. Senate Tallmadge asserted that pro-banking 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ “ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƉĂƌƚǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚďƵƚĂƐŚŽƌƚƚŝŵĞ
since ? ?94  dĂůůŵĂĚŐĞ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĞŵƉůŽǇƐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐǁŚŝĐŚ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐ ?ŚĂĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ
ďĞĞŶƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚĨĂƵůƚůŝŶĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Andrew Jackson  W Symbol For an Age, particularly pages. 13  W 101.  Particularly of note are pages 77-78 which 
expose the weakness of the use of nature to justify Democratic political theories.  
93 Ibid. p. 39-40. 
94 Nathaniel Tallmadge, Remarks of Mr. Tallmadge in Defence of the People of New York, against the Charge of 
Bank Influence, Washington 1838, p 13. 
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throughout the previous decade.  Speaking out against the passage of the Independent Treasury Act, 
dĂůůŵĂĚŐĞĐƵƌƐĞĚƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĂƐĂ “ĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂŶƵŶĨĂŝƌĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?95  Tallmadge attacked the act 
as an example of excessive executive pŽǁĞƌ ?ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬŵŽƐƚŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐ ? “dŚĞ
ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞƚŽŽƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĨŽƌƚŚĞ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞďƌĂŶĐŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚǁĂƐĂ
ƐŝŐŶƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĚ ? ?96  Tallmadge also invoked the 
revolƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂƌŵ QŝƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚďĞǇŽŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ĨĂƚŚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĚĞĞŵĞĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?97  
The rhetorical conflict between the Locofoco and pro-banking factions of the New York Democratic 
Party was the result of rhetoric designed to create stark contrasts between political groups bearing 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?sĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚ Ğ>ŽĐŽĨŽĐŽƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐ
difficult for him not to do so and appear to remain consistent with the principles of Jacksonian 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶŚŝƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƐƚĞŶƵƌĞŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?dŚĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ
employed by parties at the time, branding opponents despotic, dangerous, tyrannical, engaged in 
attempts to subvert the constitution and likely to undermine the fabric of society, meant that true 
reconciliation became difficult, if not impossible.  The result of these divisions, combining with the 
fury of the electorate over the ongoing economic crisis, was unmitigated disaster for the Democratic 
Party at the polls in the state elections of 1838.  Seward was elected by a majority of 10, 421, and 
the Whigs gained control of five of the eight senate seats that were contested, and nearly two-thirds 
of the seats in the assembly.98 
     Democrats knew that in order to win the 1840 election they had to present a unified identity at 
the ballot box, and their effort illustrated the weaknesses inherent to their rhetorical methods.  In 
order to present unity during the 1840 election national Democratic rhetoric attempted to shy away 
from divisive issues in favour of classic attacks on the Whig Party.  Efforts to stress unity of principles 
                                                          
95 Ibid. p. 12-13.  
96 Ibid. p. 13. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Alexander De Alva Stanwood, A Political History of the State of New York Vol II., New York 1906, p. 29.  
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ĂŶĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇǁĞƌĞŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚ ?Ɛ ? ?40 platform.  The platform 
consisted for the most part of staples of Democratic rhetoric from the previous decade but also 
attempted to put the issue of the sub-treasury scheme to rest.  The platform asserted that the Party 
ŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĚŽĞs not confer upon the general government the power to commence 
ĂŶĚĐĂƌƌǇŽŶ ?ĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚƐŽƵŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇĨŽƌďŝĚƚŚĞ
federal government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another, or to cherish the 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨŽŶĞƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŶũƵƌǇŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
 “ĐŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŚĂƐŶŽƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĐŚĂƌƚĞƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂŶŬ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƵĐŚĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽŶĞŽĨĚĞĂĚůǇ
hostility to the best interests of the country, dangerous to our republican institutions and the 
liberties of the people, and calculated to place the business of the country within the control of a 
ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚŵŽŶĞǇƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞůĂǁƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝůůŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?99  Democratic principles 
were expressed in ƚŚĞǀĂŐƵĞƐƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?ĂƐ “ŚŽŶĞƐƚǇŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?[italics in original text], and the 
ƌĞƉƵĚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚůĂǁƐǁŚŝĐŚŐŝǀĞŽŶĞŵĂŶ ?ŽƌĐůĂƐƐŽĨŵĞŶ ?ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽǀĞƌ
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?100  In an attempt to encourage unity at the polls, Democratic spokesmen turned to attacks 
ŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ? “dŚĞƌĞŚĂƐŶŽƚďĞĞŶĂƚŝŵĞ QǁŚĞŶŽƵƌůŝďĞƌƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŝŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĂŶŐĞƌ ? ?
declared the Albany Rough Hewer, a Democratic Newspaper whose editor, Azariah C. Flagg, was a 
prominent member of the Albany Regency.101   “ŽƌƌƵption and fraud are undermining the public 
virtue, and seeking to use, for the destruction of liberty, laws and institutions which have been 
ĚĞǀŝƐĞĚĨŽƌŚĞƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?102  dŚĞ “ĂŶƚŝ-ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐ ? “ĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
mass of mankind have not, and can not have sufficient intelligence or virtue to participate in the 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵďůŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?103  However the absence of tangible policy strategies to oppose those 
of the Whigs highlighted that in order to employ their standard rhetorical strategies, the Democrats 
                                                          
99 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,  ‘Democratic Party Platform of 1840, May 6, 1840 ? ? The American 
Presidency Project, n.d. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29572> [accessed 10 July 2016]. 
100 Democratic Party (N.Y.), Address to the Democratic Electors of the State of New York, Washington 1840, p. 
4, col ii. 
101Ibid. P. 4 col i. 
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were forced to forgo specifying what a Democratic government would mean in practical terms.104  
This was a symptom of the weakness in their rhetorical methods  W in order to preserve unity, it was 
necessary to maintain vague positions on the issues during times of internal turmoil.  
     The rhetoric of the 1840 presidential campaign revealed various tendencies in the rhetoric of the 
New York Parties, particularly that it exacerbated intra-ƉĂƌƚǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?tŝůůŝĂŵ,ĞŶƌǇ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
candidacy shows that party political identity was increasingly based upon development of rhetorical 
identities designed to make the party ideology synonymous with a popular identity of what it meant 
to be an American.  The identities that parties sought to develop focussed on conservatism, 
dedication to democratic principles and the promotion of economic opportunity.  Although both 
parties had distinctive policy strategies, they conveyed the impact of these strategies in the same 
way.  Whigs argued that a positive philosophy of government was necessary to ensure public 
prosperity and an egalitarian society.  Whigs believed government had a responsibility to take an 
active role in the economy to promote prosperity.  Democrats believed that the role of government 
was to ensure that the liberties of individuals were not infringed upon by the actions of others.  They 
argued legislation ought to remove impediments to democratic and economic participation, thereby 
ensuring economic prosperity through equality of opportunity.  However in the election of 1840, 
both parties set these arguments aside.  Whigs did so in favour of the promotion of a campaign that 
sought to develop their party identity as a party of the people, presenting Harrison as the archetypal 
American, hard-working, patriotic, poor but aspiring to economic and social mobility and dedicated 
to assisting his fellow Americans.  Democrats relied on broad assertions of democratic and 
egalitarian principles and attacks on their opponents as elitist and dedicated to the interest of the 
wealthiest sections of the population.  The vagueness of this rhetoric was a result of increasing intra-
party division on both sides.  Whigs suffered from division over the leadership of the party.  
Democrats, much more severely beset, suffered from division over the practical implications of the 
                                                          
104 The subject of the simplification of electioneering language is worthy of more examination than there is 
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party or another anti-democratic.  Owing to the similarities between the parties, this led to schisms 
when a section of the party found its principles and policies attacked in similar terms to the 




















     During the 1840s the intense economic and demographic changes that New York State 
experienced between 1825 and 1860 continued.  Rapid population growth and urbanisation fuelled 
ďǇƌŝƐŝŶŐŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂŶĚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁĂs 
1,372,812, and it increased at a rate of approximately 29% each decade between 1820 and 1860.  
Arising birth rate was augmented by huge increases in the number of immigrants entering the state.  
By 1854 that number had risen to 327,000.105  New York City had a population of 348,943 in 1840, 
and a population of more than 1,000,000 by 1860, by which time nearly one in every four New 
Yorkers lived in New York City.106  Between 1820 and 1840, New York had the highest rate of 
urbanisation in the country.  Utica grew by 330%, Rochester by 1244%, and Buffalo by 769%.107  This 
explosive urban growth included immigrants, particularly Irish, who settled permanently in New 
zŽƌŬ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
     In addition to this rapid increase in population, the state changed dramatically in economic terms 
during the 1840s.  This change was marked by the growth of manufacturing industry in New York.  
By 1840 the state had $55 million invested in manufacturing, which produced an annual $96 million 
in goods.108  The growth of manufacturing industries caused a decline in the traditional ways that 
New Yorkers bought, sold and produced goods; between 1815 and 1855, household manufacture of 
textile goods declined from approximately 16.5 million yards to less than 1 million by 1855.109  
Manufacturing profoundly altered the working relationship between employers and employed.  
Eager to take advantage of larger markets created by transport development and population 
growth, craftsmen and entrepreneurs reduced costs and increased output by breaking down the 
process of production into a series of simple tasks, and hiring large numbers of unskilled workers to 
                                                          
105 Milton M. Klein (ed), The Empire State: A History of New York, New York 2001, p. 311. 
106 Ibid. p. 309. 
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perform the majority of the labour.110  Although this system allowed for increased profits and lower 
prices, it dramatically changed the working lives of New York artisans, who found their skills 
devalued and their economic mobility reduced.  In addition, the new system reduced the amount of 
time that employers spent in the company of their employees, reducing their moral authority and 
status within the community. 
     The political rhetoric used by New York politicians was heavily influenced by changes occurring 
within the state.  Politicians sought to reassure New Yorkers that despite the dramatic changes 
occurring all around them, New York society and politics was still defined by the classic republican 
values upon which so much of their system of politics was based; liberty, equality and opportunity.  
In a state increasingly divided between those who were benefiting from these changes, and those 
were not, this was increasingly a matter of reconciling these abstractions with the new society being 
created by changes in the economy and commercial system.  Historians have argued that the Whig 
ĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨǁhether or not they benefited from these 
changes.  Lawrence Frederick Kohl argued that the Whig Party represented those who welcomed 
and benefited from the change, and Democrats those who opposed and were discomfited by 
change.111  Marvin Meyers, despite claiming that by 1846 the two major parties had reached a 
ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŽŶŵŽƐƚŵĂũŽƌŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚEĞǁzŽƌŬĞƌƐƐƚŝůůĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ “ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌtŚŝŐŚŽƉĞƐ
ĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĨĞĂƌƐ ? ?112  Lee Benson however criticised the established historiography and argued 
that this has created a framework for interpreting the rhetoric (and history) of the two parties that 
has compromised historical research.113  Benson has a point  W the argument of John Ashworth that 
this was essentially a period of populist Democrats against elitist Whigs is untenable when 
                                                          
110 Ibid. p. 325. 
111 Lawrence Frederick Kohl, The Politics of Individualism:  Parties and American Character in the Jacksonian 
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considering the shared egalitarian theme of both parties rhetoric.114  The key to understanding the 
ƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝƐŵŽƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇĂŶŝĞůtĂůŬĞƌ,ŽǁĞ ?ǁŚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ
Democrats and Whigs often differed on means rather than on ends.115 
     tŚŝŐƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĨĞůůŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŵĂũŽƌƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůƚŚĞŵĞƐ ?tŚŝŐƐƵŶŝƚĞĚŽŶĂ
policy of deficit spending between 1838 and 1840, first with a loan of $4 million to complete 
enlargements of the Erie Canal, and then with a recommendation by Gov. William Seward to take a 
loan of a further $12 million for construction of the Genesee Valley and Black River Canals.  By 1841, 
popular opinion had turned against the Whigs.  Seward decided not to run for re-election, having 
lost support because of his refusal to cooperate with Virginia in returning fugitive slaves believed to 
be in New York, and his proposals for special schools for immigrant children.  But the crucial issue 
ǁĂƐ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵŽĨƚŚĞtŚŝŐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ
program in the face of the increasing strength of the anti-state funded improvement wing of the 
Democratic Party.  Whig rhetoric relating to these issues presented a consistent theme of 
defensiveness, a by-product of their holding power and a general social attitude that governments 
should not slip into debt.  It focussed on the benefits a programme of interconnected internal 
improvements offered the electorate, in conjunction with portraying Whig polices as the natural 
ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚƐŽĨĂǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “dŚĞƌŽƚŽŶĂƋƵĞĚƵĐƚŝƐďƵƚŽŶĞŽĨŵĂŶǇ
ǁŽƌŬƐŽĨƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ QƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ
the resources and promote the honor and welfare of the countƌǇ ? ?116  ^ĞǁĂƌĚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ĂŶ
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚůŝŬĞƚŚŝƐ QĐĂƐƚƐĂŵĂŶƚůĞŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůƐƚŽƌĞŚŽƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ? ?117  ŵĂŶƚůĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇ ? “ƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚǇĞŶŐŝŶĞŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƵďůŝĐĐƌĞĚŝƚ ? ?118  
^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶce of conceptions of morality and honour in legitimising 
                                                          
114 John Ashworth ? ‘ŐƌĂƌŝĂŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚƐ ? PWĂƌƚǇ/ĚĞŽůŽŐǇŝŶƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?-1846, London 1983, 
p. 7, 52, 269. 
115 Howe, Daniel Walker, The Political Culture of American Whigs, Chicago 1979, p. 16. 
116 George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. III, New York 1853, p. 233. 
117 Ibid, p. 231. 
118 Ibid, p. 231. 
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legislative policy.  He spoke at great length to discredit ongoing Democratic attempts to sharply 
reduce public spending. 
     These efforts reflected the schism which had developed within the New York Democratic Party.  
The pro-banking wing of the party represented by members of the Albany Regency such as Edwin 
Croswell, editor of the Albany Argus, Daniel Dickinson, William C. Bouck and Horatio Seymour, 
argued for a continuation of the improvements projects at a slower pace.  This faction was 
challenged by anti-paper money, anti-bank Democratic politicians, led by Silas Wright and Arphaxed 
Loomis and Michael Hoffman of Herkimer County.  These men sought the immediate cessation of 
state-funded improvemĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĞƚƌĞŶĐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚĞďƚ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ>ŽŽŵŝƐ ? “WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? W a series of constitutional 
amendments requiring that laws authorising new state debts be submitted directly to the people for 
ratification  W was defeated in the 1841 and 1842 legislatures, debt restriction would reappear in the 
movement for constitutional revision in 1846.  Democratic division emphasised the importance of 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂl principles that they used to define party political identity and 
legitimise their politics, allowing them to unite effectively for state-wide and national elections, 
despite deep, intrinsic divisions within the state party. 
     Both parties developed idĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƌĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚ “ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞďƌŽĂĚůǇƚĞƌŵĞĚ “ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǀŝƌƚƵĞ ? ?
 “ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǀŝƌƚƵĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƐŚĂƌĞĚĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝŵƉortance 
to American conceptions of democracy and public morality.  A consistent theme of rhetoric during 
this period was the responsibility of the public to be active participants in the political system, 
reflected by a high level of voter turnout, and an increase in the number of public offices filled by 
elected candidates.  This theme of civic responsibility was complemented by the sense of communal 
moral responsibility created by the Second Great Awakening. Many Americans believed religion and 
politics were moral matters.  Pastor Gardiner Spring of the New York Brick Presbyterian Church 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? “/ƐƚŚĞƌĞŶŽƚƌĂƚŚĞƌĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐŽĨƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ?ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐƚŚĂƚ
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ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶǁĞĂůƚŚ ?ƚŽƐƉĞĂŬŽĨƚŚĞŵ Q ? ?119  Many ministers agreed, and the pervasive 
morality of political rhetoric and concepts encouraged many to speak at length of the dangers they 
believed threatened their congregations.  Religious and moral elements of political rhetoric 
encouraged a powerful sense of communal responsibility.  This was voluntary, but was presented to 
the public by both parties as necessary not just to protect their prosperity, but also their morality.  
Through their rhetoric both parties developed identities as conservative institutions, dedicated to 
ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǀŝƌƚƵĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂƐƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŽŝƚ ?dŚŝƐ
responsibility was emphasised by similarities between Whig and evangelical rhetoric, particularly in 
terms of the didactic nature of Whig rhetoric that is highlighted by Howe.120 
     In the 1840s, as the state continued to suffer the effects of the Depression of 1837, political 
rhetoric became increasingly influenced by the growing divide between those who benefitted from 
the economic changes affecting the state, and those who did not.  Whig rhetoric attempted to tie 
conceptions of republican virtue, manliness and the preservation of American abstractions, to the 
continuation of their programme of internal improvements.  In a speech given at the celebration of 
the ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌŽƚŽŶƋƵĞĚƵĐƚ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? “ƵŶŵĂŶůǇĚĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐǇ ?ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚEĞǁ
zŽƌŬ ?ƐŚŽŶŽƵƌ ?121  tŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞŵŽƌĞĚĞŐƌĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂŶ ? “ƚŚĞĚŝƐŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚǁŽƌŬ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂƋƵĞĚƵĐƚ ? “ůǇŝŶŐŝŶĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŝƚƐůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨĨŽƌƚǇŵŝůĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞCroton lake to the 
ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ? ?122  ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐŽĨƉƵďůŝĐĨĂŝƚŚŚĂǀĞŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ?
ŝŶũƵƌŝŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐƚŽƉƵďůŝĐŵŽƌĂůƐ ? ?ŚĞĂƐƐƵƌĞĚŚŝƐĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ ?
 “ŽƵƌƐƚĂƚĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚƌĞǀĞŶƵĞs, sure and unfailing, equal to the support of government 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂůůŚĞƌĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĚĞďƚƐ ? ?123  ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
state debt had created, particularly in relation to the notion of public character, and the communal 
                                                          
119 Gardiner Spring, The Danger and Hope of the American People: A Discourse, New York 1843, p. 3-4. 
120 Howe, Daniel Walker, The Political Culture of American Whigs, Chicago 1979, p. 33.  
121 George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. III, New York 1853, p. 234. 
122 Ibid. p. 233. 
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fear of the humiliation of inability to meet debt.  These notions were related to a declining system of 
ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
warning of the unmanliness of abandoning internal improvements developed the link between 
public virtue and legislative actions of government, presenting them in a positive light by associating 
them with conservative themes; honour, manliness, public morality, etc. 
     Democrats, on the other hand, warned of the dangers to morality presented by the new market 
economy and credit system that Whigs advocated using to fund internal improvements.  Writing for 
a supplement of the New York Diamond in 1841, Gilbert Vale, a Jacksonian economist and political 
theorist, aƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŚŽůĚŶŽĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŐŽŽĚǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚŵĞƌĞůǇƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŚĞ
accumulation of wealth at the expense of moral principles, health, or rational refinements of the 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?124  Democratic rhetoric attacked professions and business practices which were encouraged 
by the changes occurring in the economy, and offered the opportunity for rapid accumulation of 
ǁĞĂůƚŚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŽƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů “ŵĂŶůǇ ?ůĂďŽƵƌ W that which was physical and productive.  
 “tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŽƌŚĂƐďĞĞŶĨƌĞƚƚŝŶŐŚŝƐďƌŝĞĨĐĂƌĞĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŽĨƵŶƌĞĂůƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
William G. Boggs, editor of the New York Evening Post ? “ƚŚĞŚĂƌĚǇĨŝƐŚĞƌŵĂŶŚĂƐƉůŽƵŐŚĞĚƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚ
and beautiful Pacific, and drawn from its fathomless abyss the monarch of the sea, and returned to 
enrich ŚŝƐďĞůŽǀĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?125[Italics in original text].  The fisherman performed a physical labour  W 
his industry was not an unnatural invention of the modernising market system, but was rather in 
manly, virtuous symbiosis with natural order.  This kiŶĚŽĨŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ “t/>>ƌĞǁĂƌĚĞĚ ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚ
ŽŐŐƐ ?ĨŽƌ ? “dŚŝƐŝƐĂůĂǁŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/ŶĨŝŶŝƚĞDŝŶĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐ
trenched upon, be sure that some foul hand hath embarrassed the free action of the social 
ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ ? ?126  This kind of rhetoric fit comfortably with wider Democratic principles; rejection of 
                                                          
124 Joseph L. Blau, Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy, Indianapolis & Cambridge 2003, p. 203. [Article 
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centralised power and support of laissez faire social and economic theories.  In addition to this, it 
leant these economic and social theories a clear moral value, which was contrasted with the moral 
vacuity of the world which Democrats claimed the Whig party wished to create. 
     dŚĞƌŝƐŬƚŽƚŚĞ “ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ŽƌŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŝƐĂƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
this period.  Political rhetoric often addressed the issue of debt through morally themed rhetoric; 
 “ƌĞĚŝƚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƵƉŽŶŵĞĂŶƐ ?ďƵƚƵƉŽŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚEĞǁzŽƌŬtŚŝŐ
Joseph Blunt, while the Democratic Review ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞ^ƚĂƚĞŝƐŝŶŚĂďŝƚĞĚďǇĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ
of honest men, who aƌĞŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƉĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĚĞďƚƐ ? ?127dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
meet debt was a facet of the conservatism of Whig and Democratic rhetoric.  Debt payment carried 
a strong moral element  W inability to meet debt was considered dishonourable.  The major parties 
promoted themselves as holding conservative attitudes, and in the process engaged in a struggle 
either to define conservatism in new terms, or reassert it in the old ones, through dedication to 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ “ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?tŚŝůĞtŚŝŐƐ presented their arguments as the continuation of a 
conservative program of development designed to preserve public virtue and ensure general 
opportunity, the Democrats presented themselves as defending New Yorkers from the corrupting 
influences of the Whig economic vision.  In a speech made during the 1842 Tariff debates in the 
,ŽƵƐĞŽĨZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŵĂŶ&ĞƌŶĂŶĚŽtŽŽĚĂƐŬĞĚǁĂƐ ? “ƚŚĞĨŽƐƚĞƌŝŶŐĐĂƌĞŽĨ Q
government to be exerted for their particular benefit, to the detriment of every other class[? ? ?128  
dŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ǁĞƌ “ŝŶŝƋƵŝƚŽƐ ?sic], anti-democratic, and 
ƵŶĞƋƵĂů ? ?129  dŚĞŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌƐŽĨŚŝƐDĂŶŚĂƚƚĂŶĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ “ŶŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƌĚŽĨ
ŚŽŶĞƐƚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? W ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ ? “ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐĚĞĂƌĞƌƚŽ Q ?ƚŚĞŵ ? ƚŚĂŶƉĞĐƵŶŝĂƌǇĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?130  While 
neither party opposed economic development, they ascribed different risks to the honour of the 
state that were incumbent to that development.  Whigs stressed the shame of failure to complete 
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projects already started, while Democrats warned of the dishonour of failure to meet debts 
contracted for that purpose. 
     The principles on which New York politicians based their rhetoric were tightly bound to popular 
abstractions and concepts that both parties used to legitimise their politics, and discredit that of 
their opponents.  These abstract concepts were shared between the two parties.  Discussing the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĞƋƵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐ^ĞǁĂƌĚĂǀĞƌƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉƵƌĞǁŚŝŐĐƌĞĞĚ ?ǁĂƐ “ĞƋƵĂů ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?131  Democrat William G. Boggs, editor of the Evening Post defined a 
ŐŽŽĚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƐ “ŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚŬŶŽǁƐŶŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝƚƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ďƵƚƚƌĞĂƚƐall alike, 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇďĞƌŝĐŚŽƌƉŽŽƌ ?ůĞĂƌŶĞĚŽƌƵŶůĞĂƌŶĞĚ ? ?132 [Italics in original text]  Further to this, both 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂƌƌĂǇĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐŽĨĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? “dŚĞ
ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŵŽĚĞƌŶǁŚŝŐƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞƐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŐƌĂŶƚĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐ ? ?
warned Boggs.133Meanwhile, Calvin Colton, the popular Whig political writer, warned of the 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐƚŚĂƚ ? “ŶŽƉĂƌƚǇĞǀĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƐŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇƚŚĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ŽƌǁĂƐƌƵůĞĚƐŽ
ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇďǇKůŝŐĂƌĐŚƐ ? ?134  Both parties maintained a strong religious element to their rhetoric; 
^ĞǁĂƌĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ “ƚŚĞǁŽƌƐŚŝƉŽĨ'ŽĚ ?ĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉƵƌĞǁŚŝŐĐƌĞĞĚ ? ?135  The WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
Democratic Guide ĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂůůŵĞŶǁĞƌĞďŽƌŶĨƌĞĞĂŶĚĞƋƵĂů ? “ďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŵĂŶ ?
ĂŶĚďĞĨŽƌĞ'ŽĚ ? ?ƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞĐŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞ ? “ĚĞŐƌĂĚĞĚďǇĂǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂǁƐŽĨhis nature and the 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŚŝƐDĂŬĞƌ ? ?136  &ŝŶĂůůǇďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐŵŽƌĂů
and financial security which related closely to their party identities, such as when Democrats 
                                                          
131 George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. III, New York 1853, p. 242. 
132 William G. Boggs, The Crisis Met.  A Reply to Junius., New York 1840, p. 1. 
133 Ibid, p. 2. 
134 Calvin Colton [Pseud. Junius], The Junius Tracts, New York 1844, p. 87. [note the page number given for the 
Junius Tracts is in relation to the publication of the full works, not specific tracts  W thus although this specific 
reference relates to page 7 of Tract No. VI, the page number 87 relates to its page number in the Greeley & 
McElrath publication of the first 8 Tracts.] 
Note  W Calvin Colton was a minister and political commentator from western New York.  He was an active 
correspondent of Henry Clay, and a prolific political theorist.  While a little known historical character, his 
writings under the pseudonym Junius provide, and provided, a systematic description of Whig political 
philosophy. 
135 George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. III, New York 1853, p. 242. 
136 Democratic Party (N.Y.), dŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ'ƵŝĚĞ ? New York 1842, p. 308. 
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ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ “ŐƌĞĂƚŚĂƌƚĞƌĞĚDŽŶĞǇ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ QĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?137 
     Both parties then, shared a similar conservative methodology.  The rhetorical debate between 
them was a competition to define conservatism.  The Whig Party found much of its support amongst 
those who were benefitting from the economic changes being experienced by the state.138  Thus 
they held great strength in Western New York, where the Erie Canal had extensive mileage.  This 
benefit was complimented by the popularity of the Protestant revivals occurring in those areas, 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŽƵƐ “ƵƌŶƚ-KǀĞƌŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ? ?dŚĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐǁĞĂůƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞĂƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂŶ
expanding middle class.  Primarily small business men, manufacturers and financiers, they were 
disturbed by their declining moral authority over their employees.  They also struggled to reconcile 
ƚŚĞŝƌƌĂƉŝĚůǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐǁĞĂůƚŚǁŝƚŚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůWƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŶƚŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶŝĚĞĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? “it 
is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of 
God."  Thus Whigs were often explicit in the language they used to show their politics had religious 
endorsement.  In 1839, Whig success in the state elections was described by Seward as, 
 “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ Q ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŽƵƌ ŐƌĂƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽůŵŝŐŚƚǇ'ŽĚ ? ?139   “,ĂƉƉǇǁŝůů
ŝƚďĞĨŽƌŽƵƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?ŚĞŽƉŝŶĞĚ ? “ĂŶĚƚŚƌŝĐĞŚĂƉƉǇĨŽƌƵƐ ?ƵƉŽŶǁŚŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
legislation have fallen, if they shall inspire us with submissive obedience to his will, and a sense of 
constant depenĚĞŶĐĞƵƉŽŶŚŝƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? ?140Explicit appeal to dissenting Protestants 
ǁĂƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞtŚŝŐ ?ƐǁŝĚĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ďĞůŝĞĨ
in the ability of man to beneficially reorganise society, and in conjuŶĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐůŽƐĞ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƌĞĨŽƌŵŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?tŚŝŐƌĞůŝŐŝŽƐŝƚǇŚĞůƉĞĚƚŽĐĂƐƚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŝŶ
ĂĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂƐƉĞĐƚ ?ĂŶĚŵŽůůŝĨŝĞĚƉĂƌƚǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ĨĞĂƌƐ ĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ
                                                          
137 William G. Boggs, The Crisis Met.  A Reply to Junius., New York 1840, p. 1. 
138 Lawrence Frederick Kohl in his work The Politics of Individualism: Parties and the American Character in the 
Jacksonian Era, (New York 1989) argued that Whig support came from those who believed that modernizing 
economic institutions would benefit them and Democrats vice versa - pages 65-66 (Whigs) and page 24 
(Democrats).  Daniel Walker Howe supports this interpretation in his work The Political Culture of American 
Whigs (Chicago 1979) ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐtŚŝŐƐĂƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ “ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?- page 
299. 
139 George E. Baker (ed), The Works of William H. Seward Vol. II, New York 1853, p. 184. 
140  Ibid. 
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occurring within the work place and society.  Democratic rhetoric shifted to account for the support 
the party counted on from Catholic Americans and urban Americans whose status was declining as a 
result of the economic changes occurring within the state.  This rhetoric tended to focus more on 
 “ůĂǁƐŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ'ŽĚ ?ƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨĚŝǀŝŶŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐŝƚƐ
relevance in the practical world.  In doing so they typically also sought to portray their opponents as 
dangerous radicals or corrupters; Democrats accused the Whigs of seeking to develop an aristocracy 
of privileged wealthy elites and breaking down traditional American political secularism.  The 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ 
party identities that whilst sharply differentiating them from their opponents, allowed them to 
embrace a very broad spectrum of political attitudes; essential for a party to be able to construct 
large coalitions of politicians within the environment of mass politics. 
     Dedication to a rhetorical framework founded on political abstractions such as liberty, equality, 
and republican virtue, created problems when debating matters of legislative expedience.  The 
rhetoric through which both parties legitimised their ideologies and principles created enormous 
problems with regard to rationally debating the issues they addressed.141  Debate over tariff rates 
was heavily influenced by the ideological legacy of the Compromise Tariff of 1833, masterminded by 
Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun in an attempt to defuse the sectional tension created by the 1832 
Nullification crisis.  It provided for a successive reduction of tariff rates between 1832 and 1842, 
reducing them gradually until the majority of imports were taxed at a 20% rate.  The Crisis had been 
a seminal event for the Jacksonian Democratic Party, causing the departure of large numbers of 
southerners into Southern states-rights parties.  The Compromise bill ended intra-party turmoil  W as 
such the bill held ideological significance to the Democratic Party.  Noting that it was the position of 
ŵĂŶǇ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĂĐƚŵƵƐƚďĞĨĂŝƚŚĨƵůůǇĂĚŚĞƌĞĚƚŽ ? ?ĂƌŶĂƌĚ
observed that it would be impossible to raise even one half of the revenue required for government 
                                                          
141 Daniel D. Barnard, Speech of Mr. Barnard of New York on the Policy of a Protective Tariff.  Delivered in the 
House of Representatives U.S. July 6th 1842, Washington 1842, p. 4. 
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with a 20% ad valorem tariff rate.142   “hŶĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ ?ƵŶũƵƐƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞĐůĂŝŵƐĂƌĞƐĞƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ
ďĂƐŝƐ ?ŽĨĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĂĐƚĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂƌŶĂƌĚ ?143  Congressman Millard Fillmore of 
Buffalo expanded on the difficulties inherent in confronting practical legislative problems with 
rhetorical methods that stressed abstract principles.  He observed sourly that, 
/ĚŽƚŚŝŶŬǁĞƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞŵŽƌĞƚŽĨĂǀŽƌŝƚĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂŶĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ Q/ƚŝƐŝŶ
[the collision] of interest anĚŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞƚŽĨŝŶĚƚƌƵƚŚ QŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĞ-spun 
theories of unpractised political economists, or of mere useless declaimers for popular effect 
upon this floor.144 
tŽŽĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŽŶƚŚĞƚĂƌŝĨĨǁĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞĚŝĞŶĐǇŐŝǀŝŶŐǁĂǇďĞfore rhetorical 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?tŽŽĚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚǁĂƐĂƉĂƌĂĚĞŽĨĐůĂƐƐŝĐĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŐĂŵƵƚŽĨ
ĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨtŚŝŐĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ? “ƚǁŽ-ƚŚŝƌĚƐŽĨ Q ?ƚŚĞ ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ Q ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨ
DĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƐŚĂǀĞ ?ƉƌĞũƵĚŐĞĚ ? Q ?ĂŶĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƐůŽƵĚůǇĐůĂŵŽƌŽƵƐĨŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ Q
ƚŚŝƐŝƐĂĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞĨŽƌƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ ? “^ƉĞĐŝĂůůĂǁƐ ?
granting exclusive privileges or encouragement to particular classes or professions, are unequal, and 
consequently unjust, aŶĚŝŶǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐĞŶŝƵƐŽĨŽƵƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?ŶŐůŽƉŚŽďŝĂ ? “/ƌĞƉƵĚŝĂƚĞ
ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƵƉŽŶŶŐůŝƐŚŚĂďŝƚƐĂŶĚŶŐůŝƐŚĐƵƐƚŽŵƐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů QdŚĞƚƌƵĞ
interest of America is to sever all connexion with the worn out and rotten mŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞƐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?
and defence of free trade, 
The spirit of the age is tending towards free trade.  The nations of Europe have recently 
become anxious inquirers into its political and social advantages.  The general assimilation of 
ĐƵƐƚŽŵ ?ƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?the mutual dependence of an unfettered intercourse, the beautiful and 
harmonious working of a system beyond the control of ambition or avarice, would in time 
ďŝŶĚŵĂŶŬŝŶĚŝŶďŽŶĚƐŽĨ ‘ĂŵŝƚǇ ?ŐŽŽĚǁŝůů ?ĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĚƌŝǀŝŶŐǁĂƌĂŶĚĨĂŵŝŶĞĨŽƌĞǀĞƌĨƌŽŵ
the world.145 
                                                          
142 Daniel D. Barnard, Speech of Mr. Barnard of New York on the Policy of a Protective Tariff.  Delivered in the 
House of Representatives U.S. July 6th 1842, Washington 1842, p. 6. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Millard Fillmore, Speech of Mr. Fillmore, of New York, on the Tariff Bill.  Delivered in the Committee of the 
Whole, House of Representatives, June 9, 1842, Washington 1842. P. 4. 
145 Democratic Party (N.Y.), dŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ'ƵŝĚĞ ? New York 1842, p. 152 col i, 152 col ii, 154 col ii, 
153 col ii, 155 col i. 
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Whigs were equally prone to vagueness.  Fillmore established his support of a tariff partly on the 
ďĂƐŝƐŽĨŚŝƐŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĞǆĐŝƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĐůĂŝŵĞĚǁĞƌĞ “ŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶŝƵƐŽĨĂĨƌĞĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
ŚĂĚĂƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽ ? “ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƉĂƚƌŽŶĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ? ?146  On the subject of free trade he 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞŚĞĨĞůƚŝƚŝŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞ ?ŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚŝĨ “ĂůůƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐǁĞƌĞĚŽŶĞ
away with, here and in every other country, and we could confidently rely on continued peace, that 
would be ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŽƵƐĂŶĚŚĂƉƉǇƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?147 ,ĞƐƚĂƚĞĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐůǇƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ ? “ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŶŐĨŽƌŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ “ŝĚůĞƚŽ
think of benefiting any particular class by protection.  This can only be done by giving a monopoly to 
ĂĨĞǁŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇŽďĨƵƐĐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĂŶĚĞƋƵĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?148 
     In 1846 a movement led by Democratic Assemblymen Hoffman and Loomis demanded a 
constitutional convention.  The convention movement wanted constitutional reform to restrict the 
ability of the state legislature to intervene in the state economy.149  This faction, known as the 
Barnburners, supported by progressive Whigs seeking a relaxation of the voting restrictions placed 
upon African Americans in New York confronted the conservative wing of the Democratic Party, 
known as Hunkers, who opposed Constitutional reform.150  Constitutional reform was popular.  The 
question of whether or not to hold a convention was put to the electorate in referendum, who voted 
overwhelmingly in favour, 218,257 votes in the affirmative to 88,860 in the negative.151In 1844 New 
                                                          
146 Millard Fillmore, Speech of Mr. Fillmore, of New York, on the Tariff Bill.  Delivered in the Committee of the 
Whole, House of Representatives, June 9, 1842., Washington 1842, p. 11. 
147 Ibid. p. 14. 
148 Ibid. p. 15. 
149 Thomas P. Kettell (ed), The United States Magazine, and Democratic Review Vol. XVIII, New York 1846. p. 
405. 
150 The names Hunker and Barnburner have been interpreted as having various meanings and sources by 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐ ? “,ƵŶŬĞƌ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐŽƵƌĐĞƐďǇǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐ ?ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐ
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ “ŚĂŶŬĞƌĞĚ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĚĞƌŝǀes 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƵƚĐŚǁŽƌĚ “ŚŽŶŬ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƉŽƐƚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽƌŚŽŵĞ ĂŬĞƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŵŽƌĞƐĞŶƐĞ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƚŝƐŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? “ĂƌŶďƵƌŶĞƌƐ ?ŝƐŽĨ
unquestionable origin  W it relates to a tale of a Dutch farmer who burned down his barn in order to rid himself 
of the rats which infested it.  The term initially related to the factions opposition to state participation in 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ŝŶĂ “ƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞďĂďǇŽƵƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďĂƚŚǁĂƚĞƌ ?ƐĞŶƐĞ ?
151 Franklin B. Hough, The New York Civil List, containing the Names and Origins of the Civil Divisions, and the 
Names and Dates of Election or Appointment of the Principal State and County Officers, from the Revolution to 
the Present Time, Albany 1858, p. 58. 
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York State was engaged in myriad economic enterprises, such as subsidisation of agriculture, 
manufacturing and transportation development, direct investment in private business and the 
issuance of loans to farmers and businessmen.152  Although they differed on how these policies 
should be implemented, until then both Whigs and Democrats has embraced the notion of State 
participation in economic development (in varying forms and degrees).  The 1846 Constitutional 
Convention, held at Albany, was dominated by the Barnburners, who successfully reformed the role 
of the state in the economy.  The resulting constitution stipulated that only after the entire state 
debt had been paid through a sinking fund could the state appropriate any surplus for canal 
development or expansion that was not already mandated by law.  In addition, corporations, 
including banks, were to be chartered under general laws and not by special act.153  By severely 
ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĚĞďƚ ?ƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƌĞŵŽǀĞĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ
around which to focus political rhetoric.154 
     As politicians defined their position on certain policy issues in relation to the fundamental 
precepts of their party philosophy, debate over legislative measures often focussed on how the 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞWĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŝŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŽƌŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?dŚŝƐ
presented the issue in terms whŝĐŚǁĞƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽĂŶĚĞǆƉĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?
For example, when quoting several Whigs who opposed the New York City Registry Law (stipulating 
all voters of any town or ward must be placed upon an official register at least 20 days before an 
election), the Democratic Guide ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞŵĂƐ “Distinguished Modern Whig Editors turning 
,ŽŶĞƐƚ ?[Italics in original text]; these Whig editors (who were inherently dishonest, being Whigs) 
had improved their moral calibre by adopting the Democratic position.155 This moral fault line 
                                                          
152 Ibid. p. 391. 
153 Arthur A. Ekrich :ƌ ? ? ‘Democracy and Laissez Faire: The New York State Constitution of 1846 ?, Journal of 
Libertarian Studies, Vol. I, No. 4 1977, p. 322. 
154 Marvin Meyers in his work The Jocksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford 1957) argues that the 
1846 convention and its results reflect the redundancy of economic issues owing to shifting Democratic and 
Whig attitudes, but also notes that division on what may be broadly termed social issues  W particularly slavery, 
are still very divisive - pages 194-195. 
155
 Democratic Party (N.Y.), dŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ'ƵŝĚĞ ? New York 1842 p 18. 
68 
 
divided politicians on a party basis, and was strengthened by the way in which individual politicians 
crafted their rhetoric to apply to the specific regions or groups to which they looked for support.  
Democratic Congressman Ely Moore of New York City, in reply to Whig Congressman Waddy 
dŚŽŵƉƐŽŶŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚĂƌŽůŝŶĂ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞůĂďŽƵƌŝŶŐƵƌďĂŶƉŽŽƌŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ ?ĐůĂŝŵĞĚŚŝƐ
comments were an attack on  “ƚŚĞůĂďŽƵƌŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐĞƐ, the back-bone of the democracy of this 
counƚƌǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƐŽƵŐŚƚ “ƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵŽƌĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇƚŚĞůĂŶĚŵĂƌŬƐǁŚŝĐŚ
distinguish the two great political parties of this country  W the democracy and the aristocracy ? ?156 
[Italics in original text]. While the specific group or region to which a politician was appealing led to 
variations in rhetoric, or even policy decisions, their justification for their position always remained 
in line with the broader, fundamentally conservative party philosophy.157 
     The development of a mass political system dominated by two parties led to both parties 
ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ
issues; state debt, the role of the state in internal improvements, education etc. became increasingly 
if not defined, then legitimised by broad, party principles.  Both parties developed identities as 
ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǀŝƌƚƵĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌ
opponents as a threat to it.  The political rhetoric used to convey these broad principles and threats 
to the public was heavily influenced by public anxiety over the great social changes occurring in New 
York at this time, which revolved around Victorian conceptions of declining manliness and virtue in 
the industrial age.  Thus political rhetoric became increasingly morally charged.  It became 
ƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶĞ ?ƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇĚĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
broad party principles without attacking them on a moral level.  Politicians who attempted to break 
ranks often found themselves adrift, denied the support of their party. Although this made inter-
party dialogue difficult, as in the 1842 Tariff debates, and increased intra-party division in the case of 
                                                          
156 Ibid. p. 151. 
157 This point relates to a similar one made by Howe and Benson, who note that Democrats and Whigs often 
agreed as to the ends but not the means of legislation. 
Howe, Daniel Walker, The Political Culture of American Whigs, Chicago 1979, p. 16., Benson, Lee, The Concept 
of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case, New York 1964, p. 337. 
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the New York Democratic Party, it allowed for the construction of electoral majorities by diverse 
groups of politicians.  The views of individual politicians within the party could, and often did, differ, 
but were justified through the same intellectual and ideological principles.  This allowed politicians 
to frame rhetoric and policy arguments to appeal to constituents within a heterogeneous state 
population, however at the same time, remained consistent with the overarching conservative 
identity of the party. 
     By 1846 the Whig and Democratic Parties were using completely different rhetoric to that used in 
political discourse in the 1820s and early 1830s.  This transformation had taken place over the 
course of the 1830s and had been galvanised by economic, demographic and social changes which 
took place within New York State during that period.  A rapidly growing population combined with 
evolving forms of production and transportation, and a developing market economy to wreak, 
radical changes on the form of New York society.  Moving away from an agriculturally dominated 
economy and a political environment dominated by prominent, landed New York families such as 
the Clintons, New York expanded the suffrage and the number of elective offices, and struck down 
restrictions to participation ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĂƉŝĚůǇĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐŶŽŶ-agricultural economy.  The rhetoric 
of politics in New York evolved to reflect these changes and the impulses which drove them.  
Rhetoric became simplified, as politicians sought to make politics as accessible as possible in the 
new, democratised era of New York politics.  Language used by politicians during this period 
increasingly sought to translate complex social and economic issues into black and white options 
from which the electorate could choose.  At the same time, the expansion of the suffrage caused a 
proliferation of political factions.  Representatives during this period increasingly came to represent 
their district, party and state in that order.  As it became more and more difficult to maintain the 
disciplined party structure the prototype for which had been created by the Albany Regency in its 
struggle with the Clintonian faction in the 1820s, the rhetoric of New York politicians became their 
weapons in wars fought over the identity of the party as a whole. 
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     dŚĞtŚŝŐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŚĂĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?Ǉ ? ? ? ? ?tŚŝŐƐŚĂĚ
abandoned the rhetorical methods of the Adams generation.  That rhetoric remained wedded to the 
deferential system of politics which had been prevalent during the revolutionary era.  The Whigs had 
copied the methods which the Democratic Party had pioneered in 1828 and 1832.  Their rhetoric 
effectively developed party unity by creating a political identity based upon attitudes that made it a 
distinct political entity to the Democratic Party, synonymous with popular methods of governance 
ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŶǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĚĞƐƉĞƌĂƚĞůǇǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽƐĞĞĞŶĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ,ĞŶƌǇůĂǇ ?ƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
System.  Their dogged defence of the BUS, whilst apparently ill-advised at the time, proved that the 
party was dedicated to a clear set of policies.  More importantly however, Whig rhetoric established 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŝŶƚŚĞh ?^ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ?dŚĞǇŚĂĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐĂĐůĞĂƌ
alternative to the Democrats not only on economic policy, but also political philosophy.  This had 
been achieved through a consistent dedication to opposition to alleged executive tyranny, 
dedication to law and order which they claimed the Democracy was contemptuous of, and 
refutation of the DemocratiĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞŵĂƐĂĐůĂƐƐďĂƐĞĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ǇĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŶŐ
their policies as measures designed to promote equality, not simply in a legal and political sense, but 
also in an economic sense, the Whigs offered New Yorkers eager to continue the economic 
developments taking place in the state a legitimate Party to support at the polls. 
     The Democratic Party had not run the political gauntlet of the 1830s with such aplomb.  From 
initial successes stemming from their spectacular rhetorical campaigns against critical institutions of 
Whig philosophy such as the BUS, New York Democrats increasingly found themselves turning those 
rhetorical methods upon one another.  Divisions in the party stemmed from the great promises their 
rhetoric made during the late 1820s and early 1830s.  The Democrats had attacked their pro-Adams, 
Anti-Masonic and later Whig opponents as aristocratic bodies which held democracy in contempt.  
Whilst this was highly effective in the late 1820s when challenging patrician opponents such as 
DeWitt Clinton and John Quincy Adams, the Party had failed by 1832 to clearly define what this 
rhetoric meant in terms of concrete policy strategy.  As the policy decisions of the Jackson and later 
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Van Buren administrations increasingly alienated New York party members who supported the 
credit system, banking, and manufacturing, the Party was driven by its own rhetoric into repeated 
internecine conflict.  Anti-Bank Democrats would turn their rhetoric upon the pro-bank wing of the 
Party, causing a sharp decline in the power of the Albany Regency and party unity in general, which 
would lead to increasing difficulty at the polls.  It was this rhetorical contest that drove the 
successful demand for constitutional revision in 1846, the results of which would clearly define the 
Democratic Party identity in terms which were acceptable to the Locofocos.  
     Democratic and Whig rhetoric bore many similarities.  Both revolved principally around economic 
issues.  Both parties used many of the same rhetorical methods and key words.  Opponents were 
ůĂďĞůůĞĚ “ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚƐ ? ?dŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐǁĂƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĂů
degradation they would cause.  Both parties presented themselves as the defenders of key American 
ideals such as liberty, equality of opportunity, religious conformity and freedom and social 
egalitarianism.  However despite the similarities in the structure and language of their rhetoric the 
two parties had clearly defined themselves from one another by 1846.  This had been achieved 
through founding their rhetoric upon totally opposed attitudes towards the role of government in 
society and the economy.  The Democratic Party had rejected political theories that suggested that 
mankind could effectively shape its own society.  Instead Democrats became wedded to theories 
that identified government itself as the greatest threat to the American abstractions they used to 
legitimise their rhetoric.  This process was completed by the dominance of the Barnburner faction at 
the 1846 constitutional convention.  There, they greatly curtailed the scope of the state government 
to participate in economic development, settling temporarily the division within the party.  The Whig 
Party, in contrast, embraced new theories of the power of man to create model societies, not just in 
economic, but also in moral terms.  Using rhetoric which stressed the inter-relation of all sections of 
the economy and society, inspired and augmented by the rhetoric and philosophy of the Second 
Great Awakening, Whigs sought to convince the public that mankind could be trusted to regulate, 
ĞĚƵĐĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůƐ ?dŚƵƐtŚŝŐƐ ?ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐŽĨ
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extensive economic and industrial development with impressive uniformity, were closely linked with 
social movements such as temperance, prison and asylum reform, and projects to combat urban 
poverty.  Following the Constitutional Convention of 1846, social issues took on increasing 
importance in relation to defining the identity of the New York Whig Party, as its scope for economic 
action was sharply reduced.  This led to difficulty as slavery became the dominant issue in New York 
politics. 
     In rhetorical and philosophical terms, both parties had identified themselves by 1846 as 
conservative institutions.  Labelling groups such as the Locofocos as radicals takes too much of the 
rhetoric of their opponents at face value.  The relentless insistence of the Whigs that the Democrats 
were dangerous radicals, and that of the Democrats that the Whigs were corrupt patricians, serves 
to prove the conservative nature of both parties.  Both were dedicated to what they perceived as 
conservative values inherited from the Revolutionary generation; the rhetoric of both parties was 
principally concerned with affirming that, and undermining the conservatism of their opponents.  
This is the key to understanding the reliance of both parties on incessant reference to the intentions 
of the Founding Fathers, despite the fact that by the 1840s, these intentions had been left far 
behind.  Both the Whigs and the Democrats sought to assure the electorate that what they were 
attempting to achieve, or destroy, was entirely in keeping with the intentions of the Revolutionary 
generation.  It was this desire to encourage a belŝĞĨƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇǁĂƐ “ƐƚĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
inspired the use of rhetoric which insistently condemned the constitutional interpretations of their 
ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇǁĂƌŶĞĚŽĨĂĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶ “ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǀŝƌƚƵĞ ?ŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ
exampůĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĨŽƌĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝƐƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
WĂƌƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƚŚĞĨƚŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐďǇŽƚŚĞƌ
parties was one source of their failure, the real issue was thosĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
tŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇĂƐĂƌĂĚŝĐĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨŵĞŶƐƵĐŚĂƐdŚŽŵĂƐ^ŬŝĚŵŽƌĞ ?
or Robert Dale Owen, or far more catastrophically, Fanny Wright, doomed the Workingmen.  They 
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had abandoned the past  W their more radical policies called for the abandonment of key 
conservative social and political theories. 
     The demand for wider suffrage, for more state officers, and eventually judges, to be appointed 
electively, and for greater ease of access to economic opportunity were communicated to the 
electorate as the natural repercussions of the Revolutionary Era.    Politics in antebellum 19th century 
United States increasingly revolved around the interplay of many competing interests.  It is this 
change which encourages the notion that these were radical parties, making radical changes to the 
political system.  However the rhetoric of the period actually reflects the fact that it was crucial to 
the success of both major parties that these decisions appear conservative.  However this was 
conservatism in republican terms.  Central to understanding the conservatism of political rhetoric 
between 1828 and 1846 is the importance of the debate over means rather than ends.  The 
distinction between Whig and Democratic rhetoric is that it stressed a contest between positive and 
negative roles for government.  Both parties presented their theories as being the only way to 
ensure the preservation of American abstractions, particularly liberty.  Thus while both parties 
agreed on the ends their rhetoric promoted, an egalitarian society that championed the rights and 











     The Constitutional Convention of 1846 settled many of the major economic issues on which party 
political rhetoric had focussed in order to construct and define party identity.  The struggle of the 
Democrats against alleged monopolistic privilege and the efforts of the Whigs to promote a 
harmonious society based on an interconnected system of credit and infrastructure, had provided 
debates through which both parties had established political identities.  These identities were based 
ƵƉŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ?ƚŽĂŐƌĞĂƚĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŽƉƉosition to each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ?dŚĞtŚŝŐƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŚĂĚĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉůĂǇĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐƚŝǀĞ
role in the economy and society of the state.  Democrats believed the state had a responsibility to 
avoid interfering with the interests and pursuits of the society of the state.  But the removal of the 
power of the state to meaningfully contract debt had reduced the power of these issues to 
effectively divide the two parties.158  In addition, the constant use of rhetoric which encouraged New 
York politicians to take positions on issues based upon partisan principles had created intense intra-
party conflict.  These conflicts left a legacy of bitterness and recrimination that intensified following 
1846.  Their rhetoric concerned state issues, eschewing national concerns.  Increasingly the internal 
divisions of the New York state political parties were heavily influenced by national issues.   
     dŚĞŵŽƐƚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŝƐƐƵĞǁĂƐƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?^ůĂǀĞƌǇŚĂĚŶĞǀĞƌďĞŶǁƌŝƚůĂƌŐĞŝŶEĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
rhetoric.  The question of slavery had been settled in the opinion of the majority of New Yorkers in 
1827, when the last slaves in New York were freed.  Debate over slavery had been further subdued 
by the passage of the Pinckney Resolutions in 1836, written by South Carolina Representative Henry 
L. Pinckney, mandating the tabling of all petitions relating to slavery, which became known as the 
 “ŐĂŐƌƵůĞ ? ?159  But slavery began to play an increasingly large role in national competitions between 
                                                          
158 See previous chapter for discussion of the reduction ŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĚĞďƚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞ
1846 Constitutional Convention. 
159 Note - ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŐĂŐƌƵůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĂŵŝƐŶŽŵĞƌ ?^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞWŝŶĐŬŶĞǇZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚ
standing house rules, they had to be renewed each session.  The meagre Anti-Slavery forces present in the 
ŚŽƵƐĞĂƚƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ ?ůĞĚďǇƚŚĞǀĞŶĞƌĂďůĞ:ŽŚŶYƵŝŶĐǇĚĂŵƐ ?ƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞŶĞǁĂů
to provoke and engage in debate.  The Pinckney Resolutions were renewed in January 1837; they were 
75 
 
the two parties following the end of the rule in 1844.  This vote reflected growing anxiety over 
slavery in the North that was exacerbated by the Mexican War.  New York politicians divided over 
slavery in ways that closely related to pre-existing intra-party divisions.  Emerging from these 
divisions in 1848 was the Free Soil Party.  This short lived third party changed the nature of political 
rhetoric in New York that had stressed partisan principles.  Instead it focussed heavily on what its 
members shared, while simultaneously glorying in their differences.  This new method, though 
buffeted by the efforts of the major parties to reassert the old methods of party distinction, would 
eventually triumph over old rhetorical strategies.  Slavery was the issue which allowed politicians 
from both the Whig and Democratic Parties to unite under the banner of Free Soil and later 
Republicanism.  The rhetoric they employed fundamentally altered the nature of political rhetoric in 
New York, and drew to a close the Second Party Era in that state. 
     Divisions in New York State over the issue of slavery emerged, before the ratification of its 
constitution.  In 1784 a state manumission society was formed.  In 1799 the state legislature passed 
a gradual emancipation law, but this was contested and it was not until 1827 that the last slaves 
were freed.160  The New York State Colonisation Society (formed in 1816), was led by prominent New 
York merchants Arthur Tappan and Gerrit Smith, and reflected the views of many in the New York 
community regarding African Americans  W many would rather have seen the African American 
community removed from the state altogether.161  However during the 1830s, the abolition 
movement emerged in a more determined and organised form.  Inspired by the evangelical revivals 
sweeping across the state, and by the anti-slavery arguments presented by William Llyod Garrison in 
The Liberator, an anti-slavery newspaper first published in 1831, abolition in New York developed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇƚŚĞWĂƚƚŽŶZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ƚŚĞƌƚŽŶ'ĂŐ ?ŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?/Ŷ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ
1840 the House passed the Twenty First Rule, prohibiting Congress from accepting petitions on the subject of 
slavery at all.  The history of the debate over the right to petition is both fascinating and complex, and owing 
to this there is inadequate space here to cover it in full.  For a complete examination of the subject, refer to 
tŝůůŝĂŵ>ĞĞDŝůůĞƌ ?ƐArguing About Slavery:  John Quincy Adams and the Great Battle in the United States 
Congress (1995). 
160 Milton M. Klein (ed), The Empire State: A History of New York, New York 2001, p. 247-248. 
161 Ibid. p. 335. 
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into one of the most determined and controversial civil reform movements of the era.162  However 
the topic of slavery consistently remained unaddressed by mainstream political rhetoric.  Slavery 
was considered simply too divisive an issue  W neither Whigs nor Democrats risked the division it 
could create within theŝƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚǇƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ “'ĂŐZƵůĞ ? ? 
     The New York City Anti-Slavery Society (NYCA-SS) played a large role in laying the foundation for 
standard New York Abolitionist rhetoric.  NYCA-SS rhetoric, similarly to political rhetoric at the time, 
focussed on conceptions of public and republican virtue.  The Society was formed in 1833 by Arthur 
dĂƉƉĂŶ ?dŚĞ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŽEĞǁzŽƌŬĂƌŐƵĞĚŝĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ
slavery, it would demand its immediate destruction; it was ignorance of the moral evil, and the 
threat to the republic that it presented, which caused public apathy.  The NYCA-SS announced that, 
 “We trust to the candor of our fellow-citizens, that this enlightened community will pronounce an 
upright judŐŵĞŶƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇƐŚĂůůďĞĐŽŵĞĨƵůůǇĂĐƋƵĂŝŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƌǀŝĞǁƐ QtĞĂƌĞƋƵŝƚĞƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ
ĂůůǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĚĞƐŝƌĞ Q ?ƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?Ɛ ?ĞǆƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?163  Those citizens who did not yet support 
abolition had been deceived by the influence of the institution.  Thus abolitionists maintained that, 
 “ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŵŝŶĚƐŚĂůůďĞƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐĂŶĚƐŚĂůůďĞĚŝƐĂďƵƐĞĚŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐďǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŵƉŽƐĞĚƵƉŽŶ ?ŝƚǁŝůůĐĂůů ? QĨŽƌƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƌŝŐŚƚŝŶ
themselves, congenial with our republican principles, and fraught with benefits to the whole 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?dŚŝƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĂƚƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇŝŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞh^ ?^ůĂǀĞƌǇ
was a corrupting influence that had deceived a section of the public into thinking of it as a 
benevolent element of U.S. society.  All that was necessary was to pull back the curtain placed 
around it by a small number of corrupt individuals, and the public would naturally recoil from it.  This 
argument formed one of the core principles of anti-slavery rhetoric in New York  W that slavery was a 
moral evil which tainted the entire American Republic.  It was related to the attitude promoted by 
the Evangelical revivals of the Great Awakening, that stressed that not only were individuals 
                                                          
162 Ibid. 
163 New York Anti-Slavery Society, Address of the New-York City Anti-Slavery Society, to the People of the City of 
New-York, New York 1833, p. 3-4. 
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responsible for their own salvation, but also for the salvation of those around them.  Therefore 
abolition rhetoric closely resembled mainstream political rhetoric, as it stressed a collective 
responsibility for action on the part of the community. 
      The NYCA-SS represented a departure from the past.  Abolition and manumission movements 
had argued for long term methods, such as gradual emancipation and systematic re-colonisation, to 
reduce slavery until it became extinct effectively of its own accord.  The NYCA-SS however, rejected 
ƚŚĞƐĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨ'ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĂĚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂŶĚƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞŵĂŶĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? “KƵƌŽďũĞĐƚ ?ĂƐƐĞƚĨŽƌƚŚŝŶŽƵƌŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞĨĞƌǇŽƵ ?ŝƐ ?ƚŽƚĂŬĞĂůů
lawful, moral, and religious means, to effect a total and immediate abolition of slavery in the United 
States."164  Immediate emancipation aggravated New Yorkers fears over racial conflict and changes 
in African-American status in a society which held deep racial prejudices.  Thus the NYCA-SS 
presented its arguments as vital measures to preserve republican virtue. 
tĞ QƐƉĞĂŬŽĨŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŽƵƌƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĨƌŽŵĂůůŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ
destroy slavery, in our country. Our object being both lawful and honorable, our means 
honest, and our motives pure, we have no occasion to conceal them, by professing to aim at 
something else. We consider it criminal to amuse the country with any project, which will 
not attain an end so essential to the prosperity and very existence of our happy union. It is 
generally admitted, that the accursed system of slavery has already made the pillars of our 
government tremble, and it is demonstrable that nothing but its total removal can prevent 
the final overthrow and ruin of this republic.165 
 
Thus, again, Abolitionist rhetoric bore close resemblance to mainstream party and anti-bank 
rhetoric, in that it cast its intentions and principles as inherently conservative, aiming to defend, 
rather than change American institutions. 
 
     Another way in which abolitionist rhetŽƌŝĐĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝŵƐǁĂƐ
repeated references to religion.  The NYCA-SS argued forcefully that the institution of slavery was 
incongruous with the principles championed by Evangelical revivalism.  It stressed itself as a 
religiously inspired movement. 
                                                          
164 Ibid. p. 3. 
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It is one of our objects to inculcate the doctrine of Immediate Abolition as an important 
moral sentiment, as a duty we owe to our common Creator, to our fellow-men, and to 
ourselves, as republicans and Christians. We shall aim to show that this duty applies to 
individuals, to communities, to those who lead public opinion, to those who are conductors 
of the press, to preachers of the Gospel, to educators of youth, to parents, and to all 
descriptions of persons, as they love the human family, fear a just God, and hope for a 
blessed immortality.166[Italics in original text]. 
 
Politicians of this period often invoked religious language to assert their moral rectitude; the New 
York abolitionist movement used religion in the same way to cast slavery as an immoral institution 
with no place in a Christian society. 
 
     The abolitionist movement was probably at least partly inspired by the popular political rhetoric 
of the time.  Abolition was a small but articulate movement.  In 1833 the Tappan brothers, joined by 
Garrison, Theodore Dwight Weld, a writer and reform organiser, and James G. Birney of Kentucky, a 
former Democratic-ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚŐŽŽŶƚŽďĞƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌƚǇWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŶŽŵŝŶĞĞĨŽƌWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶ
1840, founded the American Anti-Slavery Society (AA-SS), headquartered in New York.  By 1834 
there were more than 200 local societies across New York.167  However although anti-slavery 
rhetoric appeared primed for adoption by political parties, the movement was shunned.   The major 
reason for this was of the divisive effect of slavery debates on national party unity, and the 
staggering unpopularity of the abolition movement among the greater body of the electorate.  In 
early July 1834 an eight day long riot broke out in New York City, targeting abolitionists.  Angry 
ĐƌŽǁĚƐƐƚŽƌŵĞĚŶŽƚĂďůĞĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚůĞĂĚĞƌƐƌƚŚƵƌĂŶĚ>ĞǁŝƐdĂƉƉĂŶ ?ƐƐƚŽƌĞĂŶĚŚŽƵƐĞ
respectively, attacked abolitionist meeting halls and terrorised African American communities.  The 
leaders of most of these mobs were not working ĐůĂƐƐƚŚƵŐƐ ?ďƵƚ “ŐĞŶƚůĞŵĞŶŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĂŶĚ
ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇǁŚŝƚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬĞƌƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĞ
abolition movement represented.168  This attitude was supported by ingrained social prejudices.  
Opposition to, and violence toward, abolitionism was often stoked and organised by wealthy social 
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167 Milton M. Klein (ed), The Empire State: A History of New York, New York 2001, p. 335. 
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conservatives from both major parties; as such it was considered a politically disadvantageous topic 
by both parties.169 
     Hostility shaped several elements of abolitionist rhetoric.   Abolitionists used hostility toward 
their movement to define ways in which slavery threatened democracy. A common tactic was to 
identify slavery as a threat to freedom of speech by highlighting the way in which anti-slavery 
conventions, spokesmen and society members were the victims of intimidation.  
Anti-Abolitionists at the North say they believe in free discussion, in the abstract, and will 
not allow it to be drawn in question; but this means, as we find it interpreted and translated 
in the dictionary of daily experience that each man may discuss slavery, or any thing else in 
the silent chambers of his own heart, but must not discuss it in public as it may then provoke 
a syllogism of feathers, or a deduction of tar.170 [Italics in original text] 
 
Abolitionists combined this with a common theme of mainstream political rhetoric, the argument 
that their aims were being systematically misconstrued and misrepresented by their opponents. 
 
the enemies of our noble sentiments and elevated intentions, have resorted to the old 
heathen track of misrepresentation, and by adding to our code views never promulgated by 
us, by charging us with intentions never harbored, with expectations never cherished, and as 
remote from the mind of an abolitionist, as infidelity is from the conscience of piety, as 
meanness is from generosity, as bigotry is from charity, as truth from falsehood, as freedom 
from slavery.171 
 
The rhetoric of New York abolitionists was similar to rhetoric used by Democrats during the Bank 
War.  By citing the attempts to harm and misrepresent them made by their opponents, abolitionists 
reaffirmed the legitimacy of their cause in ways that directly related to key American liberties, and 
democratic institutions.  New York abolitionists used the hostility against them to further define 
ƚŚĞŝƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƐůĂǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐǁŚŝĐŚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĂŶĐƚŝƚǇŽĨ
American democratic institutions, including freedom of speech.   
     Arguments emerged in abolitionist rhetoric in response to criticisms and fears created by the 
sectional division that many politicians argued the abolition movement would cause.  The NYA-SS 
                                                          
169 Ibid. 
170 New York Anti-Slavery Convention, Proceedings of the New York Anti-Slavery Convention held at Utica, 
October 21, and New York Anti-^ůĂǀĞƌǇ^ƚĂƚĞ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŚĞůĚĂƚWĞƚĞƌďŽƌŽ ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?, Utica 1835, p. 5-6. 
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responded to fears over the destabilising effect that anti-slavery rhetoric had upon national unity.  
The Union, they scoffed,  
was to have been dissolved in 1828, 1830, 1831, and 1832, at four distinct periods, within a 
short space of time, because the tariff laws were not made to suit certain slave states; but 
this noble Union held together, we did not hear of a single rafter or brace flinching. In 1835, 
the Union is to be again dissolved, and charged in account current to abolition.172 
 
dŚŝƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŬĞǇĞĚŝŶƚŽƉŽƉƵůĂƌEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚƚŚƌĞĂƚƐŽĨ
disunion.  The concept of the South as a hostile bloc was developed further in New York during 
^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?^ĞǁĂƌĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĂŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞsŝƌŐŝŶŝĂůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞƚŽ
hand over three African-American sailors who had assisted in the escape of a slave in Norfolk.  
Seward resisted such demands throughout his governorship.  Finally, in 1842, the Virginia Legislature 
passed a law requiring all ships bound for New York to be inspected for fugitive slaves, to take effect 
in May of that year unless New York turned over the three fugitives and repealed its Fugitive Slave 
Law.173  ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŝƐƐƉĂƌƐĞ ?ŚĞĂǀŽŝĚĞĚƉƵďůŝĐŝƐŝŶŐŚŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚŝĐ
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐǁŝƚŚsŝƌŐŝŶŝĂĚƵĞƚŽĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?174  However in 1842 Seward presented the 
conflict to the legislature in terms that did not stress slavery as an issue.  Rather Seward argued that 
sŝƌŐŝŶŝĂ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂĐĂƐĞŽĨƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌ-ƐƚĂƚĞŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚǇ ? “I lay before you a law of 
sŝƌŐŝŶŝĂ ?ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŽƵƌĐŽŵŵĞƌĐĞ ?ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?going on to observe that,  
New York, from motives of self-respect and devotion to the Union, will not retaliate, nor 
even remonstrate, yet that she can not consent to remain a respondent, since Virginia has 
seen fit to transcend the sphere assigned her by the federal constitution, and to pass an 
aggressive law; but that this state will cheerfully return to a discussion of the subject, with a 
sincere desire to arrive at a conclusion mutually satisfactory and conducive to the general 
harmony, whenever the effect of that unfortunate statute shall have been removed by the 
action of our sister-state, or by an overruling decision of the supreme court of the United 
States. The legislature will decide whether the trial by jury shall be relinquished, and 
whether a state, which acknowledges no natural inequality of men, and no political 
inequality which may not ultimately be removed, shall wrest that precious shield from those 
only, whose freedom is assailed, not for any wrong-doing of their own, but because the 
greatest of all crimes was committed against their ancestors.175 
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This statement was a rare piece of pre-1844 anti-slavery rhetoric from a major New York politician.  
/ƚƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨsŝƌŐŝŶŝĂ ?ƐŝŶƐƉĞĐƚŝŽŶůĂǁĂƐ “ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ŝƐĂĨŽƌĞƌƵŶŶĞƌŽĨǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĐome a 
common theme of anti-slavery rhetoric in the late 1840s and 1850s  W the portrayal of the slave 
holding South as a belligerent political entity.  The similarity of this rhetoric with that of the New 
York abolition movement, and the New York legislaturĞ ?ƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞĚŽǁŶŝƚƐ
&ƵŐŝƚŝǀĞ^ůĂǀĞ>Ăǁ ?ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?ŝĨĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇĂĚĂƉƚĞĚ ?ƚŽ
be effectively used by a major political party. 
     In one crucial respect, the abolition movement departed from the methods of political rhetoric 
being used by the major parties.  While the Whigs and Democrats focussed on the Constitution to 
legitimise their policy aims, the abolition movement was unable to emulate this tactic because the 
Constitution, and its defence of property rights, was far better calculated to defend slavery than to 
attack it.  Instead abolitionists turned to the Declaration of Independence.  They tied moralistic 
religious assertions to the Declaration and formulated an entirely different interpretation of its 
relevance to American political institutions.  A New York Anti-Slavery Society (NYA-SS) convention 
held at the city of Utica explained that  “KƵƌĐƌĞĞĚŝƐƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƚǁŽŐƌĞĂƚǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐŽĨ'ŽĚ ?Ɛ
revealed will to man, the old and new testaments. The Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitutions of our country, and the laws passed under them, we make the rule of our conduct, in 
ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝŶŐŽƵƌƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ? ?176  Through stressing the importance 
of the Declaration of Independence, New York abolitionists developed a new argument for the 
source of human rights.  Individual rights, the NYA-SS argued, were not given to men by 
governments or laws.  Men were not born into a state of bondage, and then liberated through acts 
of government.  Rather, the natural state of all human beings was one of freedom, a God given right 
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which was then either upheld or compromised by acts of human legislature.  Gerrit Smith declared 
ĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?WĞƚĞƌďŽƌŽ ?Ez-SS convention that, 
I love the free and happy form of civil government under which I live: not because it confers 
new rights on me. My rights all spring from an infinitely nobler source ? from the favor and 
grace of God. Our political and constitutional rights, so called, are but the natural and 
inherent rights, of man, asserted, carried out, and secured by modes of human contrivance. 
To no human charter am I indebted for my rights. They pertain to my original constitution: 
and I read them in that Book of books, which is the great Charter of man's rights. No, the 
constitutions of my nation and state create none of my rights. They do, at the most, but 
recognize what is not theirs to give.177 
 
This rhetoric provided an excellent alternative to that of the major parties, which hinged upon the 
rights conferred upon individual Americans by the Constitution.  In an era of profound religious 
belief, when politicians routinely quoted scripture and invoked God to support their political 
principles, this argument provided abolitionists with a justification for their demands.  It tied the 
rights which were established as inherent by the Declaration of Independence to the Will of 
WƌŽǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?dŚŝƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŝƐĂĐůĞĂƌĨŽƌĞƌƵŶŶĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŬŝŶĚĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇ^ĞǁĂƌĚŝŶŚŝƐ ? ? ? ? “,ŝŐŚĞƌ
>Ăǁ ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ĂŶĚ can be considered foundational to the rhetoric of the Free-Soil and Republican 
Parties.178 
     Before 1840 rhetoric relating to slavery, when it did occur, was typically an assertion of the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞ ?ŽƌĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞĚĞŶƵŶĐŝĂtion of the abolition movement.  In 
ŚŝƐ ? ? ? ?ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌtŝůůŝĂŵDĂƌĐǇĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “This State is 
ĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨĂĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽĨZĞƉƵďůŝĐƐ QďŽƵŶĚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌďǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŵƵƐƚŶŽƚďĞƐƵŶĚĞƌĞĚ ?
This relation gives us rights essential to our well-being, and imposes on us duties equally essential to 
the well-ďĞŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌƐŝƐƚĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?179  dŚĞĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ “ĐĂƵƐĞĚŵƵĐŚŵŝƐĐŚŝĞĨŝŶ Q
 ?^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞŶŽƚďĞĞŶĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŚĂƌŵůĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ? ?180  Marcy argued that a  
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179 New York Senate, Journal of the Senate of the State of New York at their Fifty-Ninth Session, begun and Held 
at the Capitol, in the City of Albany, the Fifth Day of January, 1836, Albany 1836, p. 26. 
180Ibid. p. 27. 
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regard for the character of our State, for the public interest, for the preservation of peace 
among our citizens, as well as a due respect for the obligations created by our political 
institutions and relations, calls upon us to do what may be done, consistently with the great 
principles of civil liberty, to put an end to the evils which the abolitionists are bringing upon 
us and the whole country.181 
 
Democratic spokesmen were reluctant to discuss slavery or abolition, fearing the alienation of the 
^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶtŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?dŚĞǇŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŝƌƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŝŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐǁŚŝĐŚDĂƌĐǇ
illustrated in his message.  However in the long term this would provide politicised abolition with a 
record of Democratic acceptance and support of slavery.  In 1846 it was this rhetoric that pushed 
many Democrats into the Free Soil Party. 
 
     In the late 1830s, New York abolitionists became convinced that political agitation and action was 
the way to attack slavery.  They identified measures which Congress ought to take against slavery 
ǁŚŝĐŚĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽŶƚƌĂǀĞŶĞƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďŝĂƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐůĂǀĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƐůĂǀĞƐ
were a species of property.  In 1838 Theodore Dwight Weld, a prominent New York Abolitionist and 
reformer, published a pamphlet entitled, the Power of Congress over the District of Columbia.  In it 
he argued that as Congress had complete authority over the District of Columbia; it had the power 
to abolish the slave trade there, and the institution itself.  Weld argued that as the District has no 
legislature of its own, and slavery was an institution which had to be established by acts of 
legislature - Congress therefore ipso facto held the power to establish or abolish that institution in 
any place where it existed that was solely under the authority of Congress.  This argument had 
important ramifications for the status of slavery in the territories.  The second is the way in which 
Weld framed his argument.  Rather than the typical abolitionist rhetoric which principally concerned 
ŝƚƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŵŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƐůĂǀĞƌǇĂŶĚŝƚƐŝŶĐŽŶŐƌƵŝƚǇǁŝƚŚĞǀĂŶŐĞůŝĐĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ?tĞůĚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ
principally framed around legal and political theory, using historical precedent to support his 
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ?ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?tĞůĚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƐŚŝĨƚ




occurring in anti-slavery rhetoric toward a more practically political form.182  In 1840, anti-slavery 
forces organised under the banner of the Liberty Party.  Although in the presidential elections of that 
year the Liberty Party received less than 1% of the national vote, in the 1844 campaign it received 
just over 15,000 votes in New York.  These votes had provided the margin of victory in the state to 
the Democratic Party.  By 1845, anti-slavery had become a noteworthy political position.   
 
     The Free-Soil Party emerged with a rhetorical strategy that harnessed anti-slavery feeling in the 
state and exploited the new, stronger position.  In order to understand its effectiveness it is 
necessary to briefly consider persistent divisions within the New York Democratic and Whig Parties.  
Divisions within the New York Whig Party were exacerbated by the issue of nativism.  In 1844 a 
secret fraternal organisation named the Order of United Americans was established in New York 
City.  The Order was dedicated to nativist principles, and its most influential members were 
conservative Whigs.183  Those conservatives, already disillusioned with Seward and his progressive 
faction for their hostility toward nativism, were becoming inĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĚŝƐƚƵƌďĞĚďǇ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
increasingly explicit denunciations of slavery.  In 1838 in a reply to a letter from Gerrit Smith and 
William Jay, a reformer and Jurist who had drafted the AAS-^ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?^ĞǁĂƌĚŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?
 “ƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚhas designated me as the representative of the whig party in this state, in the 
approaching election, has done so without any reference to the subjects indicated in your inquiries, 
and that those subjects enter not at all into the political creed of that large body of freemen whose 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ/ŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞ ? ?184Seward asserted support for trial by jury for fugitive slaves, and that he 
ǁĂƐ ? “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ QŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĞǀĞƌǇĨŽƌŵŽĨƐůĂǀĞŚŽůĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇďǇŽƵƌŽǁŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
but by all other persons, and to any recognition of such a right in this state in every form except such 
ĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐ ? ?185  In 1845, Seward refused an invitation 
ƚŽĂ “^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶĂŶĚtĞƐƚĞƌŶŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌŝĞŶĚƐŽĨŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů>ŝďĞƌƚǇ ?ĂƚŝŶĐŝŶŶĂƚŝ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
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extinction of slavery in their respective states, and its reduction to its constitutional limits in the 
hŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?186  However he dŝĚĐůĂŝŵƚŽ “ŚĂǀĞĂůǁĂǇƐƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝǌĞĚǁŝƚŚĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƐƚŽŽĚĞĞƉůǇ
ƚŽďĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚŝŶĚĞƌĞĚŽƌĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŵ ? ?187  He strongly supported the abolition 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĞ “ůĂƌŐĞŵĂƐƐŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĚŝƐĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨĐŽůŽƌ QŵƵƐƚďĞ
invĞƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŽĨƐƵĨĨƌĂŐĞ ? ?188This was a change from his position in 1838 that challenged 
the rhetoric of conservative New York Whigs.  Francis Granger, a prominent conservative New York 
Whig, asserted when appointed Postmaster-General in 1840 that he ǁĂƐ ? “ŶŽƚŽŶůǇŶŽĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?
but he should expect Gen. H[arrison] to eject him from office should he ever become 
ŽŶĞ ? ?189Conservative Whigs generally opposed abolition throughout the 1840s. 
     dŚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů point in 1848, when the party sent 
two delegations to the National Convention at Baltimore, each angrily asserting its legitimacy as the 
true representatives of the New York Democracy.  This division, already established by the 
opposition of the Hunkers to constitutional reform, had been exacerbated when that faction 
ǁŝƚŚŚĞůĚŝƚƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ^ŝůĂƐtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐƌĞ-ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?tƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚ
been attacked by the Hunkers who opposed his every move.190  But the key moment of separation 
came in 1846 when Congressman David Wilmot of Pennsylvania introduced the Wilmot Proviso.  The 
WƌŽǀŝƐŽǁĂƐĂŶĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƚŽWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚWŽůŬ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶďŝůůĨŽƌƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
Mexico following the Mexican American War.  It demanded that slavery be prohibited in all 
territories acquired from Mexico.  The amendment was designed by several Northern Democratic 
congressmen, but its relevance to New York was reflected by the involvement of Congressman 
Preston King of that state.  King went on to introduce a more extensive amendment prohibiting the 
introduction of slavery into any territory that acquired by the U.S. in the future.  In a speech 
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connected with these measures, King used rhetoric designed to shift the basis of discussion over 
slavery away from a general attack on the institution, and toward consideration of what role the 
&ĞĚĞƌĂů'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƚ ? “dŚĞƚŝŵĞŚĂƐĐŽŵĞǁŚĞŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƉƵďůŝĐƐŚŽƵůĚĚĞĐůĂƌĞďǇ
law that it will not be made an instrument to the extension of slavery oŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?
declared King.191  The arguments that King provided for prohibiting slavery laid the ground work for 
much of the Free-^ŽŝůWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?<ŝŶŐƉĂŝĚǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇŶŽĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ
objections to slavery on behalf of blacks.  His criticisms instead sought to establish slavery as being in 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ ?ĂŶĚŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽǁĂƌĚ ?ĨƌĞĞůĂďŽƵƌ ? “^ŚĂůůƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ?ŶŽǁĨƌĞĞ ?ƵŶĚĞƌŽƵƌ
jurisdiction, be free territory, open to settlement by the laboring man of the free -tales, or shall it be 
ƐůĂǀĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƵƉƚŽƐůĂǀĞůĂďŽƌ ? ?ƐŬĞĚ<ŝŶŐ ?ŽŝŶŐŽŶƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĂƚ ? “dŚĞůĂďŽƌŽĨƚŚĞĨƌĞĞ
white men and women, and of their children, cannot, and will not, eat and drink, and lie down, and 
rise up with the black labor of slaves ?ĨƌĞĞǁŚŝƚĞƐǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞĚĞŐƌĂĚĞĚďǇƐƵĐŚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?192EŝůĞƐ ?
Weekly Register ?ĂƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶ “ĂƐƐĞƌƚ ĚďǇƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
papers that the speech was substantially at least, prepared at Albany by the partizans of Governor 
tƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?193  The speech had a dual purpose.  It established a rhetorical tactic which could be used to 
ĂƌŐƵĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŝŵŵƵŶĞƚŽƚŚĞƌĂĐŝƐƚďĂƐŝƐŽĨĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨƚŚĞĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?
but was also a method of striking against the Hunker faction in New York.  The Hunkers supported 
ƚŚĞWŽůŬĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶtŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?tƌŝŐŚƚ ?Ɛ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ<ŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶƚŝ-extensionist rhetoric was a measure of striking back.  But 
whatever his intentions on, they were rendered irrelevant when Wright died of a heart attack in 
1847.  His death changed the direction of the New York Democratic Party. 
 
     It had a profound impact on the development of Barnburner rhetoric.  A masterful politician, self-
sacrificing party man and spectacular orator, Wright had been one of those politicians of the 19th 
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century who was loved by his followers with great emotion.  Manoeuvring had begun in 1846 to 
make Wright the 1848 Democratic nominee by anti-extentionist Democrats, who considered him a 
martyr as a result of the 1846 election.194  His death left New York Barnburners bereft of their 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌŝƚĞůĞĂĚĞƌ ?DĂŶǇďĞĐĂŵĞĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚƌĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŚĂĚĐĂƵƐĞĚtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐŚĞĂƌƚ
attack.  The state party convention held at Syracuse that year became the setting of a savage 
showdown.  Hunkers blocked discussion of the Wilmot Proviso.  Amidst the mutual recriminations 
that followed, an anti-extentionist pleaded with the delegates to remember Silas Wright, and to do 
ŚŝŵũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?,ƵŶŬĞƌƌĞƉůŝĞĚ “/ƚŝƐƚŽŽůĂƚĞ PŚĞŝƐĚĞĂĚ ? ?ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚ:ĂŵĞƐtĂĚƐǁŽƌƚŚƐƉŽŬĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ĂƌŶďƵƌŶĞƌĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶŚĞƌĞƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚ “dŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŵĂǇďĞƚŽŽůĂƚĞƚŽĚŽũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŽ^ŝůĂƐtƌŝŐŚƚ ?ŝƚŝƐ
not too late to do justice to his aƐƐĂƐƐŝŶƐ ? ?195  Under the leadership of John Van Buren, son of the 
former President, the Barnburners organised an opposing state convention at Herkimer.  The 
rhetoric they employed openly recognised divisions which had developed within the party.  John Van 
Buren, in his address to the convention, specifically attacked the Syracuse convention.  He began by 
reasserting the majoritarian philosophy of the radical wing of the New York Democratic Party, 
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ? “dŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁŚŝĐŚůŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇof the democratic faith but of 
representative republican government, is the faithful reflection by the representative of the will of 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚ ?196 ĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ? “ƐŚĂŵĞĨƵůůǇǀŝŽůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞ^ǇƌĂĐƵƐĞ
ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?197  Candidates that were ƚŚĞ “ĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨĂŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉĂƌƚǇ ?ǁĞƌĞ
deprived of a nomination by this base betrayal of the popular will on the part of those who were 
ĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝƚ ?ĐůĂŝŵĞĚsĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂĐĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞ,ƵŶŬĞƌƐŽĨƐĞĂƚŝŶŐĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐ ?
 “ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ǁŚŽŵƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨďƌŝďĞƌǇĂŶĚĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ? ?198  This rhetoric 
closely mirrors an article run by the Albany Atlas ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ “ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĚĞĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?
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ĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĂƚƚŚĞůĂƚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?199  The divisions in that election, 
the Atlas ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ǁĞƌĞĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ “ŚĂǀŝŶŐŵĞŶŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇǁŚŽǁĞƌ ŶŽƚŽĨŝƚ ? ?200  In his Herkimer 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐsĂŶƵƌĞŶĞĐŚŽĞĚƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚ ?ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌĞŐŽŝŶŐ
resolutions, which the Syracuse Convention refused to adopt, is one which it is the duty of the New 
zŽƌŬĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇƚŽĂǀŽǁĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ? ?201  sĂŶƵƌĞŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĂůƐŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŶĞǁĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?/Ŷ
particular, the actions of the South were openly identified as contradicting Jeffersonian Democratic 
principles, and the position of anti-extensionism was identified as one of those principles; 
 “ZĞƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?sic] by force to the application of the Jeffersonian ordinance of 1787, which interdicted 
existing slavery, to other and free territories, has been intimated to be the general purpose of the 
^ŽƵƚŚ ? ?202  The Syracuse convention provided evidence of a new rhetorical strategy that was 
emerging in response to slavery.  Used initially by the Barnburners, this rhetoric established a 
politically viable lĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?Ɛ
expansion.  But the language that Barnburners used clearly set the issue in a context of internal state 
disputes between factions of the Democratic Party.   
 
     The Herkimer Convention resolved to send an opposing delegation to the 1848 Democratic 
National Convention in opposition to the delegation organised by Hunkers at the Syracuse 
Convention.203  The arrival of two separate delegations from New York concerned the national Party, 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐŚŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞEĞǁzŽƌŬĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇƉŽƐĞĚĂƐĞǀĞƌĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
presidential campaign.  In an effort to mollify the Barnburner faction, the convention agreed to split 
EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ƵŶŬĞƌĨĂction.  But when the Convention nominated 
Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, the Barnburners walked out.  Returning to New York, they organised 
under a new aegis  W Free-Soil.  The Free-Soil Party Convention, held at Buffalo, used rhetoric that 
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would provide a framework for future politicised anti-slavery language.  The convention was a highly 
bi-partisan affair.  Several prominent New York Whigs spoke at the Convention, including 
Congressmen Erastus D. Culver and Joseph L. White.  Free Soil rhetoric emphasised bi-partisanship, a 
theme absent from the rhetoric of major parties over the previous two decades.  Democrat Judge 
:ĂŵĞƐt ?EǇĞŽĨDĂĚŝƐŽŶŽƵŶƚǇĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ŝĨǁĞĂƌĞǁƌŽŶŐŽŶƚŚĞdĂƌŝĨ ?sic], it can be righted 
in twelve hours.  If we are wrong on Banks, it can be righted in legislation.  But if we are wrong on 
ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?ŝƚĐĂŶŶĞǀĞƌďĞƌŝŐŚƚĞĚ ? ?204  This bi-partisanship was expressed in profoundly 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?tŚŝƚĞĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ŵǇĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚĂƚƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞtŚŝŐĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĂŶĚĨŽr 
tŚŝŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ QƵƚ/ĂŵŚĞƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĨŝŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚŝƐŐƌĞĂƚŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ
upon which, as a man of Northern birth and Northern education, but of national views, I have always 
ƐƚŽŽĚ ? ?205  Both Whigs and Democrats attacked their opposition within their own parties.  Nye, 
ĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ,ƵŶŬĞƌƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĞǇ “ŚĂĚŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŝƚůĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ
ĞǀŝůƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ ? ?206  tŚŝƚĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? “ƚŚĞtŚŝŐWĂƌƚǇ QŚĂƐĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚŝƚƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ Q
its principles have bĞĞŶĚŝƐĐĂƌĚĞĚ ? ?207  Again and again, in explicitly sectional terms, the Convention 
attacked the South.  It used rhetoric designed to present anti-slavery in as the cause of white 
Americans, for the benefit of white Americans.  Erastus Culver argued that the South acted as a 
threat to the prosperity of the North.   
,ĂǀĞǇŽƵŶŽƚƐĞĞŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐůĂǀĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĂůǁĂǇƐĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚŽƵƌŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? QtŚĞŶ
they said bank, we had a bank. If they said Tarif [sic], we had a Tarif [sic]. And if they said no 
Tarif [sic], the Tarif [sic] was gone in a twinkling. When the factories were all going, and the 
factory girls making lots of money, and our farmers making money, and everything going on 
prosperously here at the North, the slaveholders said we must stop this. Those Yankees are 
going on too fast. They are becoming too rich and powerful, and they brushed away your 
prosperity as a housewife brushes a cobweb from the ceiling of a room. 
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Free Soil stressed bi-partisan support for anti-extension measures and identified the slave holding 
south as its opposition.  By doing so the Party adapted old rhetorical strategies that focused on 
threat identification and economic insecurity to the process of developing a competitive third party. 
 
     The convention made virtually no mention of the inhumane nature of slavery.  Morality was 
discussed in terms which stressed the threat slavery posed to white virtue.  The convention was 
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇĐůĞƌŐǇŵĞŶ ?ǁŚŽŐĂǀĞƉƌĂǇĞƌƐǁŚŝĐŚĚĞŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĞ “ƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐŝŶŝƋƵŝƚǇŽĨ
holding thousanĚƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇ ?ďǇ'ŽĚ ?ŝŶďŽŶĚĂŐĞ ? ?ƵƚůŝƚƚůĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƉĂŝĚƚŽƚŚĞ
actual suffering of African Americans.  Instead the Free Soil movement developed rhetoric focusing 
on sectional hostility, arguing that the South had compromised the rights ŽĨƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ ? “A Virginian 
thinks the Constitution is a great jug with the handle all on the Southern side.  And when you ask 
them to look on our side of the jug to see if there are not some guaranties there, they raise the cry 
of interference or dissoluƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƵůǀĞƌ ?208  Another new element in Free-Soil 
rhetoric was its reference to the Declaration of Independence.  Democratic Attorney for the 
Southern-ŝƐƚƌŝĐƚŽĨEĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ĞŶũĂŵŝŶ&ƌĂŶŬůŝŶƵƚůĞƌ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ “ĐĂŶĂŶǇ QĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ me 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƐĞƚƐŽƵƚǁŝƚŚĂĨĂůƐĞŚŽŽĚ Q ? ?209  Free-Soil rhetoric at the 
Buffalo convention adopted many themes and methods of abolition rhetoric.  It joined these with 
rhetoric that laid bare the hostility existing between factions of the major New York Parties.  It was 
remarkably effective; John Adams Dix, the Free Soil candidate for Governor, took 26.7% of the vote 
(122, 889), beating his Hunker opponent to third place by a margin of 6078 votes.210But Hamilton 
Fish, the Whig candidate, swept the state with 218, 776 votes, providing Democrats with a sharp 
reminder of the cost of intra-party division at the polls.211However Free-Soil rhetoric had shown that 
it was possible to approach the issue of slavery on political grounds that were defensible from 
accusations of social radicalism. 
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     The successes of Free-Soil rhetoric and the importance of the slavery question to the people of 
New York could not overcome doubts the 1848 election defeats impressed upon the Democratic 
Party.  Party rhetoric shifted to focus on the necessity for urgent reunification.  The 1849 New York 
^ƚĂƚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŚĞůĚĂƚZŽŵĞƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ “sincerely desirous of union with all 
ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŚĞƌĞƚŽĨŽƌĞĂĐƚĞĚŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨĞůůŽǁƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚĚƌĞw the attention of New York 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽƌĂďůĞ “ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĚŝvision and alienation, as well upon the great 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƐĐĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ? ?212  This was the 
beginning of what would become a common theme of Democratic rhetoric until the outbreak of the 
Civil War  W calls for party unity on the basis of preservation of the Union, and denunciation of 
agitation of the slavery question.  Free-Soilers had  
demanded, as the condition of union, the distinct adoption of an extreme abstract position, 
unknown in the past action of the Democratic Party, unnecessary in any view of its future 
action, not demanded by any great public exigency, not required even if not objected to, to 
prevent the extension of slavery, but widely objected to at the North and at the South, as 
productive only of intestine evil and sectional agitation, and pernicious in its fruits upon the 
unity of the Democracy and the integrity of the Union.213 
 
The 1849 convention went on to categorisĞƚŚŝƐĚĞŵĂŶĚĂƐ ? “ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
Free-Soilers were attempting, with their third party activity, combination with Whigs and hostility to 
Democratic electoral tickets, to hold the party to ransom.214  The Convention rejected the notion 
tŚĂƚƚŚĞƐůĂǀĞƌǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŚĂĚĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶĂ “ƚĞƐƚŽĨĨĂŝƚŚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇ ?dŚĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ
then hit its stride, wheeling out traditional Democratic rhetoric attacks to face the anti-slavery 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? “dŚĞ^ůĂǀĞƌǇŐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĂƉĂƌƚǇŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŵĂy be said to have had its origin in the 
,ĂƌƚĨŽƌĚŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĞZŽŵĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?215  It argued the entire anti-slavery movement 
was the scion of federalism, synonymous with treason, and designed to achieve nothing more than 
the destruction of democracy through the overthrow of the Democratic Party.  The Convention then 
ƌĞĨƵƚĞĚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ:ĞĨĨĞƌƐŽŶĞǀĞƌŚĂĚĂŶǇĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůĞƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?ĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ “ƚŚĞ
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ĨĞĚĞƌĂůƉĂƌƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚŚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚƚŽĐĂůůƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁŚŝŐƐ ?ŽĨĂůůǇŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ “ĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƐ
ŽĨďŽƚŚƐĞǆĞƐ ?ŝŶĂƚŚŝŶůǇǀĞŝůĞĚĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽƐĞǆƵĂůƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ?216  These themes would become 
the basis for New York Democratic rhetorical efforts to maintain unity in the face of growing 
agitation of the anti-slavery cause.  This rhetoric combined appeals to party loyalty with appeals to 
prejudice and hostility toward the abolition movement and calls to maintain the Union in the face of 
their unnecessary agitation of an issue which presented a clear threat to it. 
     These efforts were assisted by the passage of the Compromise Act of 1850.  Forced through 
Congress by the wiles of Stephen Douglas, Democratic Senator from Illinois, this series of bills was 
designed to halt debate of the slavery question.  The Compromise was the saviour of Democratic 
unity  W it allowed the Party to argue that the issue was closed.  For the Whig Party, however, it 
served only to intensify pre-existing divisions.  Seward and his faction were outraged by the 
Compromise.  He denounced the Compromise in terms which built upon the rhetoric of the New 
York anti-slavery movement, but also laid down broader terms which would be developed by anti-
slavery rhetoric in the future.  Slavery was only one of many institutions in the United States argued 
^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ďƵƚ “Ĩreedom is equally an institution there. Slavery is only a temporary, accidental, partial, 
and incongruous one. Freedom, on the contrary, is a perpetual, organic, universal one, in harmony 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?217  dŚĞŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŝůůŐĂǀĞ “complete ascendency in 
the slave states, and in the Constitution of the United States, to the subordinate, accidental, and 
ŝŶĐŽŶŐƌƵŽƵƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŽǀĞƌŝƚƐƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚ ? ?218  It was here Seward spoke the words that 
would reshape thought regarding slavery and its expansion. 
There is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, 
and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part, of 
the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the universe. We 
are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust as to secure in the highest attainable 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŚĞŝƌŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ QEŽǁƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞ ?ďŽůĚ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶĂǁĨƵůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ
itself to us is this: Shall we, who are founding institutions, social and political, for countless 
millions; shall we, who know by experience the wise and the just, and are free to choose 
them, and to reject the erroneous and unjust; shall we establish human bondage, or permit 
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it by our sufferance to be established? Sir, our forefathers would not have hesitated an hour. 
They found slavery existing here, and they left it only because they could not remove it. 
There is not only no free state which would now establish it, but there is no slave state, 
which, if it had had the free alternative as we now have, would have founded slavery.219 
 
dŚŝƐǁĂƐ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ,ŝŐŚĞƌ>ĂǁƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚŚĞǁĂƐďƌĂŶĚĞĚďǇŚŝƐĚĞƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƐĂĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ
ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƉůĂĐĞĚŚŝŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀe faction of the New York Whig 
WĂƌƚǇƚŚĂƚďǇŶŽǁŚĂĚďĞĞŶůĂďĞůůĞĚ “^ĞǁĂƌĚŝƚĞ ? ?ĐůĞĂƌůǇĂŶĚŝƌƌĞǀŽĐĂďůǇŝŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
expansion of slavery.  The conservative faction of the party, meanwhile, became increasingly 
dedicated to avoiding the issue by whatever means necessary.  At the 1850 Whig State convention 
ŚĞůĚĂƚ^ǇƌĂĐƵƐĞ ?tĞĞĚĂŶĚ^ĞǁĂƌĚĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐƉĂƐƐĞĚƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
and upheld the principles of the Wilmot Proviso.  Unable to condone the language of the 
Convention, the conservative faction walked out.220  A meeting of conservative Whigs from the City 
ŽĨZŽĐŚĞƐƚĞƌƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ǁĞĚĞĞƉůǇůĂŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐǁĞƚƌƵƐƚ ?ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ
the Whig party of this State, caused by the extraordinary action of the majority in the Syracuse 
ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚůĞŶƚŝƚƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽĂĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞtŚŝŐƐƚŽďĞŚĞůĚŝŶhƚŝĐĂŝŶ
opposition.221  In 1851 Whig Governor John Young expressed opposition to the Sewardites using 
ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨƵƚĞĚ^ĞǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ,ŝŐŚĞƌ>ĂǁƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ƚhere is a law higher than all 
human law. In the abstract, this is a truth which is not to be gainsaid. But in its practical adaptation 
to human affairs, such a proposition would be found subversive of order, and all human 
government. /ƚǁŽƵůĚďƌŝŶŐƵƉŽŶƵƐĂŶĂƌĐŚǇ ? ?222  The Party attempted to reunite the following year 
on the common ground of support for canal extensions, but similarly to the Democratic Party in 
1847 and 1848, it was unable to end the bitter feelings which internecine strife had created.  Slavery 
had become an issue the major Parties in New York were finding impossible to find common ground 
on which could defuse the internal disputes it was creating.   
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     The rhetorical strategies of the 1830s and 1840s that had lent the parties strength and identity as 
a product of the interparty hostility on which they thrived were very destructive when turned 
inwards.  The pro-conciliation forces of conservative Whigs and Hunker Democrats faced a severe 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇzŽƵŶŐ ? “The whole North, in feeling, is opposed to slavery; we are taught 
from infancy to oppose it, and when the South asks us to think and feel with her, she asks what she 
ŚĂƐŶŽƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĞǆƉĞĐƚ ? ?223  Although Young immediately qualified this remark with the argument 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚŚĂĚ “ĂƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƐŬƚŚĂƚǁĞƐŚĂůůůĞĂǀĞŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĞŶũŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂůůŚĞƌƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?ŚĞŚĂĚ
struck upon the key reason that internal division within the state parties could not continue 
indefinitely.224  The rhetorical methods of both the Whigs and the Democrats hinged on two major 
principles; first the legitimisation of party principles and action through their definition as reflections 
of the popular will of the people of the state.  Second, the total refusal, relentlessly stressed in that 
rŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?ƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŽƌƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽ
enjoy.  This had been the basis for Whig and Democratic rhetoric regarding the Bank, the 
Depression, nativism, state credit, the constitutional reform movement, and every other major issue 
the state had faced in the past two decades.  The rhetorical methods of both parties meant that they 
were going to be forced to reach a consensus on the issue of slavery if they were going to continue 
as parties in their established forms. 
     What finally forced this consensus was the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854.  The Act 
was denounced by a majority of the Northern electorate.  It repealed the Missouri Compromise, a 
move which enraged the North, appearing as it did the coup de grace in a long series of insulting 
political acts which overtly favoured the South and slavery.  In New York, spontaneous Anti-
Nebraska meetings swept the state, brewing up in Rochester, Lockport, Skaneateles, Oswegatchie, 
Penn Yan, Baldwinsville, Auburn, Albion, Cherry Valley, Hornellsville, Randolph, Albany, Oswego and 





even New York City, previously a bastion of the conservative Whigs.225  Whig congressmen from New 
York all opposed the Act.  On the Democratic side thirteen Congressmen joined the Solitary Free-Soil 
representative from the state to vote in the negative, leaving 10 Democrats in favour, half of whom 
came from New York City.226  Those were men such as Mike Walsh, whose constituents 
disproportionately came from Irish American Communities whose hatred for African Americans had 
made them virtually the only groups in New York who made no public denunciations of Kansas-
Nebraska.   
 
     Slavery has commonly been seen as an issue which swept into state politics in the 1840s, 
profoundly destabilising and then eradicating previous party distinctions; it shattered established 
party structures in New York in 1854.  However, those structures were already split by 
unmanageable divisions.  The most apt analogy is that of an apparently solid block of stone, riven 
throughout with deep fractures.  It only required a single, forceful blow to shatter the block; the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act provided that blow.  These fractures had developed over the previous two 
decades, in part because of the tide of events and changes that confronted New York in that period, 
but also, substantially, owing to the rhetorical strategies that New York politicians used to confront 
and manage those events and changes.  The rhetoric they employed increasingly stressed partisan 
loyalty to be expressed through dedication to ever more inflexible political principles.  This made the 
originally wide and accommodating umbrella identities of the major parties increasing cramped and 
confined.  It created intense bitterness among politicians who were unable, or at least unhappy, 
about passing party tests of loyalty on issues such as the Independent Treasury Act, the Specie 
Circular, support for nativism and reform of naturalisation laws.  These divisions were never really 
healed  W they were papered over in order to affect unity for the sake of elections.  Intra-party 
conflict became increasingly acrimonious, but the politicians of both parties had no-where else to 
go.  It was not possible, in the democratised, mass political environment of New York in the Second 
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Party Era, to achieve meaningful political success as an independent politician.  As such, control of 
party identity was contested throughout the whole period. 
     dŚĞĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĞǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇŽĨƚŚĞƐe struggles.  Not needing 
popularity to ensure its survival, it nevertheless had to develop an argument which it could use to 
sway a hostile population to its way of thinking.  To do this, it closely mimicked mainstream political 
rhetoric, but, in crucial ways, it adapted it to better suit its aims.  Anti-slavery rhetoric argued that 
slavery was an inherent moral evil, and a threat to the virtue of the American Republic.  This was 
similar to a common rhetorical method used by the major parties, of identifying a threat to public 
virtue, or democratic institutions, and claiming that they were acting to arrest its effects on 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?>ŝŬĞƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?ĂŶƚŝ-slavery rhetoric stressed the need for 
collective action against this threat, in terms that closely resembled the attitudes of communal 
responsibility stressed by the Evangelical revivals that were popular in upstate New York.  Again, in 
similar terms to the rhetoric of the major parties, abolitionists stressed that their aims were not 
radical but were founded upon principles of moral conservatism and a desire to preserve American 
liberties and institutions.  The movement harnessed the hostility of sections of the public and major 
parties opposed to it, citing these as evidence of the threat slavery posed to freedom of speech and 
democratic processes.  The rhetoric of the movement developed the view that the slaveholding 
South was using threats and engaging in political actions which were designed to compromise the 
democratic processes of the nation to the expense of the North.  This theory would eventually 
ĞǀŽůǀĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ “ƐůĂǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶWĂƌƚǇŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƵƚŵŽƐƚ
importantly, the abolition movement used the Declaration of Independence, as opposed to the 
Constitution, to justify and legitimise its aims.  They combined references to that document with 
moralistic assertions of the natural law and the inherent rights of man which invoked religion in a 
way that sought to link Christianity with the American system of government.  It was not the United 
States that gave men their rights; God had given them freedom, and by adhering to democratic 
principles Americans were expressing their dedication not only to liberty, but to Christianity.  This 
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reasoning provided the abolition movement with a viable alternative rhetorical method to that 
which was used by the major parties. 
     By 1848, when the Free-Soil movement emerged, the abolition movement had already laid  
extensive groundwork for the rhetorical methods that that party could adopt.  The Constitutional 
Convention of 1846 had reduced the significance of the differences between the two parties in 
terms of economic theory.  Free Soil identified slavery as the major threat to the liberties of New 
Yorkers, and by doing so was able to defy established conventions of Party alliances.  At the Free Soil 
Conventions held at Utica and Buffalo, the radical Wing of the Democratic Party allied itself with the 
progressive wing of the Whig Party in opposition to slavery.  Their motives were varied  W ambition, 
genuine desire to effect reform, and the desire for vengeance upon political rivals.  But the rhetoric 
they developed completely altered the Party alignments of New York.  Doing away with reliance 
upon unanimity of view on all issues to define the party, the Free Soilers openly, and happily, 
confessed to internal division on all manner of subjects.  What they stressed was their unity in the 
face of the threat of slavery, and the bi-partisan nature of their party.  Free-Soilers developed their 
party identity based on broad principles relating to American liberties, particularly freedom, and 
focussed themselves around opposition to slavery, with freedom of expression on other issues.  
Although the Free-Soil Party did not last, it changed the conceptions of those who participated in the 
movement.  During the political upheavals caused by the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas 
Nebraska Act of 1854, the Free-^ŽŝůŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐĂĐǇǁĂƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂďŝ-partisan party 
as a viable possibility.  That possibility would be realised in the Republican Party, and would bring an 









     The political rhetoric of New York during the Second Party System represents a debate over the 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĂŐƌĞĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨǁŚĂƚ
American society should provide  W a society of egalitarian values that championed the political and 
legal rights of the individual.  However they disagreed fundamentally on how to achieve this.  The 
real key to understanding this dialogue lies in the fact that they knew the nation was developing 
rapidly.  The huge changes taking place during the Second Party Era, demographically, socially and 
economically, created intense anxiety that the United States was losing its way  W that republican 
virtue was being sacrificed on the altar of prosperity, or twisted out of shape by new social 
influences.  This was a dialogue that included both elites and members of the middle classes, and so 
was broader than that of the Revolutionary Era.  Democrats and Whigs argued that legislative action 
must conform to the popular will of The People  W the will of the majority.  New York parties 
contested elections with rhetoric that argued that representatives were expected to represent the 
will of their constituents, as opposed to being elected to lead them.  They developed rhetorical 
strategies that stressed conservatism, defence of American liberties from identifiable threats, and 
the communication of clearly defined political philosophies which established broad umbrella 
identities.  These identities were political vehicles designed to allow politicians representing a wide 
spectrum of interests to unite as one political body at the ballot box.  The rhetoric they used pushed 
egalitarianism into the centre of political debate; conflict over defining the process by which 
egalitarianism would be achieved created intense intra-party stress which eventually led to the 
breakdown of the second party system  W a remarkable irony considering that the aim of the rhetoric 
of the era was to build and maintain political coalitions. 
     Parties sought to develop identities which could be adopted by individual New Yorkers as aspects 
of their own.  In order to do so, they used rhetoric that could be easily understood and was 
appealing to individual New Yorkers.  This appeal was based upon the way in which individual New 
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Yorkers interpreted the changes they saw developing all around them as either positive or negative 
influences on their lives.  Democrats, suspicious of the new credit system and market orientated 
economy, stressed that egalitarianism could only be achieved and protected through the principles 
of a negative state doctrine  W that the best defence against encroachments on personal liberty was a 
restrained and largely inactive government.   Whig rhetoric argued for a harmonious society that 
would create widespread prosperity.  Their positive state doctrine posited that the state had a 
responsibility to play an active role in developing prosperity and ensuring the public welfare  W that 
the best way to ensure egalitarianism was for the state to protect industry and promote 
opportunity.   Both parties embraced economic change and development.  The wealth of the United 
States encouraged confidence in the idea that it was possible for all members of society to share in 
its prosperity.  However the major parties approached this in different ways.  The difference was 
that while Whigs believed that egalitarianism would be achieved by augmenting this process to 
create greater opportunity, Democrats argued that government withdrawal from the economy 
would lead to greater opportunity for individuals to participate in it.  
     The way in which Whigs and Democrats presented these arguments to the public lent heavily on 
the glorification of democratic processes.  Parties sought to recast the terms in which Americans 
understood the legitimacy of legislative power.  Before 1828, politicians had been expected to lead 
the people.  They were selected on the basis of intellectual superiority to the greater body of the 
electorate.  Politicians in the first party system were expected to ascertain the greater good of the 
entire American community and implement policy which would make that greater good a concrete 
reality, even if this meant sacrificing some of the interests of their section.  It was in the spirit of this 
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ:ŽŚŶYƵŝŶĐǇĚĂŵƐǁĂƌŶĞĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚďĞŝŶŐ “ƉĂůƐŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞǁŝůůŽĨŽƵƌ
consƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƐ ? ?227  Over the course of the 1830s both parties abandoned this attitude.  They instead 
presented their ideas as the will of the electorate at large, and claimed that popular opinion was the 
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legitimisation of all their legislative decisions.  They accused their opponents of attempting to 
subvert or manipulate public opinion, and sought to cast them as aristocratic, anti-democratic, and 
hostile to the liberties of individual Americans.  This rhetorical tactic was repeated again and again.  
Parties identified threats to liberty; the BUS, immigration, Freemasonry, Alcohol, political corruption, 
and claimed that their party stood arrayed against it defence of the liberties of New Yorkers.  In turn 
they accused their opponents of being complicit in this threat, either through the results of their 
policies, or through deliberate efforts to subvert the democratic process. 
     These threats were effective because Americans were deeply concerned about the direction in 
which their nation was headed.  As the United States reached into the future, it kept constantly 
referred to the Revolutionary past, although the figures that politicians invoked became less and less 
clearly related with their aims.  Few of the Founding Fathers would have been able to stomach the 
wild democracy in which the Whig and Democratic Parties revelled.  New Yorkers watched as 
institutions developed in around them that, along with huge concentrations of wealth, would have 
been unimaginable to the previous generation.  Political rhetoric directed these anxieties toward 
threats to the egalitarianism which Americans were convinced was constantly under threat.  
Politicians cast these threats as noxious to the egalitarianism and democracy, and their opponents as 
therefore being engaged in a deliberate attempt to subvert democracy.  From a modern point of 
view this seems hyperbolic, but the United States was not yet a cynical nation.  Popular interest in 
politics was high during the Second Party Era, and several political movements, such as Free 
Masonry, developed from grassroots, or, like abolition, struggled on in defiance of intense and 
violent opposition. 
     A natural result of this was an increase in the role that popular interests and prejudices played in 
political rhetoric.  New York went through social, economic and demographic changes during the 
Second Party Era, which created new, and intensified old, interests, rivalries and prejudices.  New 
York politicians played on these prejudices and rivalries in order to build political identities for their 
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parties with which they could unite the varied and fractious factions in New York.  Both the Whig 
and Democratic Parties were coalitions of politicians of varying economic and political philosophies, 
and more importantly, priorities.  Thus this was a complex effort, necessitating the two parties to 
balance their rhetoric between the interests of numerous, sometimes hostile groups.  However 
when done successfully, they were able to gain the support of large sections of the electorate.  
Democrats gained the support of the immigrant community, and the successful amalgamation of the 
Adams Republicans and Anti-Masons into the Whig Party lent them the support of those groups.  
Through the development of broad political principles which they argued defined ƚŚĞŝƌWĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ
definitions of egalitarian governance, parties developed political identities which were synonymous 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŚŽƉĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĨĞĂƌƐ ? 
     dŚĞƉŽůĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶment led to intense 
partisanship between them.  Rhetoric that stressed certain principles as vital to fostering an 
egalitarian state was used to differentiate the party from its opponents, principles they argued were 
synonymous with American liberties, and as such with the entire American way of life.  However as a 
ƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶǁĂǇŽĨĐĂƐƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞďƵƚ
unfounded or unwise opinion, but by being actively engaged in attempting to subvert democracy.  
While allowing scope for rhetoric that could incite great interest, participation and passion for 
politics, this method had the intrinsic weakness of being untenable if used indefinitely.  Each issue 
the parties faced  W the election of Andrew Jackson, the Bank War, the Depression, the 1846 
convention and the Kanasas-Nebraska Act to name the most critical  W became tests of party 
orthodoxy.  These tests were not always set by the parties themselves  W the Locofoco challenge 
during the mid 1830s is an example of a faction of a party forcing a question of orthodoxy upon the 
majority.  Regardless, they did become tests, and the high stakes that were set by their rhetoric - 
accusations that opponents were stupid at best and treasonous at worst - led to parties with 
increasingly inflexible political identities. 
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     These identities were conservative.  They stressed defence of individual freedom, economic 
opportunity and social egalitarianism.  The Whig Party argued that it was attempting to protect the 
electorate from excessive executive power, and promoting economic opportunity.  The Democratic 
Party argued that it was defending the people from an overly powerful and overactive central 
government.  In conveying these ideas to the public, both parties language stressed conservative 
values.  Politicians spoke of preservation and accused their opponents of radicalism.  They routinely 
employed religious references, developing the idea that their aims were in keeping with the 
maintenance of a virtuous Christian republic.  And in particular, they constantly related their ideas to 
those of the Founding Fathers, developing the idea the party philosophy developing the idea of the 
party philosophy as being a continuation of the purposes of the Revolutionary generation.  Through 
these efforts, the parties sought to recast popular conceptions of how American liberties were 
supposed to be applied to society and politics in favour of their own policy agendas.  However the 
legislation and rhetorical strategies of both parties was radical by comparison to that of the previous 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh^ ?ƚŚĞŚƵŐĞƌŽůĞƚŚĂƚEĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉůĂǇĞĚŝŶŝƚƐ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚWĂƌƚǇƌĂ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂƐƚĚĞďƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŵĂƐƐĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞtŚŝŐ ?Ɛ
ascendancy in the late 1830s were all unprecedented.  More than anything the democracy and 
ĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨEĞǁzŽƌŬ ?Ɛ^ĞĐŽŶĚWĂƌƚǇ
era was a radical shift from the sober republicanism of the Revolutionary Era.  But Whigs and 
Democrats clothed these actions as consistent with the vision of the Founding Fathers.  As the world 
changed rapidly and unpredictably all around them, and as they responded in unpredictable ways, 
politicians debated the issues of the day and relentlessly insisted that everything was going 
according to plan. 
     The parties of the Second Party Era engaged in a competitive definition of rhetoric.  This was a 
process by which the actions and positions of one party played a definitive role in the establishment 
ŽĨƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇďĞŐĂŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐWĂƌƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ
first time conducted a campaign aimed to gain the support of new voters who had recently gained 
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the suffrage during the democratisation of the political process of the 1820s.  Over the course of the 
1830s, Democrats discovered and employed certain rhetorical strategies that they found effective in 
mobilising voters.  The Bank War of the 1830s provided an example of these new strategies.  The 
Democrats identified a threat to the state and the nation  W the BUS  W and directed their rhetoric 
against it.  Through attacking the BUS, they defined their political identity more clearly by 
establishing broad principles upon which that identity was based.  This process of definition was 
made easier because the Bank was such a conservative institution  W it allowed the Democrats to 
present radical ideas, such as the removal of the federal deposits and constitutional criticisms of the 
bank as moderate, conservative attitudes by comparison.  In addition, Democrats pioneered populist 
electioneering techniques, using mass meetings and marches designed to invigorate and excite the 
electorate.  The Whigs eventually mimicked and developed upon these methods in the 1840 
election, aĚĚŝŶŐƐůŽŐĂŶƐ ?ƐŽŶŐƐĂŶĚƐǇŵďŽůŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ “ůŽŐĐĂďŝŶĂŶĚŚĂƌĚĐŝĚĞƌ ?
campaigning.  Interest group adoption was another way in which the two parties engaged in 
competitive definition.  For example the Democratic Party courted the immigrant vote, appealing to 
Catholics with claims they sought to defend religious liberty and opposition to temperance laws and 
attempts to increase naturalisation periods.  The Whig Party in turn employed rhetoric which 
courted temperance and nativist movements which had been alienated by pro-immigrant 
Democratic rhetoric.  The confluence of these two phenomena; mimicry of  electioneering and 
rhetorical techniques and polarising rhetoric based on appeals to groups alienated by the 
opposition, resulted in an odd evolution of rhetoric. Whilst using the same methods, and promoting 
the same liberties, the parties developed increasingly polarised and incompatible political 
philosophies, which helped to differentiate them from each other.  However it also put the party 
cohesion under increasing amounts of stress, as rhetoric was refined to maintain the support of such 
a wide spectrum of supporters whose attitudes toward salient issues often clashed. 
     Whigs and Democrats typically embraced rhetoric that could clearly define them from their 
opponents - important, as stated earlier, owing to the great number of similarities that the two 
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parties bore to one another.  However, slavery was divisive in a way which was dangerous.  The issue 
cut across both parties, not in economic or philosophic, but in sectional terms.  The rhetoric of 
division had by 1840 created severe schisms within both parties.  In the Democratic Party, division 
over economic issues that had begun in 1838 had continued in various forms.  By the late 1840s the 
split between the Barnburner and Hunker factions of the party was so ingrained that it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to reunify the party during major elections.  Within the Whig Party, 
by the early 1850s division between the conservative, pro-nativist wing of the Party and the 
progressive wing led by Seward had become comparably irresolvable.  Therefore slavery rhetoric 
exacerbated already barely manageable divisions in state party structure, and could not be adapted 
to the benefit of one party and the expense of another.  In this way slavery rhetoric differed from 
ƚŚĂƚĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇEĂƚŝǀŝƐƚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŽĨƚĞŶƐƚŽůĞŶďǇƚŚĞtŚŝŐƐ ?ĂŶĚtŽƌŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?
rhetoric, which was often stolen by the Democrats.  However in 1847, the Barnburner faction of the 
New York Democratic Party, employed anti-slavery rhetoric in terms that established their 
philosophy as anti-extensionist rather than abolitionist, thereby avoiding the stigma of dangerous 
social radicalism attached to abolition.  This rhetoric, adapted from established rhetorical strategies 
developed by the New York abolition movement, was popular enough to enable disgruntled 
members of both the Whig and Democratic Parties to unite within the Free-Soil Party.  Although the 
Free-Soil Party was short lived, it had shown New York politicians that there was an acceptable way 
to approach the slavery issue. So, many politicians were unwilling in 1854 to resist the explosive 
opposition to the Kansas Nebraska Act.  It was this response, coming at a time of great stress within 
the existing party structures that induced New York politicians to break from their existing parties to 
form a new identity. 
     dŚƵƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶƐŚĂƚƚĞƌĞĚ ?dŚĞďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶƚŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ
was not the result simply of destructive forces  W the Republican Party did not simply rise from the 
ashes created by the slavery debate.   By 1854 both the Whigs and Democrats in New York were 
suffering from internal divisions.  The Whig Party, split between conservatives and the progressives 
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led by Seward, was also being pulled apart by the increasing influence that temperance and nativist 
movements had over the Party.  The Democrats were split by an internal conflict between the 
Barnburner and Hunker factions of the Party which had not healed.  For politicians such as Preston 
King, the leader of the Free Soil faction of New York Democrats in 1854, the slavery agitation offered 
a chance to complete the work of 1848, and found a new party with an identity based upon Free Soil 
principles.  For a Radical Whig like Seward, it offered the opportunity for a powerful position in a 
new party more receptive to having its identity shaped by his political philosophy.  The emergence of 
that new party, fuelled by public hostility to the Nebraska Act, was the result of the rhetorical 
strategies which had been developed over the last two decades.  Bereft of large support within their 
ŽǁŶƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨďŽƚŚtŚŝŐƐĂŶĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶĐĂŵĞƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌŝŶ
response to the success of the Free-Soil and Liberty Movements.  But they established the 
Republican Party in New York on a broader basis than merely opposition to expansion, but also with 
an identity which embraced glorification of free-labour, a rejection of Know-Nothingism and 
economic development and organisation principles already popular in New York.   
     The umbrella identities created by the major parties between 1830 and 1848 were fragile, and 
this fragility became increasingly harder to disguise.  Their desigŶŚŝŶŐĞĚƵƉŽŶƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
construct identities which represented the interests of a diverse cross section of the electorate, in 
pursuit of the support of the 51% of the voting population they needed to maintain power within 
the state.  It was from this necessity that their weakness stemmed; as evidenced by the difficulties 
posed to both parties by well mobilised and organised political movements such as Anti-Rent, 
Temperance and most importantly, Free-Soil, it left their cohesion open to being held hostage by 
ƐƵĚĚĞŶ “ĞǆĐŝƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŶƚŝ-Rentism and Know-Nothingism), in contemporary parlance.  
Throughout the 1830s and 40s, these excitements were accommodated and merged into one or 
more of the parties, but slavery provided an issue which broke party identities both in New York and 
elsewhere, leading to the establishment, first, of the Free-Soil Party, and subsequently the 
Republican Party.  The rhetoric of the Second Party System in New York had been focussed 
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throughout the period on economic issues which divided the two parties.  It offered both distinct 
identities, allowing them to construct the electoral followings which were vital to victory at the 
ballot box.  However by 1854 in New York these identities could no longer serve their purpose.  The 
reason for this was that the key element to political identity was that it resonated with the identity 
of the electorate.  Confronted by slavery, an issue which neither party was able to accommodate 
within their established identities, they broke down, and were replaced by emerging parties which 
were willing to take that issue and place it at the heart of their rhetoric and principles, and present 
those in turn to the electorate.  During the 1830s, broad umbrella identities developed with rhetoric 
that focussed on the parties as institutions acting in defence of liberties, and cast the opposition 
party as hostile to those liberties, had provided a means of uniting large numbers of politicians in 
order to achieve electoral majorities.  During the 1840s these identities became less and less flexible.  
With the decline of economic issues following the 1846 New York Constitutional Convention, the 
parties lost the ability to focus on the economic issues they had previously been able to rally around 
(although in the case of the Democratic Party, this reliability was already in decline).  By 1846 the 
parties were barely holding together against the strain of a decade of increasingly regular internal 
conflict.  Slavery was the issue that broke this tenuous unity, exacerbating pre-existing division 
beyond the point where party coherence could be maintained. The Second Party Era was over in 
New York, destroyed in part by the weaknesses and inflexibility of the rhetorical strategies which it 
had fostered and developed, when confronted with an issue  W slavery - it could not accommodate.  
However slavery was only the final blow  W the Second Party System was already reeling from the 
internal disputes of the Whig and Democratic Parties.  These disputes were exacerbated by the use 
of rhetoric that stressed differences between the two parties.  These differences were stressed in 
order to encourage unity, which was vital to compete in the increasingly organised political 
environment of the mid nineteenth century.  They differentiated Whigs and Democrats sharply, 
despite the fact both parties had much in common  W dedication to egalitarian values and a desire to 
promote prosperity.  Most importantly both embraced the economic changes occurring within the 
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state.  Democrats might have harped on about the effects of the credit system, but they made no 
real effort to inhibit its development  W rather they sought to adjust it to fit more comfortably with 
their political philosophy.  This is was the weakness and irony of the rhetoric of the Second Party Era; 
in order to promote unity, parties stressed the differences between them and their opponents.  
However by casting their opponents as actively seeking to undermine democracy, they reduced the 
flexibility of the political identities they created.  This inflexibility led to increasing amounts of intra-
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